Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1971

Kastigar v. United States
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, Box 368/Folder 18-26

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

rJ.-.H /~/~

fv-.:,

1

L,W

I

(- t u.-

'J
4

'/

,..//. IA-

I/

l,,-

"''

1,,,__

'

... .

I,. ~

.

4 .... ..

--l'--c't

C . r-,v ;__ , ~
,,.f - fA. .Z -.I- •

!

'
'f

l.

0. .,; '\.--

J-r-; --ff ' '~

t~· /J--.~ .• -~
~

I/

I

'"'/"Y- t:t"

(

' .1.-

' .7

:.-i_.,

u..>-t.

1

~

( ,,._ ,

e/J

l1 ~

1~
t-i..~

-

7l .,

- ~ K / ~ v f M , ~ ,.

Uu.

1,/4,<L.~

Uvv..A.-L d , v , ~ ~ : f "/ / {j' 7

r..-

,,
BENCH MEMO
No. 70-117
KASTIGAR AND STEWART
v.
UNITED STATES

Floyd
Cert to CA 9
Federal- -C onte:mpt

Timely

AFFIRM

The Court granted cert to review the decision of CA 9 (Koelsch,
Hufstedler, Trask) (pc) upholding the "use" inununity provisions of the
Organized Grune Control Act of 1970 against the contention that
"transactional" immunity is constitutionally required.

•

Controlling Cases: Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956); Murphy v. Waterfront Cotmnission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 u. s. 273 (1968) •

-

- zQUESTION PRESENTED
·w hether the "use inununity" provisions of the Organized Crime
Cotttrol Act of 1970, which provides that a person under a properly issued
order of a USDC to testify may not refuse to comply with the order on

the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination, but which further
provides that "no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false s tatement,

-

or otherwise failing to comply with the order" are constitutional under the
Fifth Amendm.ent to the Constitution.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment provides in part:
No person • • • shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law ••• 14
The inununity statute involved, which was enacted as part of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, and its enforcement provision provide
(18

-

u. s. c.

§ § 6002, 6003):

§ 6002. Immunity Generally.
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrhnination, to testify or
provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to - -

- 3 -

( 1) a court or grand jury of the United States.
(2) an agency of the United States. or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a sub-conunittee of either House.
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates
to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness
may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testitnony or
other information compelled under the order {or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information) niay be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order. [Emphasis added.]
Court and grand jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may
be called to testify or provide other information at any
proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States
or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district
court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall h•ue, in accordance with subsection (b)
of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney
for such district,. an order requiring such individual to give
testimony or provide other information which he refuses to
give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided
in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval
of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or
any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an order
under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment - (1) the testimony or other infor-mation from.
such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
( Z) such individual has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or· provide other .information on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrinlination.

§ 6003.

-

FACTS

-

Both petrs were sutnmoned to appear and testify before a federal
grand jury in Los Angeles, California on February 4, 1971.

Before being

.

- examined they appeared with counsel before tbe USDC CD Calif (Cary),
where the United States Attorney, who wa• of the view that petr• were
likely to refuae to testify before the grand jury

oD

the basis of their 5th

amendment privllegea, applied for an order requiring them to teatlfy

pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 6003, aupra.

Petra opposed the order on the

grouad, among others, tbat the bmnunity would not be co-ezteneive with
the privilege.

The DC entered the reqaeeted order, and. directed petrs

to "appear forthwith before the grand jury and testify and produce evidence
-1th respect to all matters under Inquiry by the grand ,t.ry." App., pp.

57, 61.
Petr Kaatigar appeared before the grand jury aJld

wa• asked the

following question by the prosecutor:
Mr. Kaatigar., as we told you before, the Grand Jury has
received a great deal of information cODcernblg a altuatloa
in which you ,bad orthodontic braces placed on your teeth
Juat prior to reportin& for military induction and had them
removed j••t after a word by a Dr. Bernard Bender with
office• at 8328 De Soto la Canoaa Park.
oald you tell ua, please, how that came about?
A. (Kasti1ar): t•m sorry, I decliae to say anything about
that OD the baais that my auwer may tend to incriminate
me and on the advice of counaeL
Kaatigar then made it clear that he intended to take the 5th with respect
to all questions concerning that subject. Stewart also refued to answer
questions concerninc his transactions with Dr. Bender on 5th amendment

-

1rounda.

,
\

-

- 5 Thereafter both petrs appeared before the DC and were held te be
in conteinpt after again refusing to answer the questions as directed by

the judge.

They were committed to the custody of the Attorney General

until they should answer or until the term of the Grand Jury expired.
The order was stayed pending appeal to CA 9, which affirmed on March 10,

1971, but stayed execution

or the

judgment pending disposition of the petn

for cert by this Court~

DECISION BELOW
There was no written decision of the DC (Cary).

-

CA 9 (Koelsch.

Hufstedler, Trask) affirmed the judgment of contempt per curiam.

They

reasoned that the grant of "usen bnmunity. as opposed to "transactional"
immunity was constitutional under this Court's decision in M'11'phy v.
Wat.e rfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964),
notwithstanding the earlier decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892), which indicated that transactional imm.unity might be required.

ARGUMENTS
PETITIONERS' ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners first argue that this Court's decisions upholding
transactional inununity are incorrect and should be reconsidered.

They

contend that any kind of statutory immunity "is utterly incmnpatible with

the historic dimeasione and imperatives of the Fifth Anendment Privilege,

-

- 6 as construed and applied by this Court." Petra say that the principles
and objectives of barring coerced confessions are also met by preventing
cOJnpulsory testimony - - the preservation of individual dignity and
judicial integrity.
Petre also contend that transactional immunity is inadequate
because it does not provide protection co-extensive with the fifth
am.enchnent privilege.

The privilege historically has embraced a privilege

against self-infamy, as well as self-incrimination, and this Court's
decision to the contrary in Brown v. Walker,, 161 U.S. 591, should be
reconsidered.

-

Petra further contend that imnmnity should be considered to be
similar to a pardon, and that inasmuch as a pardon can be re used by
an individual, the Court should hold that immunity can only be conferred
on a witness with his consent.
More pertinently, petrs argue that this Court ma.de it clear in
Counaehnan v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), that use immunity was
inadequate to displace the privilege, and that the principle of abselute
imlnunity against future prosecution for all offenses to which the

compelled testimony relates has prevailed ever since as the standard
for all Federal immunity statutes.

The decision in Murphy v. Waterfront

Commis•ion, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), which concluded that one jurisdiction

-

(state) could compel testimony if that testimony or its fruits could not be

-

- 7 -

used in another (federal) must be taken "in context.

11

Apparently they

mean that the standards which will be applied in the context of accommodating the interests of state and federal governments mu•t be different
than the standards within a particular juri•diction.
Petra contend that the use immunity concept endow• the govermnent
with overly broad interrogation power, because it allows the government
to have its cake and eat it too.

That is, the government can not only

compel testimony, but can also prosecute the person who ha• received
immunity.

Particularly in the context of the grand jury investigation,

the freedom. thus bestowed on the prosecutor to "roam at will acroas the
gamut of the witness's defenses, opinions and any other subject that suits
him" is completely incompatible with the 5th Amendment because it
"invites revival of the inquisitorial system which gave rise to the
Privilege and whose tnischief it was designed to prevent.

11

Petra also

contend that use immunity provides the government with a discovery
device for learning of the witness' defen•es, exploring their weakn sses,
and identifying defense witnesses.
Petra further object to this particular use immunity statute because
it totally withdraws from the courts any power to control or interfere with
the exercise of the power to grant use inununity.

The USOC concerned is

required by section 6003 to issue the order compelling testimony upon the

-

apecified minimal showing that the witness has invoked or is likely to invokt

-

- 8 -

the privilege, the AG has approved the im.munity, and the US Atty, in his
judgment, believes that the testimony "may be necessary to the public
interest. " The prosecutor is not compelled to disclose a reasonable
basis for his belief nor the subject natter of the investigation.
the statute leaves the witness

11

Thus,

unprotected from. abusive, irrelevant and

wiconstitutional interrogation. " And, with relevancy eliminated as a
ground for limiting inquiry~ the statute transgresses on the judicial
function.
Petrs further contend that even though the government m.ay have
the burden of showing that evidence against an immunized •.vi.tness was

-

independently aequired, thl protection is largely illusory. because it is
very easy to "m sk" evidence so that it appears to have been independently
developed.

Petra further

rgue that the prosecutor, once having heard

the testimony of the witness, m.ay take advantage of it in the subsequent
prosecution in ways which even he will not realize.

Petrs also note that

difficult questions of fact will determine the question whether the government's evidence was derived from independent sources, and that the
burden thus placed on the accused to disprove the government's contention
will be much more difficult than the questions presented by transactional
immunity.

Transactional immunity grants equivalent protection to that

provided by the 5th Amendment barring prosecution based on tainted

•

evidence and providing an avenue of appeal for the enforcement of this

-

- 9 -

protection, but the possibility of absolute protection under use immunity
is "too remote." "Decisions which turn on fact question• are too
susceptible of h\Dllan error to allow the constitutional protection hinging
on it to be characterized as absolute. "
ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT, THE UNITED STATES:
At the outset the SG tries to place this case in perspective by
arguing that two basic principles are involved in resolving the issue.

On

the one hand, "at the core of our judicial system is the settled notion that
•the public has the right to every tnan's evidence."'

On the other, is the

5th amendment privilege.
The SG then argues that the "uaeu and "derivative use" ilntnunity
afforded by the federal statute ia fully coextensive with the protection

----- ------------History reveals that the privilege was aimed

---------------

afforded by the privilege.

-----

at the evils of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber.

-

It was designed

to prohibit the govermnent from. using a man'• com.pelled testimony to
plDlish him.

It was not, however, designed to allow a witness to use the

privilege to shield others or to relieve himself from. the central duty to
give evidence.

The central principle of the Court's 5th amendment cases

is that a citizen called on to give testimony or information to the government need not incriminate himself.

The privilege requires the government

to "shoulder the entire load," i.e., to adduce the evidence against the

-

accused without compelling him. to provide the basis of hie own guilt.

-

- 10 -

----

The basic purpose of the privilege is not furthered by prohibiting
society from requiring a person to testify even though nothing he says

--

or derived from what he says can be used against hiin.

A witness is

given iminunity coextensive with the privilege when he is placed in the
same position with respect to a criminal prosecution after his testbnony
as he was before.

"Use 11 itn:munity does just this.

----

-

No contrary rule is required by the decisions of this Court.

--

The

statement appearing to require trans 1ctional inununity in Counselman v.
Hitchcock is, on close analysis, only a dictum.

The vice of the statute

involved there was that, while preventing direct use of the compelled
testimony, it did not prevent use of the "fruits" of that testimony.
Therefore, the language of the Court to the effect that:
• • • a statutory enactment. to be valid. must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offense to which the question relates"
was clearly unnecessary to the Court's decision.
It was this dictum. which lead the Congress to enact subsequent
"transactional" ilnm.unity statutes.

In subsequent decisions of the Court

upholding the transactional immunity as constitutionally sufficient. the
Court was not presented with the issue whether a use-restriction statute
which secured the witness against a criminal prosecution aided directly
or indirectly by his disclosures could supplant the privilege.

-
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It was not until Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52
(1964), that the Court considered imm.unity from use and derivative use.
There the Court held that a state witness could be compelled by the state
to testify if "the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution
against him.

n

The Court recognized that this exclusionary rule would

leave the witness in the sa.tne position as if he had claim.ed his privilege.
It follows from Murphy and Malloy v. Hogan, decided the same day,
which applied the 5th Amendment to the states with the same force as
against the federal govermnent, that use imrnunity must also be sufficient
in respect to prosecution by the sovereignty granting immunity be it state
or federal.

If transactional immunity were required and the version of the

5th Amendment applicable to the states were not "watered down" then

?

states could not grant immunity at all, since they lack the power to give
absolute immunity from federal prosecution, and Murphy would have been
decided differently.
Since Murphy, the Court has not decided the issue, but statements
of the Court have intimated the constitutionality of use-restriction.

In

Gasdner v. Broderick, 392 U. S, 273, 276, the Court cited Counselman and
Murphy for the proposition that:
Anawers may be cotnpelled regardless of the privilege if
there is imrnunity from federal and state use of the compelled
testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal
prosecution against the person testifying.

-

- 12 In United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), the Court sustained a
federal registration provision on the basis of a use-restriction scheme,
as it had intimated it would in the previous Marchetti and Grosso decisions,
where it stated that the u•e immunity concept was "in principle an
attractive and apparently practical resolution of the problem. "
Moreover. argue a the SG, it ia of major significance that the

---

Congress, in 1970, believed that the tranaactional immunity standard

was no longer required when it enacted the current p oviaiona.

The

legislative history shows that the Congress was fully aware of the
pronouncements of the Court and made a deliberate choice that "use"

-

immunity was sufficient under the Constitution.
T he uae immunity provision reflects neither a congressional
dissatisfaction with the privilege nor a denigration of Fifth
Amendment rights. Rather it refl~ t• a congre~
al
judgment that complete transactional immunity: exceeds
the r; q ~menta of the Fifth Amendment • • • • Congress
recognized that by preventing "immunity baths" society
c mid avoid an intolerable result that could be brought about
under a transactional statute by interagency mistakes or
corruption.

-

-

Finally, the SG argues that judicial administration of section 6002 can

-

fairly safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination.

In the great

majority of cases in which testimony is compelled under section 6002,
there will be no subsequent prosecution.

--

Where there is, the factual

determination of " taint" is judicially manageable.

-
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The legislative history reveals that it was conternplated that it
would be a most unusual case for the governm.ent to prosecute a person who
had been granted immunity under the statute, and this policy is reflected in
the guidelines prornulgated by the Departinent of Justice, which require
personal approval of the AG for such a proaecution.

There are circUDl-

atances in which prosecution may be appropriate, however,,

Where the

govermnent has overwhehning evidence of the "link" in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute before the witness testifies under a grant of
immunity, proaecution Dl&Y be proper eve• though the witness testifies
concerning the ,.link" if the government later learns frcmi independent
evidence that the witness committed a crime, especially one more serious
than the one concerning which he teatified.

Similarly, "use" immunity

is appropriate because the government may need the testitnony of a
particular witness only in a limited area, yet once he is called by the
government, cross-examination by defense counael may bring out areas
not covered by the prosecution.

If transactional immunity is required,

the witnesa may be given immunity on the baais of cross-examination as
to matters not anticipated by the prosecution or as to matters with
respect to which the prosecution possesses overwhehning evidence.
Uncertainties of fact-finding are no basis for rejecting use
inununity.

•

The government will have the burden of proof on "taint" and

the burden will be a heavy one.

In any case where significant information

\

\

- 14 is "first divulged 0 by the witness, it will be difficult as a practical matter

for the government to show an independent source.

Moreover, the

posaibility of error in the fact-finding process has never been accepted
by the Court as a sufficient basis to require total immunity from
prosecution.

Violations of the 4th Amendrnent have been rectified by a

rule resting on a fact-finding process.

In coerced confeasion and other

cases of 5th Amendment violation, the Court has not precluded prosecution
altogether.

It would be anomolous to give a more stringent rem.edy in

the case where the witneas ia represented by counsel and the imm.unized
te•timony has been recorded in a court, administrative, or legislative
proceeding.

Finally, even transactional immunity requires resolution

of difficult queations of "taint" where the prosecution arises out of
matters not testified to but with respect to which compelled testimony
may have provided leads.

Finally, the SG argues that it is a'ettled that the 5th Amendment
does not prohibit the adoption of any immunity statute.
ARGUMENT OF CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS AMICUS
CURIAE ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS:
The Center also relies on Counselman, and argues that its language
concerning the necessity for tran•actional inununity was not a dictU111.
Indeed, the Congress understood that transactional inununity was required

-

as is evidenced by the transactional immunity statute which it passed in

-

- 15 1893 in response to Counselman.

In the years since Counselman, there

is not a single decision of the court which casts doubt on the constitutional

validity of the principle that "as between the federal sovereign and the
federal witness, immunity from prosecution is constitutionally required
before the witness may be forced to testify over hh claim of Fifth
Amendment privilege. " Murphy ia not contrary, because it was
addressing itself to the problems of federalism that arise in a daal
sovereignty situation, and the rule it adopted was to "accommodate the
interests of the State and Federal Governm.ents in investigating and
prosecuting crime." In the present case, only one sovereign is involved,

-

and therefore the federal-state pro~lems which arose in Murphy are
absent.

That Murphy was not meant to modify the requirement of

Counselman for transactional immunity where only the federal jurisdiction is involved is demonstrated by the subsequent opinion of the Court
in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965),
which reaffirmed the transactional immunity rule.
The need for transactional immunity is also supported by the values
which the 5th Amendment is designed to protect, as noted by Mr. Justice
Brennan in bis dissent to the dismissal of certiorari in Piccirillo v.
New York, 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971).

It drastically lessens the require-

ment that the govermnent, in its contest with the individual "shoulder the

•

entire load.

11

Even though use of the testitnony or its fruits is prbhibited,

-

- 16 the U.S. Atty is the man who <::onducts the questioning before the grand
jury, and thus the prosecutor is informed of the facts of the matter which

can a.nd should be proved at trial.

Plainly use imm.unity does not, as

constitutional innnunity must, leave the govermnent and the witness in the
same position after the questioning ae they were before.

After questioning

the government attorney knows whether a case can subsequently be made

oat against the witness, and the facts for which an independent source
must be constructed.

The very decision to prosecute and seek out an

independent source may well spring frotn the testirnony cotnpelled under
a grant of use immunity.

-

Thuti, the individual is in fact much worse off

than if he had not testified -- that il!I the fundainental constitutional flaw in
the statute.
Additionally, the Center contends that the statute undercuts the
interest in a

11

fair state-individual balance," and in leaving the individual

alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him.

By allowing

prosecution notwithstanding the grant of im:munity. the statute removes
any deterrent to fishing expeditions, which have recently become commonplace.

In the past several months, the Center has witnessed the

perversion of grand juries into an investigative arm of the Executive
Branch, contrary to the historical and constitutional function of the grand
jury as a body which would stand between the citizen and his government to

-

protect the citizen against the exces es of the govermnent.

This "distortioi

poses a substantial threat to the civil liberties of all Americans.

-

- 17 The 5th Amenchnent also protects the "inviolability •Of the human
personality and ••• the right of each individual to a private enclave

where he may lead a private life • • • • " The need to protect this value
is particularly apparent today, when grand juries are being used to

conduct fishing expeditions concerning the conduct of persons who dissent
or are thought to dissent froni the political judgments of our government
and who express criticism of those judgments.

"The inquiries are

primarily 'fishing expeditions' into political activity by the witness which
have the side effect, either intended or unintended, of inhibiting future
political activity."

-

ARGUMENT OF NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD AS AMICUS CURIAE ON
BEHALF OF PETITIONERS:
The Lawyers Guild objects to the use immunity provisions on
separation of powers grounds.

The statute confers unprecedently power

on the AG to deprive persons of their right to remain silent, and
"contemplate

no judicially administrable standards for exercise of this

pernicious authority. " Two aspects of the statute promise a
of the abuses of the McCarthy era.

enewal

First, the new immunity statute may

be employed to grant immunity for investigations of unlimited subject

matter, provided only that the U.S. Atty certify that the investigation
is in the public interest.

-

Previous immunity statutes were restricted

to offenses connected with economic regulations, with certain limited

-

- 18 -

exceptions.

Thus, for the first time, the country has an immunity

statute which may be applied broadly to "deviatioas from prevalent
beliefs, thoughts, opinions, associations, and utterances -- the fields
protected by the Fifth Amendment. " The Guild also objects to the
"prospective" inununity aspect of the statute which allows a grant in
advance of a claim of the privilege.

It

believe ■

that this aspect will

contribute to the chilling effect that statute will have on the exercise of
personal rights by persons whose political views are deemed dangerous
to the government.
The Guild contends that the use immunity provisions are contrary
to recent decisions of this Court expanding the protections of the 5th
Amendment.

The concept that "use" immunity is sufficient arises from

decisions of this Court forbidding use of evidence obtained directly or
indirectly by illegal government coercion.

But this is to confuse the

constitutional remedy with the constitutional principle. It is not correct
to say that the settled constitutional principle that statutory immunity
must be coextensive with the privilege means no more than that formal
immunity must be coextensive with the judicial retnedy for a violation
of the privilege.

The remedy and the privilege are not coextensive.

The Guild thus, som.ewhat unsuccessfully from m.y point of view., attempts
to argue that the Court's decisions dealing with coerced confessions,

-

civil penalties for failure to testify, and statutory registration provisions

-

- 19 {see discussion) stand only for the proposition that the 5th Amendnlent
forbids teetim.onial compulsion in any c ase; it argues tha.t any atte:rnpt
to read these cases as narrowing the 5th to state that the 5th Amendm.ent
contains only a use restriction i

to confuse judicial remedies with the

substantive right.
Finally, as is foreshad owed by the previous argum.ent, the Guild
argues that no type of inununity is constitutionally permissible.

It is

clear., for example, that the Congress could not authorize unrestricted
searches and seizures inerely by prohibiting use of the evidence obtained;
the same principle applies to the 5th Amendment.

Immunity statutes

permit prosecutors to probe into nthe innermost secrets of the witness,
into his political opinions, his associations and indiscretions.

They

foster theft of his conscience itself by forcing him to inform on others."
Thus, no iJ::nmunity statute

is_coextensive with the

right to remain silent.

In fact, these statutes are not immunity statutes at all; they are

"cotnpulsory testitnony" statutes, for they provide a witness to no more
than he is entitled to in any event by judicial decision -- proscription
against use of compelled testimony.

"The i nevitable conclusion.

is

that what the constitution says a policeman may not do by torture,
unconscionable threats, or e ven inadvertence, Congress has said a
United States Attorney may now do with a district court order in his hand."

•

-

- 20 -

DISCUSSION
There ia no getting around the fact that in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Court said clearly and espressly that absolute
immunity is required by the Constitution.

However, as the SG points out,

the Court also noted that the immunity statute there was deficient under
the 5th Amendnlent because, while preventing use of the compelled
testimony itself in a subsequent crinlinal prosecution, it did not prevent
use of the "fruits" of that testimony.

Accordingly, the language concer~J

absolute immunity was unnecessary to the decision, and the language has .

-

been characterized as dictum, a reasonable conclusion (see Mr. Justice
White's concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 106 (1964).

Accordingly, in my view, even if precedent were a

controlling factor, Counsebnan does not mandate the result that absolute
immunity is required by the Constitution.
As to the subsequent decisions of the Court upholding the
constitutional sufficiency of absolute immunity, they were all dealing with
a given, na.mely congressional statutes, passed in response to what was
thought to be the requirement of Counselman, conferring such absolute
immunity. Such decisions established only that absolute inununity is
constitutionally sufficient, not that it is constitutionally necessary. ~ .

-

Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956).

/

~

- 21 To the contrary, there have been several decisions of this Court

/)

which strongly indicate that full transactional immunity is
so long as the immunity conferred extends to the
conipelled testiinony as well as the

u■ e

u■ e

~ required,

of the

fruit ■

of the

of the com.pelled testitnony itself.

In Murphy v. Waterfront Comnussion, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court
reconsidered earlier doctrine and held that the immunity conferred lty
a

~

muat, in order to satisfy the 5th Amendment, protect against federa

incrimination.

The state statute involved there conferred full transactional

immunity within the state, but, of course, it was impossible for the state
to immunize the witness against federal prosecution.

Nevertheless, the

Court sustained the immunity statute by adopting a rule forbidding the
of the compelled testimony or its fruits in a federal prosecution.

-

In so

doing, the Court stated (per Mr. Justice Goldberg):

-

We hold that the constitutional privilege against selfincrbnination protects a state witneas againat incrimination
under federal as well as state law and a federal witness
against incrimination under state as well a.s federal law.
We m.uat now decide what effect this holding has on
existing state imm.u.n.ity legislation • • • •

*

-

*

*

•

~

*

we hold the constitutional rule to be that a state
witness may not be com.pelled to give testimony which
may be incriminating under federal law unless the
compelled testimony and its fruit ■ cannot be used in
any manner by federal officials in connection with a
criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover,
that in order to implement this constitutional rule and
acccmunodate the interest ■ of the State and Federal

-

- 22 Govermnents • • • the Federal Govermnent m.ust be prohibited
from making any •uch use of conipelled testiJnony and its fruits.
This exclusionary rule, while permitting the State• to secure
information necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves
the witne•s and the Federal Government in •ubstantially the
same position as if the witne•s had claimed his privilege
in the absence of a state grant of imm.unity. 378 U.S., at
78-79.
More recently, in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), the Court,
per Mr. Justice Fortas, •truck down a New York procedure under which
a policeman sUJ'llDloned before a grand jury investigating police corruption
was compelled to waive hia right against •elf-incrimination upon penalty
of discharge if he refused to do so. In so doing, the Court stated:
. . • Anawera may be compelled regardless of the privilege
if there is inununity from federal and state use of the
compelled testbnony or it. fruits in connection with a
criminal prosecution again•t the person testifying.

*

*

*

*

*

••• If appellant, a policeman had refused to answer
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating
to the performance of his official duties, without being
required to waive his immunity with respect to the use
of his answers or the fruit. thereof in a crinrlnal
prosecution of himself, • • • • the privilege against
self-incrimination would not have been a bar to his
dismissal. 392 U.S., at Z76, 278.

Similarly, this Court's decisions invalidating wagering occupational tax
and registration provisions and firearms registration provisions,
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), while

•

declining to impose a use restriction, suggested that it was "in principle

-

- 23 an attractive and apparently practical resolution of the difficult problem

before u s .

11

390 U. S,, at 58.

See also United States v. Freed. 401 U.S.

601 (197 1), sustaining a. revieed gun registration law in part on the basis

of use-restriction provisions (but purporting to reserve the question of
the validity of "use" immunity).

Subsequently. the "absolute" immunity

language was repeated in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1954), but the
statute there suffered froni the sallle deficiency as the one in Counselman,
because it did not prevent use of "fruits" of the compelled disclosure.
Accordingly, it is clear that the question is still open.
On one level of analysi

-

the question presented would seem. to be

whether t he cases cited which indicate tha.t "use" immunity is sufficient
can be limited to their facts.

For example. is Murphy limited to the

federal state context, absolute inununity being required within a single
jurisdicti on, but not in the Murphy situation because of considerations of
"federali s m.." This a rgument is strenuously adva nced, but it is difficult
to see how a change in jurisdictions would eliminate an invasion of the
policies underlying the privilege if they would be violated by nuae" imm.unit1
within a single jurisdiction.

One possible rationale w ould be that the values

underlying the privilege must be balanced against the needs of law enforcement in d eterntlning the reach of the privilege in any given instance.

In

the Murphy context, so the argmnent would run. it was essential that "use"

-

inununity be allowed with respect to federal prosecutions, because

-

- 24 -

otherwise all state im.munity statutes would have been struck down, with
drastic consequence• to state law enforcement. On the other hand. no
such incapacitating result follows within a •ingle juriadiction by requiring
full ''transactional" inununity.
Apart frorn the

di ■ cornforting

feeling this argument leaves

concerning the malleability of the privilege, the difficulty• at least frODl
the standpoint of precedent. is Gardner, supra.

On the other hand, one

might try to distinguish Gardner on the ground that there was a legitimate
non-criminal object of the questioning there -- namely, to root corruption
out of the police deparhnent.

However, in terms of the language and

.\\
\

policies of the privilege, assuming that the cmnpelled evidence and its
"fruits" cannot be "used" in any way against the person testifying, there 1
\
seems little in reason to distinguish between a criminal grand jury
investigation investigating the cri'Dlinality of others than the witne•s and ah
\

investigation with a non-critninal purpose.
A •e"Cond difficulty with this explanation of Murphy is that it is
difficult to see what values protected by the 5th Amendment are not
sufficiently protected by a "use" im.munity standard, at least wlmre the
scope of the exclusionary rule is broadly enough defined.

If

this

suppositi on is correct, then there is no impairment of the 5th Amendment
to "weigh" against the needs of law enforcement.

•

A third difficulty with

this argument is Malloy v. Hogan, which extended the Fifth Amendment

t

-

- ZS -

to the states in full force.
single jurisdiction

The SG's contention that the position that a

:ust grant absolute immunity with respect to its own

prosecutions but need only grant "use" inununity with respect to
prosecutions by another jurisdiction implies that only a "watered-down"
version of the 5th Amendment applies to the states seems valid to me.
As with most difficult questions, it would appear that the answer

I

is moat easily arrived
at by exanuning t.tie language of the constitutional
..,.,.-.

--

provision and the policies underlying it.

-

same direction.

Both, to my mind, point in the

The language of the 5th Amendment is that "no person

• • • shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself•. ' It seems reasonably clear that nuse" immunity, by excluding
the compelled testimony and its f ruita from a subsequent prosecution of
the witness satisfies this requirement.

Mr. Justice Brennan argues to

the contrary in his dissent from the dismissal of cert in Piccirillo v.
New York, 400 U.S. 548, SSZ (1971), stating that he thinks the language
applies unless there is no possibility of a criminal charge:

If the individual ia only promised that the government will
not actually use his conipelled testimony or its fruits to
convict him, he is still being compelled to testify against
hinlself "in [a] criminal case," in clear contradiction of
the constitutional comm.and. He is still being forced by
the tate to admit criminal cond\lCt for which he may be
punished, albeit not on the basis of his compelled testimony.
400 U.S., at 565.

-

All I can sayl is that this appears to be a non-sequitur to

ine.

Certainly

there is no self incrimination involved, although there may be self

-

- 26 accusation or degradation.

But the Court squarely held that self

degradation was not the subject of the privilege in the Ullman decision,
supra. as it had to sustain the concept of transactional immunity.
As to the policies underlying the privilege, theae have been

articulated in various ways, and, aa the Court recognized in Scbmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 76Z (1966), the scope of the privilege does not
coincide with the COD'lJ)lex of value it helps to protect.

In his concurring

opinion in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424~ 434 (1971), Mr. Ju•tice
Harlan relied in part on the suggestion of a commentator that this Court's
decisions establish two basic t~~es: ( 1) the privilege is designed to
secure ainong govermnental officials the sort of respect for the integrity
and worth of the individual citizen thought to flow from. the commitment

to an "accusatorial" as opp01!1ed to an "inquisitorial" criminal process;
(2) that the privilege is part of the concern for individual privacy "that
bas always been a fundamental tent,t of the American value structure."
Although (1) may be a legitimate characterization, it seems to me that
even Justice Harlan would take the position that "use plus fruits"

immunity iff sufficient to maintain the values of the accusatorial system..
at least

aP

lo!lg

as it can be said to be practically tna.nageable

and the scope of the use exclusion is appropriately broad.

These, it

seems to m.e, are the core and difficult questions presented by this case.
As to the privacy rubric. it carries with it its own difficulties; I do not
find it particularly helpful in deciding this case.

-

- 27 I cmne then to what it seems to me are the central is sues in this
case: (1) assuming "use" inun11Dity is sufficient. what is the scope of
the constitutionally required exclusionary rule; (2) are the practical
problems of enforcing that rule so difficult as to render the constitutional
protection "sbnply a cloud of words behind which the substance of the
privilege is lost." Mansfield, 1he Albertson Case: Conflict Between the
Privilege Against Self-incrimination and the Govermnent' s Need for
Information,

1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 103, 165. As to the standard of

exclusion. it appears to me that something m.ore than the standard
exclusionary rule utilized in cases of 4th. 5th and 6th Amendment
violations may be required -- these are remedial rules designed to deter
unlawful police practices. and have been adopted with the "given" that
a constitutional violation has already occurred.

On the other hand. the

exclusionary rule that is involved in this case is one that is designed to
supplant the 5th Amendm.ent privilege and avoid any constitutional
violation at all.

Perhaps another way of saying this is to say that the

rule will be sufficient only if the witness is placed in no worse a position
than he would have been had he claimed the privilege.

The United States

seems to concede that this is an appropriate standard by which to judge

the statute.
It seems at the outset clear to me that the exclusionary rule

-

adopted should not have any of the "attenuation" features which

-

- 28 characterize the ordinary exclusionary rules.

The question with respect

to any actual evidence sought to be introduced in the criminal trial should
be simply whether it was or was not in fact derived froin the compelled
testbnony.

I recognize, of course, that in particular cases, this factual

diffic1llty will be difficult, but the govermnent will ha.ve the burden in any
event.
More difficult problems

re presented by the possibilities for uae of

the com:pell~d testimony in less obvious ways.

For example, what if the

conipelling grand jury indicts the defendant on the basis of hie compelled
testimony, even though the actual evidence at the c:riminal trial is of
wholly independent origin?

It can be argued that since a person cannot

be convicted of certain crhnes without being indicted, his com.pelled
testimony has in a. very real sense incriminated him.

On the other hand,

the formal counter-argument is that an indictment is nothing more than a
charge, and a person ia incriminated or not incrhninated solely on the
basis of evidence produced in the trial.

-

Certainly if all the government's

evidence at trial is in fact of independent origin, it seems difficult to
argue that the return of the indictm.ent was a substantial "incril:ninating"
factor.

Cf. United States v.

J!!!!!,

384 U.S. 251 (1966) (presentation of

evidence obtained in violation of 5th Amendment to Grand Jury does not
bar prosecution).

-

-

- 29 Petitioners in this case also suggest that the prosecutor before
the grand jury will be the same man who prosecutes the witness cODlpelled
to testify, and that he will be able to take advantages of the compelled
testimony in ways in which even he will not realize.

For example, the

prosecutor is informed of the facts which can be proved at trial, and thus
knows whether a case can be made out.

He is also informed of the facts

for which an independent source must be found.

In fact, so the argmnent

goes, the very decision to prosecute and seek out an independent source
may be based on the compelled testimony. Simila rly, suppose that the
compelled testimony has no causal relationship to the evidence at trial

-

except that it provided the reason for commencing the investigation?
Insofar as the decision to commence a.a investigation is concemed,
it would appear that it could equally well be based on a claim of the
privilege. Accordingly, the witness will not be, in my view, significantly
worse off than he would have been otherwise.

I do, however, have

difficulty with the concept that the government attorney before the grand
jury may be the one to subsequently prosecute the witness or may be

involved in the investigation of the case. Although I have not fully
resolved the question, it appears to me that it will be necessary to
prevent such uses of the compelled testimony, and to require that those
having knowledge of the grand jury testimony and the testimony itself

-

be totally separated from the personnel engaged in investigating and
prosecuting the witness.

-

- 30 -

Assuming a proper excl'Uflionary rule can be devised . are the
uncertainties of fact-finding such that the Constitution will not permit "use"
innnunity notwithstanding the fact that the govermnent m.ust carry the
burden of showing la.ck of uta.int. n Mr. Justice Brennan apparently
thought. so in his Piccirillo dissent, supra:

-

Finally, the uncertainties of the factfinding process
argue strongly against "use" immumty • • • In dealing
with a single jurisdiction, we ought to recognize the
enormous difficulty in attempting to ascertain whether
a subsequent prosecution of an individual, who has
previou.aly been compelled to incriminate himself in
regard to the offense in question, derives from the
compelled testimony or from an "independent" source.
For one thing, all the relevant evidence will obvious ly
be in the hands of the government - - the government whose
investigation included compelling the individual involved
to incriminate himself. Moreover. this argument does not
depend upon assum.ptions of misconduct or collusion
among government officers. It aasUD1es only the nornial
margin of hwnan fallibility. Men working in the s a:me
office or department exchange information without
recordi!lg carefully how they obtained certain information
• • • Moreover. the poseibility of subtle inferences drawn
from action or non-action on the part of fellow law enforcement personnel would be difficult if not impossible to prove
o disprove. Thie danger, substantial when a single
jurisdiction both compels incriminating testilnony and
brings a later prosecution, m.ay fade when the jurisdiction
differs from. the jurisdiction that compelled the testim.ony • • • •
400 U.S., at 567-568.
However, I must agree with the SG that the possibility of error in the
fact-finding process has never been accepted by the Co rt as a sufficient
basis to require total im.m.unity from prosecution.

-

------

Exclusionary rules

have been managed in the 4th and 5th Amendment are~s.

In any event,

.

◄

•

- 31 difficult problems of fact finding often are presented by the transactional
immunity standard.
Other argunients advanced by petr• in this case and by appellants
in the Zicarelli case. which presents the same issue, do not see1n to me

to carry much weight.

It is true that "use" immunity may encourage

wide-ranging grand jury investigations.

However. so long as the

policies of the 5th Amendment are not otherwise offended. this fact
does not seem te me to dictate a contrary result.

The objections really

are to the duty to give evidence to the govermnent. not to the fact that
the evidence given may incriminate the testifying witness. As the SG

•

points out. we have not yet coni.e to the point where a right of noncooperation is recognized. even though some may think it desirable.
I can see no substance to the objection that the courts have no discretion
in granting the order.

In Ulbnan. the objection was that the courts had

discretion and thus were exercising a non-judicial function.

Justice

Frankfurter sustained the statute, finding that the courts were exercising
no discretion.
AFFIRM

Floyd

Op CA 9 -- App. p. 71
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This case presents the question whether the United
I

I

States Government can compel testimony from an unwilling
witness, over a

~~ of the

Fifth Amendment privilege

against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring on
the witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony
in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity
from use of evidence derived from the compelled testimony.
Petitioners were subpoenaed to eppear before a
United States grand jury in the Central District of. Calif ornia on February 4, 1971.

The Government. bellirved that

their
petitioners were likely to assert :tkR Fi:11:h Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. and
refuse to testify.

Prior to petitioners'. scheduleq

appearances, the Government applied to the district
court for an order directing petitioners to answer
questions and produce evidence ERkK before the grand

~

;,-~

~.

2.
jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to
18 U.S. C.

§

6002-03 (1970).

Petitioners opposed

issuance of the order, contending primarily that the
scope of the immunity authorized by the statute was not
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-

I

1

incrimination, and was therefore not sufficient to compel
the
their testimony over a cliam o:11/privilege. The district
court rejected this contention, and ordered petitioners
to appear before the grand jury and answer its
questions under the statutory grant of immunity.
,,-

Petitioners appeared before the grand jury, but r.efused
to answer its questions. Petitioners were brought before
the district court, and each persisted in his refusal to
,j

··i1

answer the grand jury's questions.

The court found both

l

in contempt, and committed them to the custody ·of the
Attorney General until either they answered the grand
jury's questions, or the term of the grand jury expired.

,

'

'(

i"

3.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Stewart v. United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA 9 1971).
This Court granted certiorari to resolve the important
question whether it is necessary to grant immunity from
prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony
relates in order to compel a witness to give testimony
before a grand jury over a claim of the privilege against
~

self-incrimination, or whether immunity from

the use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived
therefrom suffices to that end. 402 U.S. 9·71 (1971).
Immunity I£{ statutes,. like the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, have historical roots
which run deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence.

1~!~

~;

;. i

Soon

after the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
because firmly established in law, it was recognized that

1
the privilege did not pply when immunity had been
2

granted.

'

Parliament enacted an immunity statute in

'

.1
x,. . .

.,
·. . . . .' ·
'

:. ~J<.. r ~:·.

r. ~~~:;--·.~-·· ·

'

.

3

1710 directed against illegal gambling, which became·
the model for an identical immunity statute enacted in l&
4

I
I

1774 by the colonial legislature of New York.

These

statutes provided that the loserxxxrd.could sue the winner,
I

who was compelled to answer the loser's charges.

After

the winner responded and returned his ill-gotten gains,
he was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and discharged from any further or other punishment, forfeiture
or penalty, which he .

may have incurred by the
5

playing for, and winning such money.

''

Another

notable instance of the early use of immunity legislation
is the 1725 impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor
Macclesfield.

The Lord Chancellor was accused by the

House of Commons of the sale of public offices and
appointments.

In order to compel the .testimony ·of

Masters in Chancery who had allegedly purchased their
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could
incriminate themselves by testifying that they-had

.•

""'-·~

~·

...

_

5. -

purchased their offices, Parliament enacted a statute
granting immunity to persons then holding office as
Masters in Chancery.

Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's
6

Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767

, 1147 (1725).

The legislatures in colonial Pennsylvania and New York
7

enacted immunity legislation in the eighteenth century,
8

and federal statutes have existed since 1857.
Like the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the power of ·government to compel residents to
testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American
9

jurisrudence.

The p:>wer to compel residents to appear

and testify in court was established byx statute~in
10
England in 1562,

and Lord Bacon observed in 1612

that all subjects owed the King their "knowledge and
11
discovery. "

While it is not clear when grand juries

first resorted to compulsory process to secure the
attendance and testimony of witnesses, the general

6.

common law principle that "the public has a right to every

·,J, ...

man's evidence" was considered an "indubitable certainty"
12

which "cannot be denied" by 1742.

The power to compel
.-

testimony, and the corresponding duty of residents or to
testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses
against him, 'and have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.

The first Congress turned its

attention to the Sixth. Amendment compulsory-process
.
guarantee and implemented it in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which provided for the compulsory attendance of witnesses
- 13
in the federal courts.

The power to compel testimony is limited by the
Fifth Amendment privilege against :«EEDOJ:J:X compulsory
self-incrimination, as well as by other testimonial
exemptions and privileges which also exempt witnesees

14
from the testimonial duty.

The privilege against self-

. / .' ..

incrimination reflects a complex of our fundamental values

15
and most noble aspirations,

and "registers an important

advance in the development of our liberty - 'one of the

j

great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
I

I

16
Kmix civilized'. "

The privilege can be asserted in any

proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicia\
17

investigatory or adjudicatory;

and it protects against any

disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other

18
evidence that might be so used.
-

Immunity statutes seek to accommodate the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the
power of government to compel testimony,. and the duty
of residents to testify.

Their existence reflects the

importance of testimony, and the fact that many -offenses

l

are of such a character that the only persons KXEXElP

·1
I

capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated
in the crime.

~

Indeed, their origins were in the. context

,,

;

.

;..

,-

-'

8.
19

of such offenses,

and their primary use has been to
20

Congress included immunity

investigate such offenses.

statutes in almost every regulatory measure adopted in
21

the first half of this century,

and this Court has on

several occasions characterized such statutes as
essential to t}:le effective enforcement of various
22

federal regulatory acts.

The commentators have also

recognized the critical importance of immunity statutes
23

in investigating certain types of crimes.

Mr. Justice

Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Ullman v. United
States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956), observed that im,munity
24.

statutes have ''become part of our constitutional fabric. "
350 U.S. at 438.

Prior to the amendment of the immunity

''-•

.........1

. ,.• ,

statute under consideration in this case, there were in

tf

25
force over 50 federal immunity statutes.
'

In addition,

every State in the Union, as well as the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one or more immunity
26
statutes.~

~

9.

In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892),
't,:.

the Court considered for the first time a constitutional
challenge to a» witness immunity statute.
Immunity Act of 1868, 1-5 ~bat.

~

The statute, the

provided that no "evidence

obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial
~

proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any manner

z,'1
3Q

used against him . . . in any court of the United States .
Ndt#ithstanding a grant of immunity and order to testify under

j
i

j
. il

the 1868 Act, the witness, asserting his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination,. refused to testify before
a federal grand jury. He was consequently adjudged· in

11;21
contempt of court.

On appeal, this Court construed the

immunity statute to protect a witness only against the use
of the specific testimony compelled from him under the grant

1

1

of immunity.

This construction meant that the statute "would

not prevent the use of his testimony to search out other

'

'

Jtl-"The

testimony to be used in evidence against him. "

"

-.

;

.~

-~•· ..':·, •·.• ,"~· ·-~◄\i:i,.

..:.

•

•

T·•

-

' .

'.

10. -

Court held that an immunity statute cannot supplant the
privilege against self-incrimination, and a grant of
immunity cannot compel testimony over a claim of the
privilege, unless the scope of the statutory grant of
immunity is coextensive with the

KEp

scope of the

30

privilege.

Since the 1868 Act, as construed by the

Court, would permitthe use against the immunized
witness of evidence derived from his compelled
testimony, ir it did not protect the witness to the same
extent that a claim of the privilege would protect him.
This possibility that the compelled testimony could mrlrn.k
It

lead to the infliction of criminal penalties_ made the
witness's refusal to answer on the basis of the privilege

J

proper.
The issue in the case before us is whether the
irnp

scope of the immunity provided by the federal

witness immunity statute is coextensive with the scope

L

•

_.: ~

;

~

11.
31
of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
If the immunity granted petitioners is coextensive with

the scope of the privilege, their refusals to answer based
on the privilege were unjustified, and the judgments of
contempt were proper.
(1896).

Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591

If on the other hand, the immunity granted

petitioners is not as comprehensive as the protection
afforded by the privilege, petitioners properlyIDetioo relied
upon the privilege in refusing to answer, and the . judgments
of contempt must be vacated.

McCarthy v. xkxN Arndstein,

266 U. S. 34, 42 (1942).
The statute, 18 U:. S..C .. 6002 . (1970), provides that
when a witness is compelled by district court order to
testify over a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination:
no testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly
or indrectly derived from such testimony or
other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to c_omply with the
order.

/1

12.

Petitione rs contend that a statute mus t at minimum
gran t im.nrnnity from prose cution for the offens e to which
the compelled te stimony relates in order to be coextensive
with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
In support of this contention, petitioners rely heavily upon
the fallowing language from Counselman:
'

We are clearly of opinion that no statute
which leaves the party or. witness subject to
prosecution after he answers the criminating
question put to him, can have the effect of
supplanting the privilege conferred by the
Constitution of the United States. [The
immunity statute] does not supply a complete
protection from all the perils against which
the constitutional prohibition was designed
to guard, and is not a full substitute for that
prohi"Jition. In view of the constitutional.
· provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid
must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates. 142 U.,S. at 585-86~

The Counselman decision, and particularly the
language relied upon by petitioners, evoked a swift
congressional response.

Sixteen days after the ~ecision,
32

a new immunity bill was introduced by Senator Cullom,
who urged that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce

l

Act would be impossible in the absenc.e of an effective .

j

....

•

I

. --~
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,

i
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immunity statute.

This bill, which became the Com-

34
pulsory Testimony Act of 1893,

was drafted specifically

to meet the broad language in Counselman relied upon by

;

j
35

petitioners.

It provided that:

i

I

,

no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise . . . .
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443

The immunity against prosecution afforded by this statute
36
because the basic form for federal immunity statutes
until the adoption of the statute under consideration.
Notwithstanding the congressional response to

I

I

l

~1

Counselman, the Court has recognized that the conceptual
basis of Counselman is that a grant of immunity is
constitutionally sufficient only if it is co-extensive with
the scope of the privilege against sel(-incrimination.
In Murphy v. Water front Comm'm, 378 U.S. 42, 54, 78
(1964),

~

the Court recognized that this was the

principle of Counselman, without even noting the broad

14.
language in Counselman ur ged upon us by petitioners.
The broad langua ge in Couns elman on which
petitioners rely, completely unnecessary to the Court's
decision, must be considered dictum.

The statute, as

construed by the Court, was plainly deficient in its
failure to prohibit the use against the immunized witness
of evidence derived from his compelled testimony.

The

Court repeatedtly emphasized this deficiency, noting
that the statute:
could
~

not, and would not, prevent the use of
his testimony to search out other testimony
to·be used in evidence against him or his
property, in a criminal proceeding. . . ,
142 U. S. at 564,
that it:
could not prevent the obtaining and the use
of witnesses and evidence which should be
attributable directly to the testimony he might
give under compulsion, and on which he might
be convicted, when otherwise, and if he l?,ad
refused to answer, he could not possibly have
been convicted . . . , 142 U. S. at 564,
1

;l

and that it:

\\

....

I

li

...

I

\

15.

~

l

afford no protection against that use of
compelled testimony which consists in gaining
therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime,
and of sources of information which may supply
other means of convicting the witness or party.
142 U. S. at 586.
The Court in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1965),
interpreted Counselman as holding the immunity statute
insufficient:
because the immunity granted was incomplet<::,
in that it merely forbade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of
information obtained from the compelled
testimony.
350 U.S. at 436-37.

(Emphasis supplied)

The Ullman interpretation of Counselman, as well as
t h e ~ I.flrphy Court's recognition that the principle of

1

J

Counselman is that a . grant of immunity is sufficient if

it is coextensive with the scope of the privilege, reaffirm
37

our view that the broad language in Counselman is dictum.
Since post-Counselman immunity statutes

1
i

j

l

l

reaching this Court have followed the pattern of the
1893 Act in providing immunity from prosecution for
38
the offense to which the compelled testimony relates;

~-~

... ...

.. · . -. 16." .
this Court has heretofore not been squarely confronted
with the question whether immunity from the use of com-

ji

pelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is
-·

coextensive with the scope of the privilege x:h against
j

39
self
ElRi incrimination.
While a grant of immunity must be

coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination,
it need not be broader. We believe that immunity from
prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony
relates is broader than the scope of the privilege against

I
self-incrimination, and is not the minimum immunity
claim
requir~d to compel testimony over a «limm of the privilege.
We hold that immunity from. the use of c.ompelled·testimony
and all evidence derived therefrom is-coextensive with
the privilege against self-incri~ination, and is- sufficient
.

.

to compel testimony over a cliam of the privilege.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'm, 378 U~ .S. . 52

(1964), the Court carefully consider~d immunity fr.om use
of compelled testimony and evidence derive.ct ther.e.form.

,

' ••

' t

..,.:..·

:

. ~ ·.

17~

The Murphy petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a
hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor. After

R

refusing to answer certain questions

on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate
them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution
40

under the laws of New Jersey and New York.

They

continued to refuse to testify, however, on the ground that
their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal
law, to which the immunity did not purport to extend.
l

They were then adjudged in civil contempt, and. that judgment
-

41

was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.

i.
;
This C.0urt in Murphy undertook an examination ·

i

of the policies and purposes of the privilege against self-

j

i

incrimination, and held that the privilege pr.o tects state
l

~

·I'

witnesses against incrimination under federal as--well as

I

state law, and federal witnesses against incrimination

i

l

tI

under state as well as federal law.

l

4'

principle to the state immunity legislation before. it;

J

1-

l

.l
l

:,

Applying this

\

.

..

18.

the Court held the fZ c·o nstitutional rule to be that:
a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in
any manner by federal officials in connection
with a criminal prosecution against him. We
conclude, moreover, that in order to
implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the State and
Federal Governments in investigating and
prosecuting crime, the Federal Government
must be prohibited from making any such
use of compelled testimony and its :oox: fruits.
378 U.S. at 79.
The Court went on to emphasize that this rule left the
state witness and the Federal Government, against which
the witness had immunity only from the use of the compelled
testimony and evidence derived therefrom, "in .substantially

I

the same position as if the witnes.s had claimed his privilege
in the absence of a state grant. of immunity." 378. U. S~ at 79.

In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), decided
the same day as Murphy, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self - incrimination
was safeguarded against infringement by the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.

l

.!

The Cour.t also held that the

.. · ...-

, ••

r'.
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19.
same standards would determine theR extent of the
42

privilege in state and in federal proceedings,

E

for

the same substantive guarantee of the BJll of Rights was
involved.

This holding, that the scope of the privilege is

the same :bm: irrespective of the jurisdiction seeking to
compel testimony, was an important part of the decision
43

in Murphy.

Murphy's holding that a state witness's

privilege against self-incrimination is not infringed when

-~1

the :fmx federal government is prohibited from using the
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom, and
that such a prohibition on the use of the compe°lled testimony
leaves the witness and the federal government in substantially
the same position as if the witness has claimed· the pr.ivilege
and not testified, compels the conclusion that immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and RXirldr evidence
derived therefrom is coextensive with the privilege against
·l

1
compulsory self incrimination.
J

The

Muruh:y Court held

that the privilege protects a state witness against

j
~

r
l

t

·j

·I

I

l

,.

,:i,

.•

"

. ' -; ~·

.

20.
incrimination under federal law, and that the protection
accorded by the privilege is achieved by prohibiting the
federal government from using the compelled testimony
and evidence derived therefrom.

l
I

,I

..

,,I

I

21,
This understanding of Murphy is reflected
in Garaner y. Br oder ick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
In di s¢uss ing the pr ivil ege aga inst compulsory s e l f incriminat ion, the Court note d:
Answers may be compelled re gardless of the
privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled
testimony or its fruits in connection
with a criminal prosecution against
the person t~stifying. Counse lman y.
Hitchcock , 1142 U.S. 542/, 585-586;
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, [378
u.s. 527, 79.
392 U,S, at 276,
Again, !in United States .Y• Freed, 401 U,S. 601, 606
(1971), l the Court, citing Murphy, approved a
statuto
+in~

~

scheme compelling potentially incrimina-

admissions, but barring state and federal

prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled *dmissions.

Although the C-0urt noted that

it was not reaching the broader question of the sufficiency tjf immunity from use of compelled testimony an~ evidence derived therefrom in the context
of immunity statutesp the restriction on use of
the comp~lled information, as well as the general
unavailability of the information, was deemed sufficient to : supplant the privilege.

f

-·
,.

·-·.,... '_:.

.
'

..

~

~-

- -22,

The Fifth. Amendment privilege against self-

l.

incrimination obviously does not afford complete protection
against criminal prosecution.

Its sole concern is to afford

protection against being "farced to give testimony leading
to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to .

criminal

44
Immunity from prosecution for the offense to

acts. "'

which the compelled testimony relates affords greater

Ot\ -¼e. ~er "1,,JJ
protection than does the privilege. rb~~P~- 0f immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived
'

~

from the

i

-thbt ,·.s
the same protectionlafforded by the privile.ge. . Immunity

;

m;~ of

compelled testimony xmhoox: affords precisely

from use and derivative use of compelled testimony
prohibits the prosecutiorial authorities from using the

l

.. ,l

compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore

'"su.res
is4'Ueit

that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction

I

.j

of criminal penalties on the witness.
The fact that a witness may subsequently be

l
'l

1

prosecuted for the crime concerning which .he testifies

:i,,;-- :--·.

-~ - .

23.
under a grant of immunity from use of the compelled
testimony does not render such immunity insufficient.
Since the prosecution cannot use the compelled testimony
in any respect, the witness's right not to be compelled
to give testimony leading to the infliction of criminal
penalties has not been infringed.
We note, in addition, that once a defendant

demonstrates that he has previously testified under a
grant of immunity, the prosecutorial authorities have
the burden o:fxsmx showing, by clear and convincing
evidence, that their evidence is in no respect ·derived
45
from the compelled testimony.

The- statute p~ovides

that no evidence "indirectly':' derived .from the compelled
testimony may be used against the witness in. a criminal
case.

Viewed against the constitutional background

in the area of immunity legislation, the statute obviously
prohibits the use of compelled testimony as an "investigatory

24.
1

/l

45·
lead" andiro. bars the use of any evidence obtained as
a result of focusing investigation on a witness who has
been compelled to testify under a grant of immunity.

This

degree of statutory protection insures that the compelled
testimony can in no way lead to the infliction of criminal
penalties upon a witness.

Thus the grant of immunity

leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in
the same position as if the witness had claimed the
privilege.

The immunity is therefore coextensive with

the scope of the privilege, and suffices to supplant the
privilege.

The judgment of the-Court of Armeals of the

Ninth Circuit affirming the judgments of contempt is-

. .~

accordingly affirmed .
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Accord, Gardner v. Broderick 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Arndstein
McCarthy v. ~ , 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924) (Brandeis,
J. ); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913)

.l

(Holmes, J. ).

We reaffirm today the decisions in Brown

and Ullman.
32.

Counselman was decided January 11, 1892.

Senator Cullom introduced the new bill on January 27,
..

:

~

' 'i

1892.

23 Cong. Rec. 573 (1892).
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3 3.

23 Cong. Rec. 6333 (1892).

• I
l

1

34. Act of February 11,. 1893, ch. 83, ·.27 stat.

i

'j

,.j

443 (1893), repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
35.

§

245, 84 stat. 931.

See the remarks of Senator Cullom, 23 Cong.

Rec. 6333 (1892), and Congressman Wise, who introduced
the bill in the House. 24 Cong. Rec. 5.03 (1893).

'

-

See

Shapiro v. United states, 335 U.S. 1, 28-29,n. 36 (1948).
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36.

Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438

(1956). Shapiro v. United Slates, 335 U.S. 1, 6 (1948).
Th,' 1( ol,l!, (l et' f\') 1(tC(' ,-., ,: N ' [)·l i l ' ll, :::) ~ ( \ r.:: , r1 li e ~ !J i?~' Ye, l
L/00 U f>· ,; L/ f;)....

(t9·,1) ((3, e:> 11/lt) n, J.,

J

rCi sc,en-( 1 ,-, g ~

37. _c_f. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv.

L. Rev. 179, 230 (1964).

Language similar to the Counselman

dictum can be found in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595

j
i

·1

•I

(1896), and Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).

Brown

j

and Hale, however, involved statutes which were clearly
sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination,
as they provided full immunity from prosecution "for and on
account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which hem may testify or produce evidenc.e . . .- . . . . " 161:
U. S. at 594; 201 U. S. at 66.

The same is- true- with respect

to the broad fanguage used in Smith v. United States, 33 TU. S.
137, 146 (1949(, and in United states v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424,
428 (1943), and the immunity statutes involved in these cases.
In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382. U. S.
70 (1965), some of the Counselman language urged upon us

.
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upon us by petitioners· was again quoted. But Albertson,

1

held insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of

I

I

like Counselman, involved an immunity statute which was

"uninvestigatory leads" and other evidence derived from

I

compelled admissions. 382 U. S. at 80.
In Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954),

the Counselman dictum was referred to as the principle of
Counselman.

The reference was in the context of an

ancillary point not essential to the decision of the Court.
The Court did note, however, that the Fifth Amendment
-

privilege prohibited the "use_" of .c-ompelled self-incriminatory
testimony. 347 U. & at 181 .. In any event; two years later
the Court

N

in Ullinan v .. United· States, 3'50 U.

s.: 422,

436-37 (1956), recognized that the rationale of Counselman

was that the statute was insufficient for. failure :k to prohibit
use of evidence derived from compelled testimony.
38.

E.

g.,

Murphy v. Waterfront fx1m1mx Com 'm,

378 U.S. 52 (19 64) ;. Smith v; . United States, 337' u: s: . 137
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11.
(1949); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (l956);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 tiS U. S. 43 ( 1906); Jack v. Kansas,

ifill 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896).
39.

See, e. g., California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424,

n.
442 ~. 3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 n. 11 (1971); Piccirillo v. New York,
400 U. S. 548 (1971); Stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 244
,

~

. l

•

(1966).

!_:_..

...,

40.

1
.

1
.

The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor

is a _b_i=!,+.--'-c1_"tc_..e"--_ body· established under. an interstate .

.1

e·ompact
approved· by: Congress-. 67: stat. 451.

~

41. In re Application of Waterfrong Comm 'n of ·
N. Y. Harbor, 39 N...r. 436, 189 A. 2d. 36 .(1963).

u: S.

42.

Malloy v. Hogan, 378

43.

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'm, 378 .U. S. 52,

1~ 10-11 :(1964).

:ii: 79 ( 1964).
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12.
44.

Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 438-39

(1956), quoting Boyd v. United states, 116 U.S. 616, 634

.J
I

(18

).
45.

Se~ Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.

?'ln.18>
52,j103 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
'
'
I

.,

46.

See,

~

g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities

Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965).
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In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892),

the Court considered for the first time a constitutional
challenge to a11 witness immunity statute.

The statute, the

Immunity Act of 1868, l-5 itab. 3">\ provided that no "evidence
obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial
proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any manner
used against him . . . in any court of the United States . . .
Ndtvithstanding a grant of immunity and order to testify under
the 1868 Act, the witness, asserting his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, refused to testify before
a federal grand jury. He was consequently adjudged in

?1 .:zj
contempt of court.

On appeal, this Court construed the

immunity statute to protect a witness only against the use
of the specific testimony compelled from him under the grant
of immunity.

This construction meant that the statute "would

not prevent the use of his t e stimony to search out other
testimony to be used in evidence against him.

11

The

II

10.

Court held that an immunity statute cannot supplant the
privilege against self-incrimination, and a grant of
immunity cannot compel testimony over a claim of the
privilege~ unless the scope of the statutory grant of
immunity is coextensive with the~ scope of the
30

privilege.

Since the 1868 Act, as construed by the

Court, would permit the use against the immunized
witness of evidence derived from his compelled
testimony, :k it did not protect the witness to the same
extent that a claim of the privilege would protect him.
This possibility that the compelled testimony could ledalt:
r

w~ ..
lead t o the infliction of criminal penalti~

~f'1

~

the

witness's refusal to answer on the basis of the privilege .

"'-~pc..=l-'~~- l
c:,---c
r--

The issue in th~ase
~

~whether the

scope of the immunity provided b~the federal

~-.c.i"6.l ·~

l/fi,?01 I~ IL S C I,,() b t.
1
witness immunity statute is coextensive with \~ B08i8@
A

I..--

11.

1-+H.-O.,u
~

94<~ ,--&A,

J-

31

the privile~ again~t compulsory self-incrimination.

"
If the immunity granted petitioners is coextensive with

the scope of the privilege, their refusals to answer based
on the privilege were unjustified, and the judgments of
contempt were proper.

Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591

If on the other hand, the immunity granted

(1896).

petitioners is not as comprehensive as the protection
afforded by the privilege, petitioners properlyx,elied:relied
upon the privilege in refusing to answer, and the judgments
of contempt must be vacated.
266

u. s.

McCarthy v. x.tD Arndstein,

34, 42 (1942).

The statute, 18 U.S. C. 6002 (1970), provides that
when a witness is compelled by district court order to
testify over a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination:
no testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly
or indrectly derived from such testimony or
other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order.

12.

l~- -- Petitioners contend that a statute must at minimum
grant immunity from prosecution for the offense to which
the compelled testimony relates in order to be coextensive
with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
In support of this contention, petitioners rely heavily upon
the following language from Counselman:
We are clearly of opinion that no statute
which leaves the party or witness subject to
prosecution after he answers the criminating
question put to him, can have the effect of
supplanting the privilege conferred by the
Constitution of the United states. [The
immunity statute] does not supply a complete
protection from all the perils against which
the constitutional prohibition was designed
to guard, and is not a full substitute for that
prohi'Jition. In view of the constitutional
provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid
must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates. 142 U.S. at 585-86.
The Counselman decision, and particularly the
language relied upon by petitioners, evoked a swift
congressional response.

Sixteen days after the decision,
32

a new immunity bill was introduced by Senator Cullom,
who urged that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce
Act would be impossible in the absence of an effective

13.
33
immunity statute.

This bill, which became the Com34

pulsory Testimony Act of 1893,

was drafted specifically

to meet the broad language in Counselman relied upon by
35

petitioners.

It provided that:

no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise . . . .
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443
The immunity against prosecution afforded by this statute
~

"

36

beca use the basic form for federal immunity statutes
until the adoption of the statute under consideration.
Notwithstanding the ~ ~ponse to
A

•

~~

Counselman~ the Court has recognized that the conceptual
J\

basis of Counselman is that a grant of immunity is

f.,)',

>

~J
1 P j..A... _,.(.,,_,c,r-

~~£' "'~
,,..,.,--l

~~r

_>.,-v

the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.
~

In Murphy v. Water front Comm'm, 378 U.S. 42, 54, 78

l),v'-~

rr--e-+

-6

constitutionally sufficient~ if it is co-extensive with

k

• --=••,;,.."4.A....

(S,,,,f,..,

(1964), ffllB'. the Court'\»@lil8~i£lg'1 tllt&t this AWft'S the
principle of Counselman, without even noting the broad
,
"-+'-"

7k
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14.
language

~·

~

urged upon us by petitioners.

, I lan_~age
-,
h
he brQad
in-:v-.
'< ounselman on whic

~ ;rd.

.,

/

completely unnecessary to the Court's
decision, must be considered dictum.

The statute, as

construed by the Court, was plainly deficient in its
failure to prohibit the use against the immunized witness
of evidence derived from his compelled testimony.

The

Court repeatedtly emphasized this deficiency, noting
that the statute:

/'l,
/

could
~ not, and would not, prevent the use of
his testimony to search out other testimony
to be used in evidence against him or his
property, in a criminal proceeding. . . ,
142 U. S. at 564,

that it:
could not prevent the obtaining and the use
of witnesses and evidence which should be
attributable
directly to the testimony he might
1
give 'under compulsion, and on which he might
be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had
refused to answer, he could not possibly have
been convicted . . . , 142 U. S. at 564,
and that it:

1'--~P ~
r~~~

~ ( A . - < - (~

I

~

15.

t,,,_-,_;[A,... ~

afford no protection against that use of
compelled testimony which consists in gaining
therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime,
and of sources of information which may supply
other means of convicting the witness or party.
142 U. S. at 586.

<ff {,,/
?.I'he Court in Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 ( 1965),

~ ~rkA.

~r-•/ (';,. /-4t

/

interpreted Counselman as holding ~ t y statute /
I'

1

,\

insufficient:
because the immunity granted was incomplet~
in that it merely forbade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of
information obtained from the compelled
testimony.
350 U.S. at 436-37. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ullman interpretation of Counselman, as well as
I

!"
the Mp1x Mlrphy ~

~-

-t;t~~ recognition that the principle of

Counselman is that a grant of immunity is sufficient if
it is coextensive with the scope of the privilege, reaffirm
37
our view that the broad language in Counselman is dictum.
,.,-

_LJj_
Since post-Counselman immunity statutes
reaching th-is Court have followed the pattern of the
1893 Act in providing immunity from prosecution for
38
the offense to which the compelled testimony relates,

J

It is true that in Murphy it was unnecessary to decide

-~-41

the precise issue here involved, whether use and derivative
I\
use immunity is constitutionally sufficient where the jurisdiction
which compelled the testimony is the same jurisdiction which may
later bring a prosecution. But we think both the reasoning of the
~~

#... • ..-

Court,\and the result reache~ compel anl affirmative answer.
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Rider A, p. (ii){ Immunity Cases)
The statute attacked provides in relevant part as follows:
'

,

[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of this privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used against the witness in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for per)lry, giving a false statement, or
otherwise falling to comply with the order.*
*For other provisions of 1970 Act (which is part 5 of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970) relative to immunity of witnesses, see
18

u. s. c.

6001-60004.

Alternate Rider A, p. 19
These two decisions clarified the uncertainty that had previously
existed. The "constitutional rule" enunciated by the Court is that a state
witness's privilege against self incrimiaation is not infringed when the
federal government is prohibited from using "the compelled testimony
and its fruits".

The Court did not say that it was constitutionally necessary

to go beyond this and provide the type of transactional immunity which would
foreclose prosecution.* Indeed, as the Court concluded that the less
restrictive type of imm

c~ J

eft the witness in the same position as if

he had claimed his privilege a:c.d-tae~

.e e::t the test of coextensivene~

it was unnecessary for the Court to mention transactional immunity which
accords a witness a sanctuary status not embodied in the privilege.
*Pete: If we use this rider a footnote at this point might be an
appropriate place to say what ought to be said as to the inability
of a state to deny the federal government the right to prosecute.
I judge you would prefer not to emphasize this point by using it in
the text. We should discuss this further.

~ 12-1~-6(
P . e ; e ; _ ~ ~- ~
-t<_z_~~Y-o ~
CL~ .

22.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination obviously does not afford complete protection
against criminal prosecution.

Its sole concern is to afford

protection against being "forced to give testimony leading
to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to . . . criminal

44
acts. "'

Immunity from prosecution for the offense to

which the compelled testimony relates affords greater
protection than does the privilege.

°" ~ ~,.. f..,,Jj

A ~alznt of immunity

from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived
from the•• 0£ compelled testimony XJUhB1K affords precisely

-thbt

1:S

the same protection£afforded by the privilege.

Immunity

from use and derivative use of compelled testimony
prohibits the prosecutiorial authorities from using the
compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore
mSltre!I

iafi111101t that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction

of criminal penalties on the witness.
The fact that a witness may subsequently be
prosecuted for the crime concerning which he testifies

23.

under a grant of immunity from use of the compelled
testimony does not render such immunity insufficient.
Since the prosecution cannot use the compelled testimony
in any respect, the witness's right not to be compelled
to give testimony leading to the infliction of criminal
penalties has not been infringed.
We note, in addition, that once a defendant
demonstrates that he has previously testified under a
grant of immunity, the prosecutorial authorities have
the burden o f ~ showing, by clear and convincing
evidence, that their evidence is in no respect derived
45

from the compelled testimony.

The statute provides

that no evidence "indirectly':' derived from the compelle d
testimony may be used against the witness in a criminal
case.

Viewed against the constitutional background

in the area of immunity legislation, the statute obviously
prohibits the use of compelled testimony as an "investigatory

24.

'-lfo

~

lead"

andim bars the use of any evidence obtained as

a result of focusing investigation on a witness who has
been compelled to testify under a grant of immunity.

This

~-

degree of statutory protection insures that the compelled
testimony can in-no.-Wa.¥ lead to the infliction of criminal
penalties upon a witness.

Thus the grant of immunity

leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in
the same position as if the witness had claimed the
privilege.

The immunity is therefore coextensive with

the scope of the privilege, and suffices to supplant the
privilege.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the

Ninth Circuit affirming the judgments of contempt is
accordingly affirmed.

3/4/72
Res

CEP

No. 70-117, Kastigar y. United States
There are a number of things concerning this draft that

I want to call to your attentions
(1)

If the opinion is too weak in its efforts to

distinguish Counselman and the cases which repeat its broad language, we can take the bull by the horns and overrule them,
(2)

Na

I have not used the words "transactional'; "use,"

and "fruits."

The former two are by and large the creation

of law reviews, and the latter is a part of a severely overworked metaphor.

Of course, using these

catch words could

tJ1(.

I~
~

..._,;_k,.;1

cut down on the length of some of the sentences which border
on the awkward.
(3)

The historical stuff is optional.

Its only value

is to blunt criticism to the effect that the statute

g~
,__,,_...

hysterical reaction to the problem of crime.
(4)

I have not in text referred to the name of the

statute, the "Organganized Crime Control Act of 1970."
Since this case has nothing to do with organized crime, to
refer to the statute by this name simply will open us up to
barbs from WOD.
(5)

I have not referred to the SG's "judgment of

Congress" argument, because I believe it to be 100"/4
(6)

I have not referred to the

the state (government) by the use of use immunity.

Since

the draft does not rely on a balancing analysis, I do not
~fs d_o ~ W UV /-w-tl PV-find such arguments pertinent.
~-~... H c;.. /-2..'-L J.-vw-- 1-t... '41 ,,,.,/>~
(7) I must add a few paragraphs near the end in order
to anticipate points made in dissent, e.g., the difference

/

between a jurisdiction compelling testimony and a jurisdiction ,
seeking to benefit from the compelled testimony, etc.
(8)

I need a bit more about the nature of the 5th

amendment privilege, such as the fact that the 5th alone prohibits
the "use" of compelled testimony.
347 US 179, 181 (1954).

See Adams y. Maryland,

In addition, a comparison to 4th

amendment exclusionary rules may be in order.
CEP

~.!;..,,___,

&"6._,.,.,. - ,

llp/SS lCC ->/Of -14

c:· -

n.
Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, which is that "no person • • •
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," deprives Congress of power to enact laws which compel selfincrimination, even if the requisite immunity is granted prior to the
compulsion of the incriminatory testimony. In other words, petitioners

assert that no immunity statute, however drawn, can afford a lawful
basis for compelling incriminatory testimony. They ask us to
reconsider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896),
and Ullman v. Unite• states, 350 U. s. 422 (1956), decisions which
uphold the constitutionality of immunity Jlilll

statutes.• We find no

merit to this cmtention and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullman.
Petitioners' second cmtention is that the scope of the immunity
provided by the federal witness immunity statute enacted in 1970, 18
U. s. C. 600~ is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege
•Accord, Gardner v. Broderic~ 392 u. s. 273, 276 (1968); Murphy
v. ,Arndstein, 266 U. s. 34, 421924) (Brandeis, J. ); Heike v.
unflted states, 227 u. s. 131, 142 (1913) (Holmes, J. ).
I

I
~

ii.

against compulsory self -incrimination, and therefore is unconstitutional
Petitioners draw a distinction in this respect between statutes which
grant immunity from prosecution (sometimes referred to as "transactional'immunity) and those which limit the immunity to the use of
the compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom (sometimes
referred to as "use and fruits" immunity)•. The test derived from
history as well as the decisions of this Court, is whether the immunity
granted petitioners under this statute is coextensive with the scope of
the privilege. If so, their refusals to answer based on the privilege
were unjustified, and the judgments of contempt were proper. Brown
v. Walker, 161 U. s. 591 (1896). If oo the other hand, the immunity
granted petitioners was not as comprehensive as the protection afforded
by the privilege, petitiooers were justified in refusing to answer, and
\

the judgments of cootempt must be vacated. McCarthy v. Arnc\stein,
266

u. s.

34, 42 (1942).

\\\
I \

I

*See PiccirIIlov. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971). The statute her\~
involved, 18 U.S. C. 6002, provides for the latter type immunity. W;'hen
a witness ms conpelled by a district court order to testify over a
claim of the privilege against self- incrimination, the statute
specifies: ''No testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any '\
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order."

iii.

Petitioners rely upon Counselman v. M:Ns:t•t«: Hitchcock, supra,
the first case in which this Coort considered a constitutional challenge
to an immunity statute. The statute, the Immunity Act of 1868,
provided that no "evidencei obtained from a party or witness by means
a judicial proceeding • • • shall be given in evidence, or in any manner
used against him ..• in any court of the United states •.• ".
Ndlwithstanding a grant of immunity and order to testily under the
1868 act, the witness, asserting his privilege against compulsory
Biaf self-incrimination, refused to testify before a federal grand jury.

He was consequently adjudged in contempt of court. On appeal, this
Court construed the statute to protect a witness only against the use
of the specUic testimony compelled from him under gm the grant of

immunity. This construction meant that the statute ''would not
prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to
\

be used in evidence against him. " The Court held that an imm\mity
\

statute cannot supplant the privilege against self incrimination, ~,d
a grant of immunity cannot compel testimony over a claim of the
\
\

'\
\

I

iv.
privilege unless the sc~ of the statutory grant is coextensive with
the scope of the privilege. Since the 1868 Act, as construed by the
Court, Jllldltk would permit the use against the immunized witness of
evidence derived from his compelled testimony, it did not protect
the witness to the same extent that a claim of the privilege would
. protect him. The statute accordingly was held invalid. In the
course of its opinion, the Court said:
We are clearly of opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege ccmferred by the Constitution of the United states. [The
immunity statute] does not supply a complete
protection from all the perils against which the
constitutiaial pr<ilibition was designed to guard,
and is not a full substitute for that pr<ilibition. In
view of the constitutional provision, a statutory
enactment, to be valid must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which
the question relates. 142 U. s. at 858-86.
Sixteen days after the decision, a new immunity bill was
introduced by Senator Cullom, who urged that enforcement of the
Interstate Commerce Act would be impossible in the absence of an
effective immunity statute. The bill, which became the Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1893, was drafted specifically to meet the broad
language in Counselman set forth above. The new Act provided that:

v.
no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise. • • .
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 stat. 443
This type of "transactional" immunity because the basic form
for the numerous federal immunity statutes until 1970 when, after
a reexamination of the adequacy of existing law and of the applicable
coostitutional principles, the Congress enacted the statute here under
consideration.
Notwithstanding the precipiblous congressional response to
Counselman

.
vi

The new statute does not' afford (the) absolute immunity against
future prosecution" referred to in Counselman. Rather, it was
framed to meet the rationale of Counselman and subsequent decisions
of the Court, namely, that immunity from the use of compelled
testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with the
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination.
The statute explicitly proscribes the use in any z criminalcase of
"testimony or other information compelled under the order ( or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information)". We hold that immunity from the use of compelled testimony and all evidence derived therefrom is coextensive
with the.p.ni privilege against self Jmm.t.wnH• incrimination and is
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While
the grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege, it
need not be broader. We believe that the transactional type of
immunity, which immunizes against prosecution for the offense to
which the compelled testimmy relates, places the witness in a
a■,-cliwl

superior position - affording him a coo.siderably broader

vii.

protection - than the Fifth Amendment privilege itself.
This holding is consistent with the conceptual basis of
Counselman as well as with subs91uent decisions of the Court.
The broad language in Counselman relied upoo. by petitioners, was
unnecessary to the Court's decision, and accordingly must be considered as dictum. The statute before the Court, as ccmstrued by
it, was plainly deficient in its failure to prooibit the use against the
immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony.
The Court repeatedly emphaiszed this deficiency, noting that the
statute:
could not, and would not, prevent the use of
his testimony to search out other testimony
to be used in evidence against him or his
property, in a criminal proceeding•••. ,
142 U. s. at 564,
that it:
could not prevent the obtaining and the use
of witnesses and evidence which should be
attributable directly to the testimony he might
give under compulsion, and on which• he might
be convicted, when ctherwise, and if he had
refused to answer, he could not possibly have
been convicted ••• , 142 U. s. at 564,
and that it:

I

viii
afford no protection against the use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom
a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of
sources of information which may supply other
means of convicting the witness or party. 142
u. s. at 186.
The Court in Ullman v. United States, 350 U. s. 422 (1965)
interpreted Counselman as holding that the statute thereimx involved
was insufficient:
because the immunity granted was incomplete,
in that it merely for bade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of
information obtained from the compelled
testimony.
350 U. s. at 436937. (Emphasis supplied)
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(Here return to Pete's draft on l~• 16, commencing with
k the discussion of Murphy. )
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squarely7:.ced the issue whether, to be coextensive with t h e ~

:\

privilege,

l

aft

f-k-eimnmnity grant had to afford immunity from prosecution

or whether assurance that the testimony of a witness could not be used
in any way against him was constitutionally sufficient.

Although a

use-type statute was not before the Court, a decision on principle
as to the permissibility of such immunity could not be avoided.

tam
r St

Jacks

the-a__-f}rM'Q-Ww,-e-F--te

...j/p---

pFeelude othex ~tatcs OF the fodel'a:1- gewenr--

ment :f:poro initiating prosectttiens} f the Fifth Amendment requires
immunity from prosecution, no state could enact a valid immunity
statute as the states lack the power to preclude other states or the
federal government from initiating prosecutions.

This was the

·~ ·
issues resolved in Murphy by a ~

holding that immunity

from use and derivative use was coextensive with the privilege.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White (H joined by
Mr. Justice ~tewart)
majority decision:

em elaborates on the plain import of the

1

- . /"••
•

ii.

~

* * * the Court does not accept the far-reaching
and in my view wholly unnecessary constitutional
principle that the privilege requires not only complete protection against any use of compelled
testimony in any manner in other jurisdictions
but also absolute immunity in these jurisdications
from any prosecution pertaining to any of the
tesimony given. The rule which the Court does
not adopt finds only illusory support in a dictum
of the Cour~ and, as I shall show, affords no
more protection against compelled information
than does the rule forbidding federal officials
access to statements made in exchange for a
grant of state immunity.** * (*)

x

It is true that in Murphy it was unnecessary to decide
the precise issue here involved, whether use and derivative
use immunity is constitutionally sufficient where the jurisdiction
which compelled the testimony is the same jurisdiction which may
later bring a prosecution.

But we think both the reasoning of the

Court and the result reached compel

ani affirmative answer.

(Here go back to Pete's draft commencing at the top of
p. 21 ).
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This case presents the question whether the United
states Government can compel testimony from an unwilling
witness, ov-e1 a

~~
=
A

.
dment privilege

against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring on
the witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony
in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity
from use of evidence derived from the~

testimony.

Petitioners were subpoenaed to j'ppear before a
United states grand jury in the Central District of California on February 4, 1971.

The Government believed that

their
petitioners were likely to assert :tkR Fi:fl.:h Amendment
privilege♦

) -wruse-te-testHy.

~R-an4D
J.-1.ul...
Prior to p0titione1:lflll' scheduled
,A,.

appearances, the Government applied to the district
court for an order directing petitioners to answer
questions and produce evidence EREi before the grand

2.
jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to
18 U.S. C.

§

6002-03 (1970).

Petitioners opposed

issuance of the order, contending primarily that the
scope of the immunity authorized by the statute was not
coextensive with ~

the privilege against self-

incrimination, and was therefore not sufficient to compel
the
their testimony over a cli~m o:t/privilege. The district
court rejected this contention, and ordered petitioners
to appear before the grand jury and answer its
questions under the statutory grant of immunity.

1/

Petitioners appeared befor e the grand jur y, but refused
to answer its questions. Petitioners were brought before
the district court, and each persisted in his refusal to
answer the grand jury's questions.

The court found both

in contempt, and committed them to the custody of the
Attorney General until either they answered the grand

k
jury ' s questions ~

the term of the grand jury expired.

*
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Stewart v. United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA 9 1971).

--

This Court granted certiorari to resolve the important

.

A

-

-•

~

-

---

prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony
relates in order to compel a witness to give testimony
before a grand jury over a claim of the privilege against

w

~ self-incrimination, or whether immunity from
the use of the compelled testimony and eviden~e derivedj
.A...v\ ,\

( ,U'T\'I. .'(

,·

~

"

,, I'
~

I

therefrom suffices to that end_: 402 U.

~~ +u-.. ~~ IV9,• -~

~

-.

~

~

(1971) \ _

I•

Immunity 3ix statutes, like the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, have historical roots
which run deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence.

Soon

after the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
because firmly established in law, it was recognized that
a.

1

the privilege did not pply when immunity had been
2

granted.

Parliament enacted an immunity statute in

4.
3

1710 directed against illegal gambling, which became
the model for an identical immunity statute enacted in l&
These

who was compelled to answer the loser's charges.

After

the winner responded and returned his ill-gotten gains,
he was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and discharged from any further or other punishment, forfeiture
or penalty, which he . . . may have incurred by the
5

playing for, and winning such money. . .

II

Another

notable instance of the early use of immunity legislation
is the 1725 impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor
Macclesfield.

The Lord Chancellor was accused by the

House of Commons of the sale cf public offices and
appointments.

In order to compel the testimony of

Masters in Chancery who had allegedly purchased their
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could
incriminate themselves by testifying that they had

5.
purchased their offices, Parliament enacted a statute
granting immunity to persons then holding office as
, Masters in Chancery.

Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's
6

Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767

, 1147 (1725).

The legislatures in colonial Pennsylvania and New York
7

enacted immunity legislation in the eighteenth century,

(, 1 "

8

and federal statutes have existed since 1857.

1137::
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ti0n, the power of government to compel residents to
testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American
p

4

juri~rudence.
~

4;,.,

~ , ,,~ -.. / ,,.. , ' ~
,t
The JX)WerJt~ eempel i:e,s-i-aents-terappear ~

9

I<

A

nd- testif~ in c.QU.Ft was established by:s: statute in

~~..e...,
I' 10

England \• 1562,

and Lord Bacon observed in 1612

that all subjects owed the King their "knowledge and
11

discovery. "

While it is not clear when grand juries

first resorted to compulsory process to secure the
attendance and testimony of witnesses, the general

6.
common law principle that "the public has a right to every
man's evidence" was considered an "indubitable certainty"
1

C)

Rider A, p. 6

Cff

In his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Com 'm,

, 93-4
378 U.S. 52/(1963), Mr. Justice White put in proper perspective this
essential power of government:
"Among the necessary and most important of the
powers of the states as well as the Federal Government ~
to assure the effective functioning of government ~
ordered society is the broad power to compel residents
to testify in court or before grand juries or agencies.
See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273. Such testimony
constitutes one of the Government's primary sources of
information. The privilege against self-incrimination,
safeguarding a complex of significant values, represents
a broad exception to governmental power to compel the
testimony of the citizenry. " ~~bt~bamb~~!k

,,,----

- - r-n _.._

'-'V

,._,\.J.I.J..l._tJ'-'.A.

..,,.....,U..,,.J.J..J..J.VJ.J.J/A J..0 .1.J.J..lJ.J.l.CU

uy

LllC

I\

Fifth Amendment privilege against

:K:Elmcop:

compulsory

self-incrimination, as well as by other testimonial
exemptions and privileges which also exempt witne~es
14
from the testimonial duty.

The privilege against self-

.7~.)

c:';
/~~
/-1JL-- I-,
,:1t.=-

!I}

I.

II.,-=t"'

I

,.ta 0,■ 11

~

1c.

,r'~

t:::o ,
I

~

....•• ~ •
I I W, ,4.

1'i,, 0, ·4

n a t,

e,(= C aJ•:

., ioc:u fs ►O f'/ '--1'
. I
~ M

{~/.t.- - ,...,..-:-....,.,'
____J - ,.
.

ll'

0J._

t.

,

~ " " t-Y"' ;'.

incrimination reflects a complex of our fundamental values ~i'~ I

15
and most noble aspirations,

and '·' registers an important

advance in the development of our liberty - 'one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself

16
K:mix civiliz~d'."

The privilege can be asserted in any

proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicia\

.

17

investigatory or adjudicatory;

and it protects against any

disclosures which the witn_ess reasonably believes could
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other
8

evidence that might be so.used. ,\
a.,...,
l
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Immunity statutes.Sij8k to a.06-0mraedate-t-he

I
~-,,,
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-oower-ef go¥.ernment -to compel testim-01ry,,

"1~

of residents to testify.

The& existence,_ reflects the ~
and the fact that many offenses

are of such a character that the only persons omtd«=l
capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated
in the crime.

Indeed, their origins were in the context
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II.

Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, which is that "no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," deprives Congress of power to enact laws which compel selfincrimination, even if the requisite immunity is granted prior to the
compulsion of the incriminatory testimony.

In other words, petitioners

assert that no immunity statute, however drawn, can afford a lawful
basis for compelling incriminatory testimony.

They ask us to

reconsider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896),
and Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), decisions which

~ the constitutionality of immunity~ statutes.*

We find no

merit to this contention and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullman.
Petitioners' second contention is that the scope of the immunity
provided by the federal witness immunity statute enacted in 1970, 18
U.S. C. 600~ is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege
*Accord, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968); Murphy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924) (Brandeis, J.); Heike v.
United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913) (Holmes, J. ).

Rider A, p. (ii)( Immunity Cases)

--

The statute attacked provides in relevant part as follows:
[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of /his privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order ( or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used against the witness in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.*

::e:

*For other provisions of 1970 Act (which is part .C, of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970) relative to immunity of witnesses, see
18 U.S. C. 6001-60004.

)I
' JJ,~

iii.

I/ ~

'9

I <./-2, lt.5. S'</- 7 (I %f
Petitioners rely pon Counselman v. ~Hitchcock, SHtt!!:3-,
J
I\

the first case in which t is Court considered a constitutional challenge
to an immunity statute.

the Immunity Act of 1868,

provided that n

Wa, judicial proceeding

btained from a party or witness by means
dT'

shall be given in evidence, or in any manner

"

used against(him). . . in any court of the United states . . . "
Ndtvithstanding a grant of immunity and order to testify under the
1868 act, the witness, asserting his privilege against compulsory
:smf self-incrimination, refused to testify before a federal grand jury.

He was consequently adjudged in contempt of court. On appeal, this
Court construed the statute to protect a witness only against the use
of the specific testimony compelled from him under
immunity.

~

the grant of

This construction meant that the statute "would not

prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to
be used in evidence against him.

11

The Court held that an immunity

statute cannot supplant the privilege against self incril_Ilination, and
a grant of immunity cannot compel testimony over a claim of the

I I)
ii.

against compulsory self -incrimination, and therefore is unconstitutional.

~,1-~I

,

~ Petitioners dra:V a distinction~

/

between statutes which

rf:;t:1::-L
~9.~~
~ g ra.Rt" immuaity-hom ~roeoecatiuxF( son r u i i ~e rrm:t=to-,as ---1-1:t::Fa:ns-

~ ~ f - h _ . , ~~ -

acta:,.. f' immuni:t~-) and those which limit the immunity)

o-. use of
'j(--

the compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom .b ~
~

es

f

~

~h_ h._~
referred h~ a-s "liSa-aRdJ-rn;it:sJi' 1mnn mit-y)'>f: Th~ test, de~r:cfi)-re,~

.--k,okJ-..
,i.,,u.;,

history as well as the decisions of this Court, is whether the immunity
granted petitioners under this statute is coextensive with the scope of
the privilege.

If so, their refusals to answer based on the privilege

were unjustified, and the judgments of contempt were proper.

Brown

v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896). If on the other hand, the immunity

f

granted petitioners was not as comprehensive s the protection afforded
by the privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing to answer~ and
the judgments of contempt must be vacated.
266

u. s.

McCarthy v. Arndstein,

34, 42 (1942).

*See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971). 'I'J:restatute here
· tf61.ved'; 18 U. ~
, prov1 es or e a er type immunity. Whe
a witness ms coITJ)elled by a district court order to testify over a
claim of the privilege aga st self- incrimination,__th.e---s~ute
specifies: "No testimony r other inform ierrc'ompelle un
·ne
, .A order (or any informatio direc~~ctly derive rom such
(;JV ~ ,r · testim911y or other inform · -nj may be used against the witness in any
~
J \-0 criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order."
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privilege unless the scope of the statutory grant is coextensive with
the scope of the privilege.

Since the 1868 Act, as construed by the

Court, xvatk would permit the use against the immunized witness of
evidence derived from his compelled testimony, it did not protect
the witness to the same extent that a claim of the privilege would
protect him.

The statute accordingly was held invalid.

In the

course of its opinion, the Court said:
We are clearly of opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United states. [The
immunity statute] does not supply a complete
protection from all the perils against which the
constitutional prohibition was designed to guard,
and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In
view of the constitutional provision, a statutory
enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which
the question relates. 142 U. S. at 858-86.
Sixteen days after the decision, a new immunity bill was
introduced by Senator Cullom, who urged that enforcement of the
Interstate Commerce Act would be impossible in the absence of an
effective immunity statute.

The bill, which became the Compulsory

Testimony Act of 1893, was drafted specifically to meet the broad
language in Counselman set forth above.

The new Act provided that:

z-

.,

)?

,

v.
no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise. . . .
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443
This type of L actional~
for the numerous federal~

~unity ~

he basic form

statutes until 1970 when, after

a reexamination of the adequacy of existing law and of the applicable
constitutional principles, the Congress enacted the statute here under
consideration.
-NohvithstaH:clifig the pr eei:pttHous congressional rcspgnse--te

C___ounse lro an

I'-

..,

~~
The new statute does not'afford (the) absolute i~munity against
future prosecution" referred to in Counselman. Rath'e__r, it was
framed to meet the rationale of Counselman and subsequent decisions
of the Court, namely, that immunity from the use of compelled
testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with tn.e
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege ~~ - r i ~ .
The statute explicitly proscribes the use in any x criminaf ase of
"testimony or other information compelled under the order ( or any

other information)".
pelled testimony and all evidence derived therefrom is coextensive

~

with the JPIX1XX privilege against s e l f ~ incrimination and is
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.

-~

~

While

H..-~u-?,

the grant of immunity musti be CO<ilxtensi.vo witk the privilege, it
need not be broader. \lie bclie:r.rc that fhe transactional type of
'

~ f-'-'-1L ~ ~
immunity, wliich~immunigos against prosecution for the offense to
which the compelled testimony relates, places the witness in a
:sx10u:mdr superior position - affording him a considerably broader

)~
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~ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~
protection

..I than

the Fifth Amendment privilege itself.

~
holding is consistent with the conceptual basis of
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decisions of the Court.

The broad language in Counselman relied upon by petitioners.) was
unnecessary to the Court's decision, and ~ordinE!iv must be considered_as di:,!um, J The statut~ efore the Court, as construed by
it, was plainly deficient in its failure to prohibit the use against the
immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony.
The Court repeatedly emphajfe.zed this deficiency, noting that the
statute:
could not, and would not, prevent the use of
his testimony to search out other testimony
to be used in evidence against him or his
property, in a criminal proceeding. . . . ,
142 U.S. at 564,
that it:
could not prevent the obtaining and the use
of witnesses and evidence which should be
attributable directly to the testimony he might
give under compulsion, and on which R he might
be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had
refused to answer, he could not possibly have
been convicted . . . , 142 U. S. at 564,
and that it:

•

I(:,
viii
afford no protection against the use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom
a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of
sources of information which may supply other
means of convicting the witness or party. 142
U.S. at 586.

11 ·~

.

~~

.

~-1<,1..,~

~

Tbe c ~t in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1965)
A

~

~ H,._c_ ~
interpreted Counselman as holding that the statute there:max involved
/\
was insufficient:
because the immunity granted was incomplete,
in that it merely forbade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of
information obtained from the compelled
testimony.
350 U. S. at 436-37. (Emphasis supplied)

6) --7'

(Here return to Pete's draft on p. 16, commencing with

k the discussion of Murphy.)

16.
-- this Court has heretofore not been squarely confronte

with the question whether immunity from the us/

f com-

pelled testimony and evidence derived therefr om is
coextensive with the scope of the privilegy xi.K against
self
39
:Et£xincrimination.
While a grant of immunity must be
coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination,
it need not be broader.

~

belie.@Mi.u.tt 3 mmunity from

prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony
relates is broader than the scope of the privilege against

~~ .t..~J- rt.._
self-incrimination, and ~ i u-. MiRi1RaH;" immunity
claim
required to compel testimony over a Kxi:mm of the privilege.
We hold that immunity from the use of compelled testimony
and all evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with
the privilege against self-incrimination, and is sufficient

II

~
/vi i.i -~✓ . .
to / ompel testimony over. a cg am
. of the privilege.
~ ~~ ~
,lo ~

--~-r - .. - .

In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'm, ·378 U.S. 52 ~
j,

t

,

H« 1 'fo.:#J ✓ \IL t3 Is L ....e
( 1964), the Court )earehllly eonsi:deretl immunity from use
~

of compelled testimony and evidence derived thereform.

17.
The Murphy petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a
hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor. After :e: refusing to answer certain questions
on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate
them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution
40
<.

l

' !
!

under the laws of New Jersey and New York.

They

continued to refuse to testify, however, on the ground that
.I

their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal
law, to which the immunity did not purport to extend.
They were tn:eri adjudged in civil contempt, and that judgment

41
was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
This Court in Murphy undertook an examination
of the policies and purposes of the privilege against selfincrimination, and held that the privilege protects state
witnesses against incrimination under federal as well as
state law, and federal witnesses against incrimination
under state as well as federal law.

Applying this

principle to the state immunity legislation before it,

18.
I/

the Court held the

e constitutional

\\

rule to be that:

a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in
any manner by federal officials in connection
with a criminal prosecution against him. We
conclude, moreover, that in order to
implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the State and
Federal Governments in investigating and
prosecuting crime, the Federal Government
must be prohibited from making any such
~
use of compelled testimony and its :fim: fruits .

---

378 U. S. at 79.

T he Court went on to emphasize that this rule left the
state witness and the Federal Government, against which

the witness had immunity only from the use of the compelled
testimony and evidence derived therefrom, "in substantially
the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege
in the absence of a state grant of immunity." 378 U.S. at 79.

µ ~ -- ---:Jr{
In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), decided

____________,~

~C-

~

{1iOJ1~

the same day as Murphy, the Court held that the Fifth
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Amendment privilege ~HG~ rm:ipul.sGr-v-self...-ine-Fimination
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was saf€gua~
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Fourteenth Amendment.

*

The Court also held that the

-

*)~'1:1
•

~

-

'

,

~

. Oi

-----Lpt;;

6 S2

~_A__,---,.~~~"7.H

~\.

~

-r •

I

~?.11 . -e v~

Gr'>-V

~1

?

,f-vp v

~ ~

-----I----!.--!....

I)

y-yz_/

.

r

,,

l?'lf, ;;;fig..

L-

.
- ..,, .......,.
~

'

,

-.

~

~ ~ ~

~=_;fa,Y~

· ~ ~ if' · ·g, · ..,,,_ '6 r

I

,•,-

.,~- ~~~~
~
~ --,,-ry ~ '

~

-J

/

~

.

•

~~ ~ 0 " 7 , ~ ~

~

. __,,, ~ - ~ ~ ~ h ~ .
: ~ ~ ,--rrry -----~ ~:~
~ ~ 07 ~ ·;·
~

(

- ~~~-;}A

,;,

~(hi('~~~~

<

'

f

s?

/

~ ~ h r. / ~ "7"- tyn/4
y
r-o ~ , , ~.,~~ ~

~

. f::t~ *
kt

VJ

»

~ 12 '7 "'h ~ · ~
:r y - ~

.:}? .: ?=I

,-9.,,=, ~
. r ?~

..

>

"i,,

~1

C=t;?

I?]::. .,,, i,,

tJ >~~

;

~
...

·-

~
.. >

4f f~"t<J

;;;:c;r5 ~

.

-

r

t

""?-I ~ ~ rl? - *
- ~~~- - - -- - I ~-,

""

~ ro

_',

-

(

.

r

~

/l.p

. . . -111.

~

- u

J1

19.
same standards would determine thee extent of the
42

privilege in state and in federal proceedings,

E

for

the same substantive guarantee of the Bill of Rights was
involved.

This holding, that the scope of the privilege is

the same :ilm irrespective of the jurisdiction seeking to

~

compel testimony, was an important

~

of the decision

43 - - - --in Murph?) ( Murphy's holding that a state witness's
_../
~

privilege against self-incrimination is not infringed when
the :fmx federal government is prohibited from using the
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom, and
that such a prohibition ~

_.; o f-the-com-i~ell€<Hesti-mon

leaves the witness and the federal government in substantial\y
the same position as if the witness has claimed the privilege
I

...
and not testified, compels the conclusion that immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and v:vidrt evidence
derived therefrom is coextensive with the privilege agains
/

compulsory self inc-rimination.

The

Mur:phy Crurt held

that the privilege protects a state witness against

20.

incrimination under federal law, and that the protection
.,,

-

accorded by the privilege is achievfe d by pro9-ihlti'figthe

/

I

/

.,,,,.

federal gov riiment from using/th; compelled testimony

7

7 t > idence derived there~

21.
3 / rhis understanding of Murphy is reflected
in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
In discussing the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, the Court noted:
Answers may be compelled regardless of the
privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled
testimony or its fruits in connection
with a criminal prosecution against
the person t~stifying. Counselman y.
Hitchcock, L142 U.S. 542/, 585-586·
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,

u.s. 5~7. 79.

L178

jf-

392 U.S. at 276. / £ ,

r Again,
--------in United

States y. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606

(

(1971), the Court, citing Murphy, approved a
statutory scheme compelling potentially incrimina+in~

~

admissions, but barring state and federal

prosecutorial authorities from using the com-

)

pelled admissions,

\

Although the Court noted that

cf'

it was not reaching the broader question of the suffi-

l

ciency of immunity from use of compelled testi-

I

mony and evidence derived therefrom in the context

\

of immunity statutes, the restriction on use of

I

the compelled information, as well as the general

I

unavailability of the information, was deemed suffi

~

cient to supplant the privilege.
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1. state of case p. 1-3.
2. Early history of immunity statute, p. 3-5.
3. Power to Compel Testimony, p. 5, 6.
4.

Fifth Amendment Privilege - p. 6,7.
A limitation on f3.

5. Immunity Statutes and their importante, p. 7, 8.
6. Consideratioo of cases relevant to issue in this case - p. 9.
'

Counselman, ~ 9, 10.

The Issue Here, p. 10, 11.
statute, p. 11
CounseJman, p. 12, 13, 14.

tn1rnan, p. 15.
7. Distinction between ''Use"-and "Transactional", p. 15. (Issue
not squarely faced before) p. 16.
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Murphy, p. 16-20
Gardner and Freed, p. 21
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Covert E. Parnell, III

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: March 6, 1972

No. 70-117 Kastigar v. U.S.
Your draft opinion of 3/2/72 is excellent.

I believe, however,

that some restructuring may be desirable before we print.
I hope you will have an opportunity before you leave to put
it through a second draft - reflecting (i) your own refinements and
additions, (ii) the minor suggestions I have made, and (iii) consideration of the following points and comments. These are based, for the
most part, on the Solicitor General's brief. I mention the points to
focus our attention on them to assure either that they are already
adequately treated, that they lack sufficient merit to be mentioned,
or that they may be added or used to enlarge the text or footnotes:
1.

Purposes served. The SG mentions the purposes of the

privilege at p. 8 of his brief arguing "that neither the purposes
served by the privilege nor the decisions of this Court require the
expansive reading attributed to the privilege by Petitioner." Commencing
on p. 10, he makes the valid point that the privilege was aimed at

.'

...
2.

-

the evils of the inquisition and the star chamber; was not designed
to prohibit the government from using a man's compelled testimony
to punish him; it was certainly not designed to allow a witness to use
the privilege "to shield others or to relieve himself from the central
duty to give evidence" (p. 11). He cites Rogers v. U.S., 340 U.S. 367,
371 for the view that the privilege is "solely for the benefit of the

witness" (p. 12); and concludes:
"that the central principle that derives from the Fifth
Amendment cases is that a citizen who is called upon
to give testimony or information to the government
need not incriminate himself . . . (but) the witness
has no proper claim to withhold information about
others. "
In footnote 6 the SG refers - gingerly - to the crime of mis-

prison of felonies.

There has been a decision by the English Court

of Appeal within the last three or four years sustaining the conviction
of a person under the English misprison statute, for failing to report
a known felony.

This is relevant tangentially, if at all, only as

supporting the duty to testify.
2.

Treatment of Counselman v. Hitchcock. Your memo

raises the question whether the draft is "too weak" in its distinguishing
of Counselman.

I do not think so. Yet, it may be well to compare

more carefully than I have been able to do at this time, the SG's

. ,.

3.
-

analysis of Counselman (pp. 14-19) with what you have in the draft.
I believe the latter can be strengthened to some extent. Nor do I
think it necessary or desirable to overrule to Counselman.
3. Treatment of Murphy. The SG also relies somewhat more
heavily than you do on Murphy. He starts out (p. 22) with the assertion
that:
"The Court in Murphy squarely faced the issue whether,
to be coextensive with the privilege, an immunity grant
had to afford immunity from prosecution, or whether
assurance that the testimony of a witness would not be
used in any way was constitutionally sufficient. "
In not-a 10, also on p. 22, the SG states that "the issue could
not be avoided".

He points out that the states lack power to give

absolute immunity from federal prosecution.

If the dictum in

Counselman is the law, then no state could grant immunity at all.
If, however, the Fifth Amendment forbids only the use of compelled

testimony and its fruits, the states do have the power to enact valid
immunity statutes.

This point is made by the SG at page 25, as well

as in footnote 10. It seems to me to be an important point. You
address it to some extent in the draft, but perhaps you can be more
explicit.
4.

Legislative history.

I note that you have a poor view of

the use of legislative history on a constitutional issue.

I believe, however,

•

<

..
4.

-

that the Court has ::icD6 often buttressed its position - even on constitutional issues - by reference to legislative history. Here, where
the history is impressive I think it should be used - at least in an
extensive footnote, expanding upon a brief reference in the text.

The

SGhas summarized this - accurately, I assume - at pp. 27-32.

It

appears that this statute was recommended by the Brown Commission,
after studying the Supreme Court cases; in addition, there is the
President's statement, the Committee reports which specifically
address the issue before the Court; and Congressman Poff' s good
statement (p. 30).
Professor Dickson - unknown to me - is also quoted on p. 30,
with a good quote in note 16. If Prof. Dickson has good academic
credentials, it might be wise to devote a footnote to what he says.
Also, Judge Edwards (Sixth Circuit) is quoted in note 17 on
p. 33.

Ju~ Edwards is widely regarded as a defender of civil

liberties.
5.

Need for "use" rather than "transactional" immunity.

The SG's brief (pp. 34-36) gives some illustrations of why it makes
a difference to government. I have heard it argued that there really
is no significant difference in terms of practical consequences.
Indeed, during oral argument it was urged - in practical effect - that

. . .,

' ... 1111

5.
-

use immunity might limit the questions asked by the state, as there
would be the possibility of opening up leads to other crimes which
would then be immunized to some extent.

I am not sure as to the

pros and cons here, but wish you would take a look at what the SG
says and see whether any of this merits attention in our opinion.
6.

White's opinion. I would like to make appropriate use of

Justice White's opinion in Murphy, especially for the reason which
you mentioned to me.
7.

Dissenting opinion. We can be sure that it will be drawn

largely from Justice Brennan's opinion in Zicarelli.
L. F. P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Covert E. Parnell, III

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: March 6, 1972

No. 70-117 Kastigar v. U.S.
In restructuring the draft, let's consider the following:

A.

Move the "History" (Point 1) to a note under Point 5.

This would launch the opinion strongly on the ''Need and Power"
( Point 2 ), fallowed by Points 4 and 5.

The English history is not

too important in view of solid history of U.S. use of immunity.
B.
has merit.

The use of Counselman (p. 7) to introduce the "issue"
Yet, this causes us to fractionate the discussion of

Counselman.

What do you think of stating the issue and the statute

(p. 10, 11) before we address Counselman, so that the entire analysis
of Counselman would follow the "issue" and be an integrated treatment
of that case ?
C.

Murphy is cited (13) - in the middle of the discussion of

Counselman - for the "coextensive point".

Let's cite other cases for

that point, and save Murphy for the full treatment later on.
D.

After the analysis of Counselman (15), the draft cites

Ullman as supporting thev.i~w that Counselman has been interpreted

✓

J

..,,

4

.

·-

-

--

2.
consistently with use immunity.

Can any other cases be cited to

this effect other than Murphy?
E.

The holding of the Court is stated between the discussion

of Counselman and Murphy (16).

This may not be the best place.

Possibly we could state the holding flatly near the beginning, and then
summarize it again at the end,{m.ost most---sf. f>. 1-6--to the end}.
L. F. P. , Jr.

np; ::;::;

.11.;1.;

u/ u; , c.

'
No. 70-117 KASTIGAR v. U.S.

-

Outline of Pete's First Draft
1.

State of case p. 1-3.

2. Early history of immunity statute, p. 3-5.

I

3.

Power to Compel Testimony, p. 5, 6.

4.

Fifth Amendment Privilege - p. 6, 7.
A limitation on #3.
Immunity Statutes and their importance, p. 7, 8.
Consideration of cases relevant to issue in this case - p. 9.
Counselman, p. 9, 10.
The Issue Here, p. 10, 11.

ff-

Statute, p. 11
Counselman, p. 12, 13, 14.
Ullman, p. 15.
Distinction between "Use" and "Transactional", p. 15. (Issue
not squarely faced before) p. 16.
Holding - p. 16

:rJJ,

Murphy, p. 16-20
Gardner and Freed, p. 21

( V-

(

8.

Discussion of Rationale, p. 22-24.
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No. 70-117 KASTIGAR AND STEWART v. U.S.
This case presents the question whether the United states
Government can compel testimony from an unwilling witness, who
invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, by conferring on the witness immunity from use of
the compelled testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, 1111as
well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the testimony.
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United states
grand jury in the Central District of California on February 4, 1971.
The Government believed that petitioners were likely to assert their
Fifth Amendment privilege.

Prior to the scheduled appearances,

the Government applied to the district court for an order directing
petitioners to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand
jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U.S. C.
§

6002-03 (1970).

Petitioners opposed issuance of the order,

contending primarily that the scope of the immunity authorized
bj the statute was not coextensive with the privilege against

2.
SVf

self-incrimination, and ~

p~114 t\.e

rr- ,, le,r <trcl

or~ not sufficient to ~ ompel their

testimony over a claim of the privilege.

The district court rejected

this contention, and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand
jury and answer its questions under the ~ tatutor'iJ grant of immunity.
Petitioners appeared
answer •

but refused to

The~
questions. ~ etitioner~ were brought before the district

court, and each persisted in his refusal to answer the grand jury's
questions.

The court found both in contempt, and committed them

to the custody of the Attorney General until either they answered the
I

grand jury's questions or the term of the grand jury expired. /
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA 9 1971).

Stewart v.

This Court granted

certiorari to resolve the important question whether testimony may
b~ afch'li~ i"""'t.l""½
(,()lY'pel\e~
be compelled p f the immunity granted i ~ from the use of the ltestimony

and evidence derived therefrom ("use and derivative use"\or
whether it is necessary fimder the Constitutimy to grant immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which the compelled testimony
*The contempt order was issued pursuant to [§ 30l(a) of the \
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970] 28 U.S. C. § 182 f (l'l"?OJ
1 ~ve M+ u~d f"'e ·•s~or-+ -f,fle ·• of -l&,e
bia-lute. , becms.e I {~;111'- ,f loob: '~""er
s.,llj ;" -l~s ".ifse wklc:." "t\.1 ,.,o{t,.:i,\J

4-o J.-c

L,lli1~

orge~iz.J

C-fl

3.
relates ("transactional immunity").

402 U.S. 971 (1971)

{we conclude

lo d,,fe +\.e
C-O•,eL.u,ct1 .~ len1t.s that use and derivative use immunity, as afforded by 18 U.S. C.
of

-U•~

J,~
t'\14«clt

"o~
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6002,

cc..,,,4e11!.1~et1es.s

da,,Gar-J anJ.
l''liMCttie ,#3'

c{'t' .-,11')11ee.
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is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege and accordingly

-hi I{ow~ ,
Wl~br\

°"'c

affirm the judgment below]
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f rio..- n!!(e,el\c~
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The power of government to compel residents to testify in
court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is

JfV

firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence.

The power

with respect to courts was established by statute in England as
early as 1562,

0P
and Lord Bacon observed in 1612 that all subjects
}($7

owed the King their "knowledge and discovery."

While it is not

clear when grand juries first resorted to compulsory process to
secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the general
common law principle that "the public has a right to every man's
evidence"~was considered an "indubitable certainty" which "cannot
../

Jif f)
be denied" by 1742.

The power to compel testimony, and the

corresponding duty of residents to testify, are recognized in the

l..rL

Sixth Amendment requirement that an accused -by Aconfronted with

4.
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.

The first Congress b:111ned iiis-

~~

attentiofl. t o the Sixth Amendment cg~ pw.laol!y process guarantee
J\

aH:d impi.emcntcd i:t in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided

"10

y.f
for the compulsory attendance of witnesses in the federal courts.
,-n__..

No paragraph.

A

>hy v. Waterfront Com ' m,

Mr. Justice White noted the

~~s~~]

importance of thi s essential

ilh4te put in proper

power of government in his concurring opinion in Murphy y .
Waterfront Comm'n, 378

u. s.

mment:

52,
>st important of the
te Federal Government
?; of government in an
~r to compel residents

93-94 (1964):

Among the necessary
and most important powers
of the States as well as the
Federal Government to assure
i juries or agencies.
the effective functioning of
r. S. 273. Such testimony
government in an ordered society t ' s primary sources of
is the broad power to compel
tst self-incrimination,
residents to testify in court
cant values, represents
or before grand juries or agencies..,1 po"\\e r to compel the
See Blair v . United States ,
250 u.s. 273 . Such testimony
constitutes one of the Government~
"'fh
primary sources of information.
r, er~
,.{ J. ne power -co compe1 -cesnmony 1s not absolute. l:t is
/,;

I/'
kt~ (f
·

e•e,v.
•
# Or\\ 4e ~e&-limoti,ol
limited by the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfrw. t'Yl~ev-
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Me.
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,,J
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e h·N" ~e~I

incrimination, as well as by other testimonial e~
81c)1r1rl

~'"f" I Oij

S.l!'lr .• ,,

fa

•

en+

f ••·viletje
mptions and

I':

privile es which also exempt witnesses from the testimonial duty.

1

~b•"'~+

1-" . .-W\C\"iV"linil

·o"
The privilege aga:in~~imirlation reflects a complex of

fl.7
J

4.
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.

The first Congress h-111ned ik. -

~4-J--

.

attention t o the Sixth Amendment compulaory process guarantee
J\

aHd- i.mi,lemcntcEl it in the Judiciary Act of 1 789, which provided

610

y.f
for the compulsory attendance of witnesses in the federal courts.

1 1 ~ r ~ ~-S'
In~

A

oncurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Com'm,

G '-""- ~ ·iu.v r~ s~~1
1

378 U.S. 52, 93-4 (l~

efol).~

<z;;>-"l°S ~~r'ce-~~e
1l

r . .A>•tice Wltite put in proper

perspective this essential power of government:
Among the necessary and most important of the
powers of the States as well as the Federal Government
to assure the effective functioning of government in an
ordered society is the broad power to compel residents
to testify in court or before grand juries or agencies.
See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273. Such testimony
constitutes one of the Government ' s primary sources of
information. [ The privilege against self-incrimination,
safeguarding a complex of significant values, represents
....1J a broad exception to governmental po\\e r to compel the
·y:," { testimony of the citizenry

J

1/
(}..'fe.

txJ-

J t he power to compel testimony is
ot.-

Y\1.Ltv1~er

o~

e"el\\f' ,c •;,

401"1\

lher~
not absolute. [!.t is
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-les+imoti•ill dJA~'j
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I/'

limited by the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-

+he ,wis-l ,~f)•V-"W>-'i o~

wL,d .,~ .µe. t"i-r4k

~ettJ11,,en.f.-

incrimination, as well as by other testimonial e~

f" ·vi let;1e

mptions and
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P.rivile ges which also exempt witnesses from the t estimonial duty. J
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5.

J,-5 11
our fundamental values and most noble aspirations,

and'registers

an important advance in the development of our liberty - 'one of the

1

!,i i
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized'. "
The privilege can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal,

vt 4 /t>
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory;

and it

protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably
believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to

P, J,11'
other evidence that might be so used.

IJ

This Courtpias been zealous
'

to safeguard the values which underlie the privileg(

/ 'V

[Pete - perhaps

;,3
you can cite cases or select an appropriate quotatioii}
""~~ l-ill~e

h\si,..,-1(

roil$.

be~ ,..,

/~

~jlo·fltl'~(,,-iA,- J~n$fru,r,.

Immunity statutes_,[are not incompatible with these values.
Rather they ~ eek a rational accommodation between the imperatives
of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel
citizens to testify.

The existence of these statutes reflects the

1W\pc,,.,.\<iYICC.

l necessity) of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such
a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony
are those implicated in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in

'~
I See.~·~·'

Mir.dnJ(!

!...· A,1lOl'i/) 38t/

a.s.

'1.36, L-/ "/~-4~ ( 1966).

j

6.
the context of such offenses,

0

I~ I c.f

and their primary use has been to
/

~ df I

investigate such offenses.

J

Congress included immunity statutes

in many of the regulatory measures adopted in the first half of this

'IA- ~ /f;
century,

and this Court on several occasions has characterized

such statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various

p1. I/J l'1
federal regulatory acts.

The commentators also have recognized

the critical importance of immunity statutes in investigating certain

~~
types of crimes.

,f

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court

in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), observed that
such statutes have ''become part of our constitutional fabric , "
350 U.S. at 438.

/2 )

7

Prior to the enactment of the statute under con-

side ration in this case, there were · in force over 50 federal immunity

'Jl5~U>
statutes.

In addition, every State in the Union, as well as the
.l:R} ~)

District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one or more such statutes.
[The essential role of immunity statutes in our constitutional hisory

}.
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+e.- }.'c)v-

11"
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is therefore self-evident.
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7.
II
Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, which is that "no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him~ l f, " deprives Congress of power to enact laws which compel self-

t,()ft\ple¼e.
tn,M ft'OSoecJ,on
incrimination, even if~he requisit~ immunityj is granted prior to the
compulsion of the incriminatory testimony.

In other words, petitioners

assert that no immunity statute, however drawn, can afford a lawful
basis for compelling incriminatory testimony.

They ask us to

reconsider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 491 (1896),
and Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), decisions which
~

',;21

-o·

uphtld the constitutionality of immunity statutes. /

We find no

merit to this contention and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullman.

]IT.
Petitioners' second contention is that the scope of the immunity
provided by the federal witness immunity statute ~ nacted in 1979, 18

(1q70)
U.S. C. 6001 is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege
·
· Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968); Murphy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924) (Brandeis, J. ); Heike v.
United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913) (Holmes, J. ).
!.;

wirle~,."4

Cciruy,•n , 37"1 ll.S.. S~

(1q <,ti); M.~ ~r-Ui~

8.
na-1---

IJ,A

ffic.ien+ '11? su.rrllltd

-tie pr,v,l~'le

JflJ C,C(llpt!I

-ks.ti

ove,r "'-

c.la,.,, o{ ~e
,,r,'11: le3e.

against compulsory self-incrimination, and therefore is(w
~ w,fne,, ,~ 0Vt\pelttJ
relevant part ,~ s follows]

~~

-th-irt wk"

Jfn

lJti,$ a&(.to• _., ,
c~.?U "P

"'l

D ■ t ·•utionrt!:J

~h'id

The statuteiattackecy provides
uiu<'t' ()r-Jer ~ {ed-i~ ~ver ~ cla,~ ,,.( ~e. pWi\r,l~je :

[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order ( or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used against the witness in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order. -Y ~~
;t «.s. <!. ?:,oo-< (t'1"o).

;,~ .,(
••-ti,~ -,,rJf!r "
t" 'ftt s4.,)~fe.

[Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes which grant

r '-'
f\"it\k

"'i

immunity from prosecution and those which limit the immunity -

~.$

,e;>/lj _a.
bP•C.- See
Poie q_

as does the present statute - to use of the compelled testimony and

J

t.01'1•.\i-ht~o~\ t.4-.,.J.,nS

evidence derived therefrom. **J The oORstitutionallJ:es~, rooted in l~it..
If\

history>as well aslthe decisions of this Court, is whether the immunity
granted[Petitioner~ under this statute is coextensive with the scope

~
f.:+t¼mtt £ I
of the privilege. If so, Ltheir] refusals to answer based on the
privilege were unjustified, and the judgments of contempt were
-lur

-He. ~".(. Jl

1fjlt',11tn1.L

rf"• 'lli\ege

proper,

1

h?>$

fr .(ll,,e.\.$ .

-re1l\.Ollel.

-4-k, Jai-,e,,s

a~rn!.-1

..uluc1 4-ite

Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). IfJon the other

.

I$

hand, the immunity granted[petitioners was] not as comprehensive

,z~ / For other provisions of 1970 Act~ which is Part V of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970LJrelative to immunity of witnesses, see
18 U.S. C. 6001-;jo4(_1q 10).
[**See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971)]

anJ.

9.
as the protection afforded by the privilege, petitioners were justified
in r efusing to answer and the judgments of contempt must be vacated.
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1942).
Petitioners rely upon Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892), the first case in which this Court considered a constitutional challenge to an immunity statute.

The statute, the

Immunity Act of 1868, provided that no "evidence obtained from a
party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding shall be given
in evidence, or in any manner used against (him) . . . in any court
of the United States . . . . ' r

~

Notwithstanding a grant of immunity

and order to testify under the 1868 act, the witness, asserting his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, refused to testify

,

before a federal grand jury. He was consequently adjudged in
contempt of court.

On appeal, this Court construed the statute

to protect a witness only against the use of the specific testimony
compelledm from him under the grant of immunity.

This construction

~ Us.{;t\J.iori be+u.ee,l sk-,Ji.de, w~·c.t. w~c •~"""";½ ~o
f ro~w\;()tt -iir uf.<'e~.s. {c:. w"'-'& 4\-e ~rnpeKeJ -1-('J,mo•~ , rel<3te~ aV\tf.. -l-t,os.e w~-~
liw.i+ {l,e. u,,MU,".tu
""1.t,c 1.4.~ > -k, ,t-75
'"""""~L
·..1 , .t!. kec.. '""'e ~(c.
•
·J, .CV.om <Ase o-C -tk.Cor.,re\\eJ
{E>~i.~o~ EIV\tl eviJ@V<.e J,@ir1·u~,r -tt~<e::.C,o~ •
71'~ "'"le..d ~ '4- .
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...... ::c;,

. ll

.(.f.e..

..

fmv,k4e.

10.

,l'f d
search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him. "

;efJ

@'he Court held that an immunity statute cannot supplant the privilege
against self-incrimination, and a grant of immunity cannot compel
~e.. k(olA.1.

testimony over a claim of the privilege unless the scope of the
1

statutory grant is coextensive with the scope of the privilege]

Since

the 1868 Act, as construed by the Court, would permit the use
against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled
testimony, it did not protect the witness to the same extent that a
AcurA, "~''i. , 1Ar,!ev- ~e. f' 1r1e.¥le.. --/ia+
an ,..,~-<•11 ~·kd(!.. C<!lv\1\11+ S.Uf,1b,"1'
. r,; +\e Pr111,J~,,e, ,t,nJ ~ ~{;l>"1 b-f
clai~ of the privilege would protect him. LThe staiute ·accoram-g1y
'"'~N(j c-D~.A ~mpe-l. -+e!>-4-tr¥\o~ e,vu- a cf~,'" a{ ~« P'"•~al1!4le , u~le ss {~!qi ~.r~C.
~ ~ ~r~vrl'-<?._ ., ,,,.,..,"dj •~ <iled-~;1s1\/e wii&t -l~e. r.u:r'c. &< -RAe pr,v, 1~1~ ft,+1..e
was held ~
j In the course of its opinion, the Court[saidQ ,.... ~"e"-'$
,,,J,_ -1-\.,

.f.11..,,,~ d.alem,,,l, on wi.,L p,i,-4;.,.,,

i..,.,,'1 ,e¼ :

li½

-J..

We are clearly of opinion that no statute which
helJ trc~rr.
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. [The
immunity statute] does not supply a complete
protection from all the perils against which the
constitutional prohibition was designed to guard,
and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In
view of the constitutional provision, a statutory
enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which
the question relate_:;- 142 U.S. at 858-86.

t
Cl,1,t11g/1t1411

Sixteen days after the Ldecision, a new immunity bill was

Jei

introduced by Senator Cullom, who urged that enforcement of the
Interstate Commerce Act would be impossible in the absence of an

[" S,e

~ !· w4zt--t e.-•· , ;

>£

I,( ., , '12, ~-.,, n ( m</}J

11.

~
effective immunity statut~

The bill, which became the Compulsory

3£~

Testimony Act of 1893, was drafted specifically to meet the broad

i

language in Counselman set forth abov'f.' The new Act provided that:
no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise . . . .
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 stat. 443
..::;::::;.

09,,transactional,,immunity became the basic form
.

This[!ype

~

J'/~.

/¥l'.M'{,t:&

~

for the numerous federal/ statutes until 1970 when, after[a reexamina-

o.pplie<>ble ccn5-hfiAio1~)l p<tr.CA.f]les <'tt'I' -4k t>l.e'tfAe,C!f o{ 0,s.l,,,,3
tion of the adequacy of existing law and of the applicab1e constitutional

1ee-u1M·,Y'\,()~

I""'~

-

35,fJ:j -X:

-

principles, the] Congress enacted the statute here under consideration.
wkidt
Th¢ new statute{does not "afford (the) absolute immunity against

future prosecution" referred to in Counselman) IJ:tather, i] was
to loe ~ <.Dnc.E!f~dl ba.s.,~
J "
bf'. elc)bo,~}Tec.Y '"
~ ramec!) to meet~ he rational~ of Counselman>~nd] subsequent decisions
1 _ 1,. fl
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of the Court, namely, that immunity from the use ~ ompelled

I

J...

testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with the
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'jt!J JP

scope of the [Fifth Amendmeny privilege.

~,,fufe•.s

ett~l,c.f
The ~ tatute explicitly

pro'.(tr,p-ho•> of

proscribe~ the use in any criminal case of "testimony or other
information compelled under the order ( or any information directly
~

()tp~o
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or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)",-. i~
c,on~n 21n~
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[we hold that this protection comports] with Fifth Amendment

w~ li..olJ {Lri
standards. (immunity from the use of compelled testimony and all
JN-Se/2..T

..!.c.o~

1

~ 4-ke.

thej privilege

Its sole concern is to afford
ficient to compel

protection against being "forced

0.,.,

to give t estimony leading to

.

the infliction of 'penalties

.e frhEil grant of immunity

i i,

~~
teed not be broader.

affixed to • • • criminal acts. , "
Immunity from the use of

l\",y'\Wni½

cords full 5 mmuni, a-

compelled testimony and evidence
derived directly and indirectly
r+
~e<~oM
:1
Lfrom the compelled testimony.J
affords this protection.

'

t

It

perior position -

prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled

the compelled

Jou

:ion thanjthe Fifth

testimony in any respect, and
it therefore insures that the
testimony cannot lead to the

has never been con-

..su6~1f~+½
>ti be prosecuted.

infliction of criminal penalties
on the witness.

nceptual basis of
~

The

by it, was plainly

Ut.l.l'-.,.Lc;.11.1,,,
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rctinst the immunized

12.
or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)",_.. i 5
CPh~n21n--\

[we hold that this protection comports] with Fifth Amendment

No 1t

w~ k.olJ {t.a-l
standards. (immunity from the use of compelled testimony and all
~CCfl!l'

~-He

evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with thej privilege
against self incrimination,and therefore is sufficient to compel
0-,

testimony over a claim of the privilege. While fihey grant of immunity

~.mJ prot~J;c,t'I

c.on1Mer.11ou.rble

w,'"1

+f.-,{ e'l{f,,rJttP ~!1

must )!10t erode the scope of]the privilege, it need not be broader.
I

L!h~transactional~ype o~ immunity,

1-1,n,½

which accords full Hmmuni, a-

tiotj from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled

.
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testimony relates, [places the witness in a superior position -

a-m~~~

w*"~-s

,

-"'e.
1
~Oe!.
affording him a_i considerably broader protection thanjthe Fifth
Amendment privilege ~tselfJ

The

ha1Jprivilege has never been con-

..sub~'lt~"'t½
strued to mean that one who invokes it cannoti be prosecuted.

[I N~/21 J

~ ~~
Our holding is jconsistent with the conceptual basis of

Counselman
---- ·

. The

statute then before the Court, as construed by it, was plainly
deficient in its failure to prohibit the use against the immunized

13.
witness of evidence derived from hisKE compelled testimony.
The Court repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the
statute:
could not, and would not, prevent the use of
his testimony to search out other testimony
to be used in evidence against him or his
:/I' property, in a criminal proceeding. . . . ,
1 42 U. S. at 564
that it:
could not prevent the obtaining and the use
of witnesses and evidence which should be
attributable directly to the testimony he might
give under compulsion, and on which he might
be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had
refused to answer, he could not possibly have
been convicted . . J 142 U. S. at 564,

1·
and that it:
afford no protection against the use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom
a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of
sources of information which may supply other
means of convicting the. witness or party. 142
• S. at 58 .
Th~

f--

[The same] reasoning was reiterated in Ullman v. United
re c.c~n• lf:J

~t,

~

States, 350 U.S. 422 (1~, when the Court [fnterpreteqJ Counselman
e,s holding that the) statute lfo.ere involved] was insufficient:
because thet ~
ranted was incomplete, in
that it mere y for bade the use of the testimony given
and fa:eailetl o protect a witness from future prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information
obtained from the compelled testimony.
350 U. S. at 436-37. (Emphasis supplied)

~ ~ ~ ~

J'\lt(h,,~,
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The broad language in Counselman relied upon by petitioners was
u:1nnd-

~e wr<i.1Jer-eiR

b,t1J,nj

unnecessary to the Court's decision, and liuust be considered as
3
4~of;½
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dictum]

Col,{,+

In Murphyv. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the
cot•r.., J.€,~ ,m.MMr1i½ ~oM L,(~e ~ WO'felv,cll +e~{.;Mon.A;j ell'\£ eA/1 l.e11cc,

dtree'-1~

Je<;..,eJ.. -6-\e~OfY\.

[ issue was whether the grant of transactional immunity by a state
I~

NUT

1P
would prote.ct the constitutional rights of the witness in a federal
prosecution.

As no state has the power to forbid such a prosecution,

it was necessary for the Court to define for the first time the scope
NON

SE~IAITU Ye.

of immunity required by the ConstitutionJ The Mµrphy petitioners were
subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission
of New York Harbor.

After refusing to answer certain questions on the

ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them, petitioners were
granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New

~ They continued to refuse to testify,

Yo~~-

however, on the ground that

their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which
the immunity did not purport to extend.

They were adjudged in civil

contempt, and that judgment was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme
¢_ 'fO

Court.

r

l >J 5crLr \

(!his Court undertook an examination of the policies and
purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination,

INSERT ON PAGE 14
The issue before the Court in Murphy was whether New
Jersey and New York could compel the witnesses, whom these
states had immunized from prosecution under tht:rlaws IIX
lOOIXHXXlt)fXDIIXNIOIXDXX, to give testimony which might then

be used to convictli them of a federal crime.

Since New

Jersey and New York had not purported to, and indeed could
not, confer immunity from federal prosecution, the Court
i~

OJ'~)

was faced with the question wha~ Jlimitations the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
impose! on the prosecutorial powers of the Federal
Government, a non-immunizing sovereign.

After undertaking

~

an examination of the policies and purposes of the privilege,
the Court overturned the rule that one jurisdiction within
our federal structure may compel a witness to give testimony
~hich could be used to convict him of a crime in another
jurisdiction.

The Court held • • • • (PICK UP ON PAGE 15)

15.

and hel~ that the privilege protects state witnesses against incrimination under federal as well as state law, and federal witnesses against
incrimination under state as well as federal law.

Applying this

principle to the state immunity legislation before it, the Court
held the ~ onstitutional rule'1o be that:
a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in
any manner by federal officials in connection
with a criminal prosecution against him. We
conclude, moreover, that in order to
implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the state and
Federal Government in investigat:ilgi and
prosecuting crime, the Federal Government
must be prohibited from makin~ ny such
'fZ..,,,
use of compelled testimony and its fruits. I
378 U. S. at 79
t/L ✓

rt added the following footnote : "Once a
defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant
of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the
federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence
is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent,
legitimate source for the disputed evidence. " I d. at 79, n.
18. If"transactionat'immunity had been a emedto be the
"constitutional rule" there could be noJ?ro~~•cution.
L A.L _._._' -

- - _, __ _._ _._,_ -

,., ___

16.

The Court went on to emphasize that this rule left the state witness
and the Federal Government, against which the witness had immunity
~ from the ~

of the compelled testimony and evidence derived

therefrom, "in substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a state gramt of immunity.

11

378 U. S. at 79.
d)_
[ The decision in Murphy affirm~ the validity of use and
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011ttfo'(lt~ ?
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I

@

derivative use type immunity and ~ rejects the view that only
transactional immunity is compatible with constitutional standards.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White [ joined by Mr. Justice
stewart

)Jcommented:
. . . the Court does not accept the far reaching
and in my view wholly unnecessary constitutional
principle that the privilege requires not only complete protection against any use of compelled
testimony in any manner in other jurisdictions
but also absolute immunity in these jurisdictions
from any prosecution pertaining to any of the
testimony given. 378 U. S. 92, 93.

J

\J ~'£11T}

'?
~..,1.._
,-< [ This W1derstanding of iMurphy is refleeted in Gardner v.
o'-~

SIAeS, ffl,(TE

ToQ
~ lli.,. l't.

Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).

In discussing the privilege

against compulsory self ·incrimination, the Court noted:

S(.(rl~TtTt.<l'E
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:f"Ote
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(Z)

the privilege against
Reconsideration of the rule that 1111UJDqjaxix«iu:irnmcix
self-incrimination does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction
aKEXXHNREKXXXKXH«nXR:xrDl}CX«CO:~RXXBXXXEJIHXXXK~X~XlCRXXBXXDIBJQ[

against being compelled to give testimony
which could be used to convLct him of a crime in another
jurisdiction was made necessary by the decision in Malloy

"Y

y. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), in which the Court held the

Fifth Amendment privilege X~XKnXXBXXKXR~XDXHnXBR
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
H...)2-

The Malloy Court also held that same standards would determine
~

or scope
the extent/of the privilege in state and in federal proceedings,
because the same substantive guarantee of the bill of rights

'/!1.r

is involved.

I~
The Murphy Court emphasized the fact the scope

of the privilege is the same in state and in federal proceedings,
and held that a state witness's privilege against self-

sew.feJ

incrimination is (!lot infringed] when the federal government
is prohibited from using the compelled testimony and evidence
derived therefrom.
HW)I

-

~

It is true that in Murphy the Court was not presented

with the precise question presented by this c a s e , ~
whether ~UBXXKKXKBXDUDBx«XB,txtmm«KXttJX~X
««RXkXDCE:X«RXXXJ[Xs«XXX~XftJdt:XX~X~O,BXX'ltflXKXMBKJXB¥BXXXX~%XI~

a

dXKKBX~DllB~BXWKUBXKKBtjurisdiction seeking to compel

the testimony D may do so by granting only "use and
derivative use" immunity. for New Jersey and New York had
~

granted petitioners "transactional" immunity.

(3)

~

The Court has heretofore not squarely confronted this question,
because post-Counselman i1111unity statutes reaching the
Court have followed the pattern of the 1893 Act in providing
"transactional"
immunity,DIU(

;i "17
But both the reasoning of the Court in

Murphy and the result reached compel the conclusion that
"use and derivative use" immunity is constitutionally
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege,
lftiQH)f The conclusion in Murphy that a prohibition on "use

secures
and derivative use"

JIXBl£11KKB

a witness's Fifth Amendment

privilege against infringement by the federal government
means, since the scope of the privilege is the same whether
it is invoked in a state or in a federal jurisdiction, that
immunity from "use and derivative use" is coextensive with
the scope of the privilege,

as noted above,
Moreover,/the Murphy Court noted

that immunity from "use and derivative use .. would leave
"the witness and the Federal Government in substantially
the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege
in the absence of a state grant of immunity."

'-!!JThis

coextensiveness with the privilege is the degree of protection
which the Constitution requires, and is all that the
Constitution requires, even against a jurisdiction compelling
testimony . by granting immunity.

As the

Court noted

in Gardner Y.• Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968), "@nswers
may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is
i mmnni t"'v frnm

fAilPr::al

::anri

~1"'::at"'A 11~A nf t"'hA ,...nmnAl 1 Ari t"'A~t" i monv

(.v
or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution
against the person testifying,"

17.
Answers may be compelled regardless of the
privilege if there is immunity from federal
and state use of the compelled testimony or
its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying, Counselman
v. Hitchcock, [142 U.S. 547], 585-586; Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission, [378 U.S. 52], 79.
392 U.S. at 276. *

In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), decided the same day
as Murphy, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege was
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendme:tt.

The

also
Couri/held that the same standards would determine the extent of
42
the privilege in state and in federal proceedings,

for the same

substantive guarantee of the Bill of Rights was involved.

This

holding, that the scope of the privilege is the same irrespective
cff the jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony, was an important

43
element of the decision in Murphy.

;,u,::,
It is true that in Murphyit was necessary to decide the precise
f\

issue here involved, namely, whether use and derivative use immunity
is constitutionally sufficient where the jurisdiction which compelled
the testimony is the same jurisdiction which may later bring a
*Cf. United states v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 (1971).

18.
prosecution.

But we think both the reasoning of the Court in

Murphy and the result reached compel an affirmative answer.
The Court there held that the privilege "protects a state witness
against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a

l't
federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal
law. " In Malloy, as noted above, it was held {In effec~ that the
Fifth Amendment privilege applies alike to the states and the
federal government.

Thus the constitutional privilege against

self-incrimination is identical whether it be invoked in a state
l

v\,(...,ltJ.-,;o

or

Gil

federal jurisdiction, and if immunity is granted it must be

I\

honored in other jurisdictions regardless of whether the granting
jurisdiction is state or federal.

Having reached these conclusions,

the Court in Murphy went on to hold that use and derivative use
immunity r~Pant@ei fl' a: ~tate] are constitutionally sufficient in
terms of possible federal prosecution.

Such immunity was deemed

to leave "the witness and the Federal Government in substantially
otl

"(il'!> ,~ IL,

the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the

~
absence of a state grant of immunity. " Murphy v. Waterfront

19.
Commission, supra, 79.

This coextensiveness with the privilege

-+k &l!!s(~e & rrAeJ-i·eit\ wkiJ fke

Ji11JiM-.on

is/ all that the Constitution requires >t egardless
e'ler)

Cdt'l\pt.llinj ~t•Mo~

t,~ 1r;i""t,11~
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[which may have granted the immunity

'(~l).1t'e!;;

a¥\J.

I~

?f th~ jurisdiction
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20.
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The legislative history of 18 U. S. C. 6002 supports the views
above expressed.

Although such history cannot confur constitutional

validity, it is relevant as reflecting the considered judgment of the

i:.., l-4•1 •is "'ft •• ,, I W fe ~!f44'414 Cl rl
Congress11• This is :me especially pertinent where, as in this
~- ~

instance, Congressional consideration resulted from the study and
recommendation of a national commission.

On March 17, 1969, the

National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, in a
special report to the President, recommended k legislation for the
"reform" of federal immunity laws.*

In commenting on its proposal,

the Commission said:
We are satisfied that our substitution of
immunity from use for immunity from prosecution
meets constitutional requirements for overcoming
the claim of privilege. Immunity from use is the
only consequence flowing from a violation of the
individual's constitutional rights to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures, his
constitutional right to counsel, and his constitutional
right not to be coerced into confessing. The proposed
immunity is thus of the same scope as that frequently,
even though unintentionallj,~
conferred as the
result of constitutional violations by law enforcement
officers. **
*See Second Interim Report of the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, March 17, 1969, " orking ]?apers of the
Commission, Vol. II, p. 1445.

f{OT
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** Id. p. 1446. A study of immunity and the relevant decisions of
thisCourt, prepared by Prof. Robert G. Dickson, Jr. of the
George Washington University i:EW Law Center, also was transmitted to the President by the Commission. Id. p. 1405 et seq.
Prof. Dickson concluded that "The central concept of 'immunity'
is modified, in accord with recent judicial clarifications of the

_...,

20A

fifth:e: amendment, so that the protection offered the witness is
a restriction against incriminating use of his disclosures, or
their fruits. Thus in the wording of the statute, use restriction
language replaces the present absolute immunity language. Under
the proposed use restriction language the possibility of criminal
prosection based on independent evidence remains open, as in the
case when a witness plea of the fifth amendment is left undisturbed
by a compulsory testimony provision. Under the existing absolute
immunity language to be replaced, a witness obtains in effect a
blanket pardon, exonerating him in regard to all offenses related
to his testimony 8(production of other information." Id. p. 1421.

21.

The Commission's recommendation of a comprehensive
federal immunity statute, embodying use and derivative use immunity,
was transmitted to the Congress by a special Presidential message. *
Following full hearings, the Committees of the Judiciary of the Senate
and the House each reported favorably on the legislation which was
enacted in 18 U.S. C. 6002. ** The House Committee Report, which
proposed the language adopted by the Congress, contained the following
statement:

'"

()~~-(.

"This statutory immunity is intended to be as broad
as, but no broader than, the privilege against self
incrimination (See Senate hearings at p. 326. ) It is
designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity
concept of Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52 (1964) rather the transaction immunity
conept of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547
(1892). The witness is also protected against the
use of evidence derivatively obtained. "***
*The President stated: "Under the Commission's proposal, a witness
could not be prosecuted on the basis of anything he said while testifying,
but he would not be immune from prosecution based on other evidence
of this offense. " House Document No. 91-105, 91st Cong. 1st Ses. p. 5.
**S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong. 1st Ses.; H. Rep. No. ~3.i-191-1549
91st Cong. 2nd Ses. Although the language of the statute recommended
by the Senate and House Committees varied somewhat, and also varied
from the language proposed by the National Commission, each embodied
the use and derivative use concept recommended by the Commission.
***Id. p. 42.

22.

It is therefore clear that 18 U. S. C. §6002 is the product
of careful study and reflects a Congressional determination that this
legislation implements the legitimate need of government to compel
testimony and also fully protects cherished Fifth Amendment rights.

23.

v·
Al4\1Du3" lJ(I O..N1 t~~•S rf' r·· r ~eeA.,')r-S, ir1.~U),c!f. ~
[ we return to the central inquiry in this case, namely, whetheiJ
1

"use and derivative usd' immunity is coextensive with the privilege~
[ As the analysis of prior decisions indicates, this Court has so
stated in Murphy (378 U.S. 79) and so implied in subsequent decisions.*
But apart from precedent, let us reexamine the arguments advanced

'"e. l\'Wd c.cr~.de.r- ilAJ,iirl'tc)l o'j"o"evJ~
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against this conclusion:} We start from the premise, repeatedly
affirmed by this Court, that an appropriately broad immunity grant
is compatible with the Constitution.
'Pe¼i-ho"e,s

.ii''\~-

,,

[It is said] that 'use and derivative use immunity does not protect
a witness from various possible incriminating uses. of the compelled

Co r

e,,.ow-p\, •

testimony: f the prosecutor or other law enforcement officials may
obtain leads, names of witnesses or other information not otherwise
available which might result in a prosecution. It will be difficult
-',\

and perhaps impossible, the argument goes, to identify

f by testimony

~

or cross-examination

i the subtle ways in which the compelled

testimony may disadvantage a witness, especially in the jurisdiction
[ *392

u. s. 276. ]

"

~

24.

1P
granting the immunity.

These arguments have appeal and merit

a thoughtful response. We start with the statutory language:
" . . . no testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witnesffis in
any criminal case. "
1i

us. e.

§6002-(ic,70).

This total prohibition on use
provides a comprehensive safeguard, barring the use of
compelled testimony as an "investi-

iLJ

gatory lead , " and barring the
use of any evidence obtained
as a result of focusing investigation on a wjitness as a result
of compelled disclosures.
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directly or indirectly,

This is a sweeping proscription

of the compelled testimony or any information_deri
.see,fl
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6e ilifficult to devise a more comprehensive safeguard,
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prosecuted, d e p ~
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~ for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith

of the prosecuting authorities.

As stated in Murphy:

"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified,
under a state grant of immunity, to matters related
to the federal prosecution, tre federal authorities
have the burden of showing that t h e i r ~
evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had
an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence. 111.37 g

l.l $.

~t

7q "· ti.

This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not
limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution

\lo
j't

the affirmative duty to provefi o the satisfaction of the tourTithat

ef,~ ... ,
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c.,'1

the evidence proposed to be used is derived from aj source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.

*:Mlpl' Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, supra, 79 n. 18; White, J. ' ]
[ concurring, 103.
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This is very substantial protection, fairly comparable[Y
we think

f}othat resulting from invoking the privilege itself.
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The most that the privilege [.can do] is to assure that the citizen,
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testimony. j The Fifth Amendment
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The state may @tillj prosecute, e sing all [other1available evidenct j
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by remaining silent, does not incriminate himself by his own

n"'. l'll>I re"" 11-.~ t .
The Court's opinion in Murphy characterized the ~ onstitutional rule,rtherein enunciated as an "exclusionary rule'.'

y

o..f

( 3 78 U. S. [ 79

r

This brings to mind relevant analogies.

An

inadmissible confession or illegally seized evidence is excluded

SJ/

but does not bar prosecution per se.
c.oticv.1<,111~ '"'

Ax Moreover, as ~

Mu,e~,)

Mr. Justice WhiteJJpointed out:
"A coerced confession is as revealing of leads
as testimony given in exchange for immunity and
indeed is ~? eluded in part because it is compelled
incrimiati-i1ion in violation of the privirege. Malloy
v. Hogan (ski supra); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315; Bram v. United states, 168 U.S. 532. "f
3,i U,6,

c4-

IOI.

[ *Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, supra, 103, White J., concurring]
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We perceive no significant difference between the position of a
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defendant[whose incriminating testimony has come from hiij
O.~li

wkcr.,
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coerced confession or ~ro~ anfillegal wireta~ and that of a defendant
~uiler.te ~~ bee"' t,t{11;.,J +"•<lLt1h
[whose testimony has been compelled by] a grant of immunity from
~o,.iJ

w~fl\\1

1ncril'l'l1/\c> hr1.3

Jen 11oi '"c. u~ e.
its use and ~ruitJ In each of these cases, the state remains free
to prosecute and the defendant's constitutional rights are adequately
protected by the exclusionary rule.

There can be no justification

in reason or policy for arguing that the Constitution requires an
amnesty grant where, acting pursuant to statute, testimony is
l~ff~l\1½

to~

[~ . >

compelled in exchange for luse and derivative use" when no such
amnesty is required where the state, acting without colorable right,

~,oln+~<- h.-~ '"fi,11w--'"1 ,:}~E>r,fw<d
r,gkh ,
coerces a defendant into incriminating himself
01"

We conclude that the type of immunity provided by
18 U. S. C. §6002 leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities
in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed
the Fifth Amendment privilege.

The immunity therefore is

coextensive with the~ privilege and suffices to supplant it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals

'1r
1 the Ninth Circuitx accordingly

is affit :rnee.f'
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7 (1955).

4.

\Of yt.

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm 'm, 378 U. S. 52,

94 (1964) (White, J., concurring), McCarthy v. Arndstein,
266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); United States v. Saline Bank, 26
U.S. (1 Peters) 100 (1828); cf. Gardner v. Broderick,
392

u. s.

273 (1968).

\ \ /II ~-

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486

\~,~e,~

(1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917).
l~

~-~f~~~"\•

g., Re.solution of January 6, 1758, in

•i

Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of
the Province of Pennsylvania (1682-1776), 6 Pennsylvania
Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban ed. 1935); Law of
March 24, 1772, ch. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 351,
354 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774, ch. 1655, 5 Colonial
Laws of New York 639, 642 (1894). Bishop Atterbury's Trial,
16 Howell's State Trials, 323 (1723), for which the House
of Commons passed immunity legislation, was a prosecution
for treasonable conspiracy.
~

- at 604-05 (1723).

See 16 Howell's State Trials

Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's

Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767 (1725), for which F

./
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Add as Footnote No.

Jf£, (

>

~ mmunity statutes, like the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, have historical roots which run deep in AngloAmerican jurisprudence]
self-incrimination

ERKXH:SR

Soon after the privilege against compulsory

xef:~~

became firmly established in law, it was
1

1

o< ' ink.Mt1i~ ; IYI ¼e

IA~~)

recognized that the privilege did not apply when immunity,,had been
(pl(+ '" ~ .2.)
granted.

'l

Parliament enacted an immunity statute in ill 1710

'"'I

' 1 A-ti.f.eJ C., f)3•'/ (J110),
directed against illegal gambling, "/which became the model for
an identical immunity statute enacted in 1774 by the colonial legis-

,( (Pctl- i" .vAe

'1)

lature of New York. / These statutes provided that the loser could
sue the winner, who was compelled to answer the loser's charges.
After the winner responded and returned his ill-gotten gains, he
was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and discharged from any
further or other punishment, forfeiture or pemlty, which he . . .
may have incurred by the playing for, and winning such money . .

1f

Another notable instance of the early use of immunity legislation
is the 1725 impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield.
The Lord Chancellor was accused by the House of Commons of the

(_P~t ;,, ,Je ~

.. ., i

/

-'~
2.
sale of public offices and appointments.

In order to compel the

testimony of Masters in Chancery who had allegedly purchased their
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could incriminate themselves by testifying that they had purchased their offices, Parliament
enacted a statute granting immunity to persons then holding office
a s Masters in Chancery.

Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's Trial,

J (HA
16 Howell' s State Trials 767

, 1147 (1725).

M\e <,)
The legislatures

J

i~

in colonial Pennsylvania and New York enacted immunity legislation

r
in the eighteenth century. /
~
1857.

•

(PJ-

io

11

df.

s-)

(_Pea,+ ;n

note.

7)

.

li,deral statutes have existed since

5.
Parliament passed immunity legislation, was a prosecution
for political bribery involving the sale of public offices
and appointments.
(1725).

See 16 Howell's State Trials at 1147

The first federal immunity statute was enacted to

facilitate an investigation of charges of corruption and vote
buying in the House of Representatives.

See Comment,

The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:

:r:

Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L.

f · 1568,

1571 (1963).

/~/ J,1f J6. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence

§

2281, at 492

(McNaughton rev. 1961). Mr. Justice White noted in his
concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm 'm, 378
U. S. 52, 92 ( 1964) that immunity statutes ''have for more
than a century been resorted to for the investigation of
many offenses, chiefly those whose proof and punishment
were otherwise impracticable, such as political bribery,
extortion, gambling, consumer frauds, liquor violations,
commercial larceny, and various forms of racketeering. "

6.

378 U.S. at 94-95.

/0 i,( 11·

See note 19, supra.

See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity

Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional
Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J. 1568, 1576 (1963).

17

fa p,.

See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906);

~ v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).

1g

yf ~- See, ~- ~- , 8

J. Wigmore, Evidence

2281,

§

at 501 ~ (3d ed. 1940); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence

§

2281,

?

at 496 (McNaughton rev. 1961)1 /§ET ADDITIONAL CITE]

'
/9

}1, ,-!.

{:LL~

Athis statement was made with specific

reference to the Immunity Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, the
model for almost all federal immunity statutes prior to
(_

d vv ~ ~ Ju-v .~
~~

~~ ~

v<--ti=/" Au,P o ~
-k H...a.,_
the enactment of the statute unaer consideratibn in this case
A - ~ ~

-

:ii) /(
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f'5·

For a listing of these statutes, see National

,=;~

Commission on Reform of ~deral Criminal Laws, Working
Papers,

.21

~

;tf Ji·

Evidence

For a listing of these statutes, see 8 J. Wigmore,

~~,~~•.~t

~ )4-J ~
~

~~

w~~ CemN,1.:.~ • 31&
U..~. 1.o..,S4, 7i (('li,'+~j
~ .

IW,..,..__)

I'/ 2.. tl,S , ~7, sgs (Ji'if Z) ,

142

u. s.
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2281, at 495 n. 11 (McNaughton rev. 1961) .

.zqg ~ ·_
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~~iv-,

§

1444-45 (1970) .

~H

·

p
f

15 Stat.

ifJ ~ o/~c.a.,r, 1Lo_ v

tL

7.

547, 560 ( 1892).
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-

&w.~110,: ,_ ~

Aie~ 1

,

~ >"l~oll ~-1J~7 ,),

, rli 11:§. gq 7.Sbb ti S'I ~.

ee Counselman v. Hitchcock,

7.
21~ ~-

In re Counselman, 44 Fed. 268 ( C. C. N. D.

Ill. 1890).

2:i;.lf ~- Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,
564 (1892).

,.z.f~ ;3-0. Precisely, the Court held "that legislation cannot
abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replace
or supply (sic) one, at least unless it is so broad as to have
the same extent in scope and effect." 142 U.S. at 585.
5~ ~ V.; \)J(jl1,1 ,~-.t ~ .... ' 3-;g l!. $. '12.>~cj /Jt ( l'h.'.).

1}1.

Petitioners also contend that the Fifth Amendment's

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which is that
"no person . . . shall be compel-led in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself," deprives Congress of power to
enact laws which compel self-incrimiation, even if the
requisite immunity is granted prior to the compulsion of the
incriminatory testimony.

Petitioners ask us to reconsider

and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), and
Ullman v. United states, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), decisions
which uphold the constitutionality of immunity statutes.

8.
Accord, Gardner v. Broderick 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Arndstein
McCarthy v. ~ , 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924) (Brandeis,
J. ); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913)
(Holmes, J. ).

We reaffirm today the decisions in Brown

and Ullman.]

1,0;!.f ~- Counselman was decided January 11, 1892.
Senator Cullom introduced the new bill on January 27,
1892.

23 Cong. Rec. 573 (1892).

311JC )-1.
.3Z--lf ;34.

23 Cong. Rec. 6333 (1892) .
Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat.

443 (1893), repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
33 ~ ;3-6.

§

245, 84 Stat. 931.

See the remarks of Senator Cullom, 23 Cong.

Rec. 6333 (1892), and Congressman Wise, who introduced
the bill in the House. 24 Cong. Rec. 503 (1893).

'

-

See

Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 28-29,n. 36 (1948).

9.

ffe;M.
~ .sill-)- ~ .ellaM&
sb~

~

c.,t'4·
S~ -

~NA~

;Jl..J. JW)+e. 'f 'I

(1956)j

Ullman v. United states, 350 U.S. 422, 438

Shapiro v. United states, 335 U.S. 1, 6 (1948).

There wc1s one m,11or exeep+ion. See P1~e.,r,llo "'- ~eu.1 York.)
4-00 l.{$- G;L/'o).. ~ 11 t n.ll (l'l71)(8reMc>n, ;T,, Jisserrtil\1~

.3i

'Yf.

_c_f. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv.

L. Rev. 179, 230 (1964).

Language similar to the Counselman

dictum can be found in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595
(1896), and Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).

Brown

and Hale, however, involved statutes which were clearly
sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination,
as they provided full immunity from prosecution "for and on
account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which hem may testify or produce evidence . . . . " 161
U. S. at 594; 201 U. S. at 66.

The same is true with respect

to the broad language used in Smith v. United States, 337 U. S.
13 7, 146 (194~, and in United states v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424,
428 (1943), and the immunity statutes involved in these cases.
In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S.

70 (1965), some of the Counselman language urged upon us

/(o7t.5

'rOrL

p~

ll._7ii£Y

/19,er
35'f.J The

.s1<P/JllWT

a.

statute is a product of careful mot study and

consideration by the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal/ Laws, as well as by Congress.

The Commission

t

recommended legislation to reform the federal immunity laws
served as
which 1QflOQHI the model for this statute. In commenting '
on its proposal in a special report to the President, the
Commission said,

QUOTATION FROM PAGE 20

Second Interim Report of the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws• March 17,
1969, Working Papers of the Commission, 1445-48 . (1970).
The Commission•s recommendation was based in large part on
a comprehensive study of immunity and the relevant decisions
of this Court prepared for the Commission by Prof. Robert
G. Dixon, Jr. of the George Washington University Law Center,
and transmitted to the President with the recommendations
of the Commission.

See National Commission on Reform of

Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers, 1405-44 (1970).

3&
iJ

See S, Rep, No, 91-617, 91st Cong,, 1st Sess. 51-56,

145 (1969); H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42
(1970).

10.
upon us by petitioners was again quoted.

But Albertson,

like Counselman, involved an immunity statute which was
held insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of
"•investigatory leads" and other evidence derived from
compelled admissions. 382 U. S. at 80.
In Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954),

al')J ,., U(l1+ecl s{~~e~ ! Ml.lftMc.l l ~g4

U..S. I1./J., 11./9 ( 193 1) ,

the Counselman dictum was referred to as the principle of
-!.

Counselman.

u,~

The reference [:vas] in the context of @nJ

ancillary poin~ not essential to the decisionsof the Court.

~

TheLCourt did note, however, that the Fifth Amendment
privilege prohibited the "use" of compelled self-incriminatory

[two years later]

testimony.

347 U. S. at 181. In any event,

the Court

in Ullman v. United states, 350 U.

H

s.: 422,

436-37 (1956), recognized that the rationale of Counselman
was that the statute was insufficient for failure :k to prohibit
use of evidence derived from compelled testimony. Su_ ~

So-¾-

5~

~ver

l'\I.IMloe.r~

oil

38' 4 3'i

httc . Pick
~e~ '-'11

t,fer,

~ ~ . (v\ c,

CoJ.:tM ,

:ZStf l( 5, '? I, ) 3

( t <'f.2. r;j

~- ~ _k., Murphy v. Waterfront fxmiiEX Com 'm,

'11
378 U.S. 52 (19 64); Smith v. United states, 337 U.S. 137

11.
(1949); Ullman v. United states, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 tiS U.S. 43 (1906); Jack v. Kansas,
iti 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591

(1896).

~

rJ.

See, ~- g. , California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424,

n.
442 ti. 3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), United states v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 n. 11 (1971); Piccirillo v. New York,
400 U. S. 548 (1971); stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 244
(1966).

3.q

)!6.

The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor

bi~+a+e

is a

body established under an interstate

compact
approved by Congress. 67 stat. 451.

E~

JIO

¢.

In re Application of WaterfroJ Comm 'n of

N. Y. Harbor, 39 N. J. 436, 189 A. 2d. 36 (1963).
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Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'm, 378 U.S. 52,

"~

ft 79 ( 1964).
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Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) .
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I}t may be appropriate~

it,\a,,~ ot

however, tha] the values which

were originally emphasized are now protected in major part by
the First Amendment.

The historic origin and purpose of the

parl-lj
privilege was [i>rimaril~ to protect against the evil of governmental
suppression of ideas.

In both England and the Colonies the privilege

was primarily a means of assuring that expression of diverse
religious and political views would not be punished or suppressed.
-0
4/'
S~ W~ W Schaefer, The Suspect and Societyr Nm:thweste1~
Yi~IIY)A

Thl' Cc/oni11(

<.:Cms.-(."'4.(..-,,..l>I
lt·s-tvrj <It +kt

dV\J

l'lnWersit'I' P!'@ss, l QQ'I,,

(I~~
r,J/71-7Y-i;.
~ Schaefer commented:

Pnv,le~e ~~n,J
Se W-.Lu 1M1r),..f1011

"Protection for unpopular and heretical political and religious ideas

fi01enco 21
Vt\ L. R'°"· ?63,

is now in the process of being remitted to the First Amendment.

in

1

?23 (1<t3S°).

StiBe{er) The. SIASeeJ ov..J ~uet!j
[ Id. 73/ 7r- (.•q~1?e Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating
()J,

a

Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963).

"

12.

37

,4.

Ullman v. United states, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39

(1956), quoting Boyd v. United states, 116 U.S. 616, 634

.see.

(188'1).

LJ 5.

,<~ '1_·

Sc.hweih.er, 357 C,(.S. 37/>.3rrl)

(j9s8).

Se~ Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.

?'l11 .IS,
52,,103 (1964) (White, J., concurring).]
{j.6.

See, ~ g. , Albertson v. Subversive Activities

Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965). ]
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No. '70-11 '7 KASTIGAR AND STEWART v. U.S.

This case presents the question whether the United Elates
Government can compel testimony from an unwWing witness, who
invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, by conferring on the witness imm1D1ity from use of
the compelled testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, - as
well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the testimony.
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States
grand Jury in the Central District of California on February 4, 1971.
The Government believed that petitioners were likely to assert their
Fifth Amendment privilege. Prior to the scheduled appearances,

the Government applied to the district court for an order directing
petitioners to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand

jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18

u. s. C.

S 6002-03 (1970). Petitioners opposed issuance of the order,
cantendtng primarily that the scope of the immunity authorized
be the statute was not coextensive with the privilege against

2.

aelf-lner1mlnatim, ~ d sufficient to compel their

testimony over a claim of the prlvllege. The district court rejected
this contention, and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand
jury and answer its questlODS under the statutory grant of immunity.
Petitioners appeared

but refused to

answer Its questions. Petitioners were brougbt before the district
court, and each peralated in his refusal to answer the grand Jury's
questions. The court found both in contempt, and committed them
to the custody of the Attomey General until either they answered the
grand Jury's questions or the term of the grand Jury expired. •
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Stewart v.
United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA .9 1971). This Court granted
certiorari to resolve the important questi011 whether testimony map
be compelled if the immunity granted ls from the use of the testimooy

and evidence derived therefrom ( "use and derivative use") or
whether lt ls necessary under the Constitution to grant immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which the compelled testimony

•The contempt order was issued pursuant to S 301(a) of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 19'70 28 U.S. C. S 1826.

3.

relates (''transactional immunity"). 402

u. S.

971 (1971) We cooclude

that use and derivative use immunity, as afforded by 18

u. s. C.

S 6002,

ts coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege and accordingly
affirm the Judgment below.
I

The power of govemment to compel residents to testify 1n
court or before grand Juries and other govemmental agencies ts
9

firmly established in Anglo-American Jurisprudence.

The power

with respect to courts was established by statute 1n England as
early as 1562,

10
and Lord Bacoo observed in 1612 that all subjects
11

owed the King their "knowledge and discovery."

While it ts net

clear when grand Juries first resorted to compulsory process to
secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the general
common law p~tnctple that ''the public has a right to every man's
evidence ''was cODSldered an "indubitable certainty" which "cannot
12
be dented" by 1742.

The power to compel testimony, and the

correspoodtng duty of residents to testify, are recognized 1n the

k

Sixth Amendment requirement that an accused ,qt coofrooted with

4.
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor. The first Congress ~

~~w

Aatteat:t ; n t!lt;_the Sixth Amendment ~ process guarantee
and implemented it In the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided

13
for the compulsory attendance of witnesses in the federal courts.
~r~ ~ '_s

•

•

1

•

In-Ms concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterlrcnt Com'm,
/\
l.-v..-

~ 1/4.,y~ ~. ~ S ~ f - ~ J

378 U. I. 52, 93-4 (1963), .AMr. Justlec Wltltc put in proper
perspective this essential power of govemment:
Among the necessary and most important of the
powers of the States as well as the Federal Government
to assure the effective functiooing of. govemment in an
ordered society is the broad power to compel residents
to testify in court or before grand Juries or agencies.
See Blair v. United States, 250 U. s. 273. Such testimony
constitutes ooe of the Govemment's primary sources of
information. The privilege against self-incrimination,
safeguarding a complex of. significant values, represents
a broad exception to govemmental power to compel the
testimony of the citizenry.
The power to compel testimony isnnot absolute.

n ls

limited by the Fifth Amendment privilege apinst compulsory selfincrimination, as well as by other testimonial excemptions and

14
privileges which also exempt witnesses from the jestimodll duty.
The privilege ~~

t1PCt1~ reflects a complex of.

5.
our fundamental values and most noble aspirations,

15
and'~eglsters

an important advance ill the development of our 11"8rty - 'one of the

16
great landmarks

1n

man's struggle to make himself civlllzed'. "

The privilege can be asaerted in any proceeding, civil or criminal,

17
adm1nlstrative or Judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory;

and it

protects against any disclosures which the witness reasooably
believes could be used

1n

a criminal prosecution or could lead to
18

other evidence that might be so used.

This courfas been zealous

to safeguard the values which underlie the privilege. (Pete - perhaps
you can cite cases or select an apprq,rlate quotation)
Immunity statutes are not incompatible with these values.
s

Rather they /eek a rational accommodation between the imperatives
of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel

citizens to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the
necessity of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such
a character that the ooly perscms c(lpable of giving useful testimony
are those implicated 1n the crime. Indeed, their origins were 1n

6.

19
the c011text of such offenses,

and their primary use has been to

20

investigate such offenaes.

Congress included immunity statutes

in many of the regulatory measures adopted 1n the first half of th1s
century,

21

and th1s Court on several occasions hu characterized

such statutes.as essential to the effective enforcement of various

22
federal regulatory acts.

The commentators also have recognized

the critical importance of immunity statutes in investigating certain

23
types of crimes.

Mr. ~ttce Frankfurter, speaking for the Court

in miman v. United states, 350

u. s.

422 (1958), observed that

such statutes have ''become part of our c01l8t1tuttonal fabric, "
350

u. s.

at 438. Prior to the enactment of the statute under cm-

sideratlon in this case, there were in force over 50 federal immunity

25
statutes.

In addition, every·state 1n the Union, as well as the

28
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has me or more such statutes.
1be essential role of immunity statutes in our c<Xl&titutional hlsory
1s therefore self-evident.

7.

u
Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
agatnat compulsory self-incrimination, which ls that ''no person • • •
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against h~-

IDf," deprives Congress of power to enact laws which compel selfincrimination, even tf the requisite immunity ts granted P"-Or to the
compulsion of the incriminatory testimony. In other words, petitioners

uaert that no immunity statute, however drawn, can afford a lawful
bula for compelling incriminatory testimony.

They ask ua to

reconsider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161

u. s.

491 (1896),

and Ullman v. United Elates, 350 U. s. 422 (1968), declaiona which

upheld the conatitutionallty

~

immunity statutes. • We find no

merit to this contention and reaffirm the declaions in Brown and Ullman.

ll [
Petitioners' aecond contention 18 that the scope of the immunity
provided by the federal witness immunity statute enacted in 1970, 18

u. S. C.

6002, ls not coutensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege

•Accord, Gardner v. Broderic~ 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968); Murph)'
v. Arndste~ 288 U.
34, 42 1924) (Brandeis, J. ); -Helke v.
United Elates, 227 u. s. 131, 142 (1913) (Holmes, J. ).

s.

8.
against compulsory eelf-tncriminattoo, and therefore 1s uncoostltutional

The statute attacked provides 1n relevant part as follows:
[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of bis privilege agatnst eelf-tncrtmlnation;
but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any lnformation directly or 1nd1rectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used aga.lnst the witness 1n any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwiae falling to comply with the order.•
Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes which grant
immunity from prosecution and those wblcb limit the immunity as does the present statute - to use of the compelled testimony and

evidence derived tberefeom. •• The constitutional test, rooted 1n
history as well as the decisi01l8 of this Court, 1s whether the immunity
granted petitioners under this statute 1s coextensive with the scope
d. the privilege. If so, their refusals to answer based on the

privilege were unjust1f1ed, and the Judgments of contempt were
proper. Brown v. Walker, 161

u. S.

591 (1896). If on the other

band, the immunity granted petitioners

was not as comprehensive

•For other provialoos of 1970 Act (which 1s Part V of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970) relative to imm1D1lty of witnesses, see
18

u. s. c.

8001-8004.

••See PlcclrWo v. New York. 400 U. s. 548 (1971).

9.
as the protection afforded by the privilege, petitioners were Justified
In refusing to answer and the Judgments of ccmtempt must be vacated.

McCarthy v. Arndstetn, 266

u. S.

34, 42 (1942).

Petitioners rely upon Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. s.
54'7 (1892), the first case In which this Court ccmsldered a coostitutional challenge to an immunity statute. The statute, the
Immunity Act of 1868, provided that no "evidence obtained from a
party or witness by means of a Judicial proceeding shall be given
In evidence, or In ~Y roano•r used against (him) ••• in any court

of the United states • • • • "• Notwlthstand1ng a grant of. immunity
and order to testify under the-1868 act, the witness, asserting his
privilege aglllnat compulsory sel-incrimtnation, refused to testify
before a federal grand Jury. He was ccmsequently adjudged in
contempt of court. On appeal, this Court cQDstrued the statute
to protect a witness ooly agalnat the use of the specific testimony
compelledilt from him under the grant of immunity. This construction
meant that the statute "would not prevent the use of his testimony to

•ta. at 560.

-

10.

search out other testimony to ,be used in evidence against him. "
The Court held that an Immunity statute cannot supplant the privilege
against self-incrlmlnatlon, and a grant of Immunity cannot compel
testimony over a claim of the privilege unless the scope d. the
statutory grant is coextensive with the scope of the privilege. Since
the 1888 Act, as ccnstrued by the Court, would permit the use
against the immunized witness of evidence derived from ~"8 compelled
testimony, It did not .protect the witness to the same·extent that a
claim of the privilege would protect him. The statute accordingly
was held invalid. In the coarse of its opinion, the Court said:
We are clearly of opinlon that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after be answers the c:rlmlnattng question put to blm,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constltutlcn of the United &lates. [The
immunity statute] does not supply a complete
protectlcn from all the perlla against which the
constitutional prcillbltlon was designed to guard,
and is n~ a full substitute for that prcillbltlcn. In
view of the ccnstttutlonal provlsl00, a statutory
enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute Immunity
againat future prQ!l8CUtloo for the offense to wbich
the queatlon relates. 142 U. s. at 858-88.
Sixteen days after the declsicn, a new immunity bW was

introduced by Senator Cullom, who urged that enforcement of the
Interstate Commerce Act would be impossible in the abaence of an

11.
effective immunity statute. The bW, which became the Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1893, was drafted speeiftcally to meet the broad
language tn Counselman set forth above. The new Act provided that:

llo person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or cm account of
any tnmautlon, matter or thing, concerning
which be may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otberwtae. • • •
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 2'1 stat. 443
Thia.type of transactional immunity became the basic form

for the numerous federal statutes until 19'10 when, after a reexamtnatton of the adequacy of existing Jaw and of the applicable constitutional
principles, the Congress enacted the statute here ~der coosideration.
1be new statute does not "afford (the) absolute immmllty against
future prosecution" referred to In Counselman.

Rather, tt was

framed to meet the ratlcmale of Counselman and subsequent decisions

w
"

of the Court, namely, that immunity from the uae d compelled

testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive wttb the
scope of the F1ftb Amendment privilege. The statute explicitly
proscribes thtt uae in any criminal case of "testimony or other
information compelled under the order ( or any information directly

~~ r~S£ ~ ~~~ ~
~~~~~~

¥-
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12.

or indirectly derived from such testtmmy or other information)".
We hold that this pr~ection comports with Fifth Amendment
ltandards. Immunity from the ~e of compelled testimony and all

evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with the privilege
against self incrimination and therefore ls sufficient to compel

testimony over a claim of the privilege. While the grant of immunity

must n~ erode the scope of the privilege, it need not be broader.
The transaetional trpe of immunity, which accords full immunt,a'

,

tton from prQSecutton for the offense to which theccompelled·
testimony relates, places the witness in a ~perior position affording him a considerably broader proteetion than the Fifth
Amendment privilege Itself.. That privilege has never been construed to mean that one who Invokes It cann~ be prosecuted.

?U.~~-c i

Our holding la Jceaalatent with the ccmceptual basts of

Coanselman

Al.I. 'J.lll::J ~ . . . . , . .

The

statute then before the Court, as construed by it, was plainly
deficient in Its failure to prohibit the use against the Immunized

1¾_3.

witness of evidence derived from hisn compelled testimony.
The Court repeatedly emphasi~d this deficiency, noting that the
statute:
could not, and would not, prevent the use of
his testimony to search out other testimony
to be used in evidence against him or bis
property, in a criminal proceeding•..• ,
142 u. s. at 564
that U:
could not _prevent the obtabµng and the use
of witnesses and evidence which shoo.Id be
attributable directly to the testimony he might
give under compulsion, and on which he might
be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had
refused to answer, he could not possibly have
been convicted ••• , 142 u. s. at 564,
and that it:
afford no protection against the use of compelled
testimooy which consists Jn gaining therefrom
a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of
sources of information which may supply other
means of con~icting the witness or party. 142
U. s. at 582.
The same reasoning was reiterated in Ullman v. United
states, 350

u. S.

422 (1965), when the Court interpreted Counselman

as holding that the statute there involved was insufficient:

beca✓-

~
unity granted was incomplete, in
that • merely forbade the use of the testimony given
and
to protect a witness from future prosecution
ed en knowledge and sources of information
obtained from the compelled testimony.

rC:iled

350 U. s. at 436-37. (Emphasis supplied)

14.
The broad language in Counselman relied upon by petitioners was
unnecessary to the Court's decision, and must be considered as
dictum.
In Murphyv. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.

s. 52 (1964), the

issue was whether the grant of transactional immunity by a state
would protect the constitutional rights of the witness in a federal
prosecution. As no ~tate has the power to for bid such a prosecution,
it was necessary for the Court to define for the first time the scope
of. immunity required by the Constitution. The

M,rphy petitioners were

subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission
of New York Harbor.

After refusing to answer certain questions on the

ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them, petitioners were
granted immunity from prosecution under th~ laws of New Jersey and New
40

Yo;Jt.

They continued to refuse to testify, however, on the ground that

their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which
the immunity did not purport to extend. They were adjudged in civil
cmtempt, and that judgment was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme
41
Court.
This Court undertook an examination of the policies and
purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination,

15.
and held that the privilege protects state witnesses against incrimination under federal as well as state law, and federal witnesses against
incrimination under state as well as federal law. Applying this
principle to the state immunity legislation before it, the Court
held the "constitutional rule''to be that:
a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled
testimony and its fruits cannot be used in
any manner by federal officlals in connecticm
with a criminal prosecution against him. We
ccnclude, moreover, that in order to
implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the state and
Federal Government in investlgatlll\ and
prosecuting crime, the Federll Government
must be prdtibited from maktngany such
use of compelled testimcmy and its fruits. •
378 U. s. at 79

•At this point the Court added the following footnote: "Once a
defendant demcmstrates that be bas testified, under a state grant
of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the
federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evide1;1ce
ls not tainted by establlsbtng that they bad an independent,
legitimate source for the disputed evidence." B:d. at 79, n.
18. If transactional immunity had been deemedto be the
"constitutional rule" there could be no prosecution.

16.
The Court went on to emphasize that this ~e left the state witness
and the Federal Government, against which the witness had immunity
only from the use of the ,compelled testimony and evidence derived
therefrom, "In substantially the same position as if the witness bad
claimed his privilege 1n the absence of a state grant of immunity."
378

u. s.

at 79.

The decision 1n Murphy affirms the validity of use and
derivative use type immunity and ~ rejects the view that only
transactional immunity is compatible with constitutional standards.
The coocurrtng opinion of Mr. Justice White (joined by Mr. Justice
stewart) commented:
••• the Court does not accept the far reaching
and 1n my view wholly unnecessary constitutiooal
principle that the privilege requires not only complete protection against any use of compelled
testimony in any manner 1n other jurisdictions
but also absolute immunity in these jurisdictions
from any prosecution pertaining to any of the
testimony given. 378 U. S. 92, 93.
This understanding of •urphy is reflected in Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). In discussing the privilege
against compulsory self incrimination, the Court noted:

17.
Answers may be compelled regardless of the
privilege if there ls immunity from federal
and state use of the compelled testimony of
its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying, COUDSelman
v. Hltchcoc!t, [142 u. s. 547], 585-586; ~·Y
v. Waterfront Commission, (378 U. S. 5 ,
•
392 U.S. at 276.
In

*

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. s. 1 (1964), decided the same day

as Murphy, the Court held that the Fifth. Amendment privilege was
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth AmendmeJt. The
also
Court/held that the aaine standards would determine the extent, of
42
the privilege in state and in federal proceedings,

for the same

substantive guarantee of the BW of Rights was involved. This
holding, that the scope of the privilege ls the aame_irrespective
~

the Jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony, was an important
43

element of the decision in Murphy.

11),.;(
It ls true that in ~ t was"necessary to decide the precise

issue here involved, namely, whether use and derivative use immunity
ls constituticmally sufficient where the Jurisdiction which compelled

the testimony ls the same jurisdiction which may later bring a

•cl.

United states v. Freed, 401

u. s.

601, 606 (1971).

18.

prosecution. But we think both the reasoning of the Court in
Murphy and the result reached compel an affirmative answer.
The Court there held that the privilege "protects a state witness

.

a~inst incrimination under federal as well as state law and a
federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal
law." In Malloy, as noted above, it was held in effect that the
Fifth Amendment privilege applies a_
llke to the states and the

federal government. Thus the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is identieal whether it be invoked in a state
\...i,v

c}...,;

or art federal jurisdiction, and if immunity is granted it must be
I\

honored in other jurisdictions regardless of whether the granting
jurisdiction is state or federal. Having reached these conclusions,
the Court in Murphy went on to hold that use and derivative use
immunity granted by a state are constitutionally sufficient in
terms of possible federal prosecution. Such immunity was deemed
to leave "the witness and the Federal Government in substantially
the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the
absence of a state grant of immunity." Murphy v. Waterfroot

19.

Commission, supra, 79. This coextensiveness with the privilege
is all that the Constitution requires regardless of the jurisdiction
which may have granted the immunity.

-· .

l

20.

The legislative history of 18 U.S. C. 6002 supports the views
above expressed. Although such history cannot cmfer constitutional
validity, it is relevant as reflecting the considered judgment of the
Congress. This is •

especially pertinent where, as in this

instance, Congressional cmsideration resulted from the study and
recommendation of a national commission. On March 17, 1969, the
National Commissioo on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, in a
special report to the President, recommended k legislation for the
"reform" of federal immunity laws.*

In commenting cm its proposal,

the Commission said:
We are satisfied that our substitution of
immunity from use for immunity from prosecution
meets constitutional requirements for overcoming
the claim of privilege. Immunity from use is the
only consequence flowing from a violation of the
individual's constitutional rights to be protected
from unreasoo.able seaeches and seizures, his
constitutional right to counsel, and llis constitutional
right not to be coerced into confessing. The proposed
immunity is thus of the same scope as that frequently,
even though unintentionallJ cwwee+Mt conferred as the
result of constitutional violations by law el)forcement
officers.••
*See Second Interim Report of the National Cp_qimissiw on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, March 17, 1969, Working tfapers of the
Commission, Vol n, p. 1445.,

** Id.

p. 1446. A study of immunity and the relevant decisions of
thisCourt, prepared by Prof. Robert G. Dickson, Jr. of the
George Washington University blilt Law Center, also was transmi~ted to the President by the Commission. Id. p. 1405 et seq.
Prof. Dickson concluded that "The central concept of 'immunity'
is modified, in accord with recent judicial clarifications of the

·~~

20A

fifthll amendment, so that the protection offered the witness is
a restriction against incriminating use of his disclosures, or
their fruits. Thus in the wording of the statute, use restriction
language replaces the present absolute immunity language. Under
the proposed use restriction language the possibility of criminal
prosection based oo independent evidence remains open, as in the
case when a witness plea of the fifth amendment is left widisturbed
by a compulsory testimony provisioo. Under the existing absolute
immunity language to be replaced, a witness obtains in effect a
blanket pardon, exonerating him in regard to all offenses related
to his testimony ef production of other information." Id. p. 1421.
/JY

-

..,.

I

-
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21.
The Commission's recommendation of a comprehensive
federal immunity statute, embodying use and derivative use immunity,
was transmitted to the Congress by a special Presidential message.•
Following full hearings, the Committees of the Judiciary of the Senate
and the House·each reported favorably on the legislati'l>Jl which was
enacted in 18 U. s. C. 6002. •• The House Committee Report, which
proposed the language adopted by the Congress, contained the following
statement:
"This statutory immunity ts intended to be as broad
as, but no broader than, the privilege against-self
incrimination (See Senate hearings at p. 326.) It ls
designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity
coocept of Mufihy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
u. s. 52 (1964 rather the transaction immunity
c~ept of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. s. 547
(1892). The witness is also protected against the
use of evidence derivatively obtained. "***
*The :,resident stated: "Under the Commission's proposal, a witness
COllld not be prosecuted an the basis of anything he said while testifying,
but he WOllld not be immune from prosecution based on other evidence
of this offense. " House Document No. 91-105, 91st Cong. 1st Ses. p. 5.
**S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong. 1st Ses.; H. Rep. No. JIil: M 91-1549
91st Cong. 2nd Ses. Although the language of the statute recommended
by the Senate and House Committees varied somewhat, and also varied
from the language proposed by the National Commission, each embodied
the use and derivative use concept recommended by the Commission.
***Id. p. 42.

• • "'I . .

-.

22.
It is the refore cldar that 18 U. s. C. §6002 is the product
of careful study and reflects a Congressional determination that this

legislation implements the legitimate need of government to compel
testimony and also fully protects cherished Fifth Amendment rights.

/.

~..

~

~..,.

23.
V

We return to the central inquiry in this case, namely, whether
use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the privilege.
As the analysts of prior decisions indicates, this Court has so

stated in Murphy ( 378 U. s. 79) and so implied in subsequent decisions. •
But apart from precedent, let us reexamine the arguments advanced
against th~ conclusion. We start from the premise, repeatedly
affirmed by this Court, that an appropriately broad immunity grant
ts compatible with the Constitution.
It ts said that use and derivative use immunity does not prd:ect
a witness from various possible incriminating uses of the compelled
testimony: the prosecutor or other law enforcement officials may
obtain leads, names of witnesses or other information not otherwise
available which might result in a prosecution. It will be difficult
and perhaps impossible, the argument goes, to identify - by testimony
or cross-examination - the subtle ways in which the compelled
testimony may disadvantage a witness, especially in the jurisdiction

*392 u. s. 276.

-

'
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granting the immunity. These arguments have appeal and merit
a thoughtful response. We start with the statutory language:
".•• no testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witnesses in
any criminal case. "

2(
This is a sweeping proscription of any use, directly or indirectly,
or the compelled testimony or any informati9n derived theref crom.
It would be difficult to devise a more comprehensive safeguard.
Nor is the witness, who may ·subsequently be prosecuted, dependent
for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith
of the prosecuting authorities.

As stated in Murphy:
i

"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified,
under a state grant of immunity, to matters related
to the federal prosecutim\ th! federal authorities
have the burden of showing that theh~ .1:wbl•1 k
evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had
an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence. "*
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not
limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution
the affirmative duty to prove to the satisfaction of the ¢':ourt that
the evidence proposed to be used ls derived from a source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.

*:rdpr Murplil v. Waterfront Comm 'n, supra, 79 n. 18; White, J. ,

concurring,

03.

-,

,,.

1,/.o
~

This is very substantial protection, fairly comparable we think - to that resulting from invoking the privilege itself.
The most that the privilege can do is to assure that ~e citizen,
by remaining silent, does not incriminate himself by his own
testimony. The Fifth Amendment grants no pardon or amnesty.
The state may still prosecute, using all other available evidence.
The Court's opinion in Murphy characterized the "constitutional rule" therein enunciated as an "exclusionary rule"
(378

u. s.

79). This brings to mind relevant analogies. An

inadmissible confession or illegally seized evidence is excluded
but does not bar prosecution~ se.

a Moreover, as--• li1f

Mr. Justice 'White pointed ou~:
"A coerced coofession is as revealing of leads
as testimony given in exchange for immunity and
indeed is excluded in part because it is compelled
incrimiatnion in violation of the privilege. Malloy
v. ~ (,ia supra); Spano v. New Yor~ 360 u. s.
315;13rim v. United states, 168 u. s.
2. "*
*Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, supra, 103, White J., concurring.

.

~

-,,.1
We perceive no significant difference between the position of a
defendant whose incriminating testimony has come from his
coerced confession or from an illegal wiretap and that of a defendant
whose testimony bas been compelled by a grant of immunity from
its use and fruits. In each of these cases, the state remains free
~o' prosecute and the defendant's constitutional rights are adequately
'-protected by the exclusionary rule. There can be no justification
'I

in reason or policy for arguing that the Constitution requires an

amnesty grant where, acting pursuant to statute, testimony is
compelled in exchange for use and derivative use, when no such
1

amnesty is required where the state, acting without colorable right,
coerces a defendant into incriminating himself.
We conclude that the type of immunity provided by
18
I

u. s. C.

§6002 leaves the witness and the prosecutoria.l authorities

.

- \

in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed
the Fifth Amendment privilege. The immunity therefore is
coextensive with the~ privilege and suffices to supplant it.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth CircuitJI: accordingly
is affirmed.

Add as Footnote No.

-

•

Immunity statutes, like the privilege agalnat compulsory
self-tncrimlnatim, have blstorlcal roots which nm deep in AngloAmerican Jurisprudence. Soon after the privilege against compuaory
self-inerimtnatton wwwww• became firmly established in law, it was
1

recognized that the privilege did not apply when immunity bad been
granted.

2

Parliament enacted an immunity statute in H 1710
3

directed against Wegal gambling,

which became the model for

an identical immunity statute enacted in 1774 by the colonial legts4

lature of New York.

These statutes provided that the loser cwld

sue the winner, who was compelled to answer the loser's charges.
After the winner responded and retumed bis W-gotten gains, be

was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and discharged from any
further or other punishment, forfeiture or pmalty, which he •••
5

may have incurred by the playing for, ~d wtnntng such money • • • • "
Another nca.ble instance of the] early use of imm1D1ity legislation
ts the 1725 impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield.

The Lord Chancellor was accused by the House of Commcms of the

-

·~
2.
sale of public offices and appointments. In order to compel the
testimony of Masters in Chancery who bad allegedly purchased their
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could incriminate themselves by testtfying that they had purchased their offices, Parliament
enacted a statute granting immunity to persons then holding office
as Masters 1n Chancery. Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's Trta~
8

18 Howell's state Trtala 787

, 1147 (1725).

The legislatures

1n colonial Pennsylvania and New York enacted immunity legislation

'I
ln the eighteenth century, and federal statutes have existed since
8

1857.

Rider A, p. 5
It may be appropriate ton<te, however, that the values which
were originally emphasized are now protected in major part by
the First Amendment. The historic origin and purpose of the
privilege was primarily to protect against the evil of governmental
suppression of ideas. In both England and the Colooies the privilege
was primarily a means of assuring that expressioo. of diverse
religious and political views would not be punished or suppressed.
See Walter¥. Schaefer, The Suspect and Society, Northwestern

University Press, 1967, pp. 71-73. As Judge Schaefer commented:
"Protection for unpopular and heretical political and religious ideas
is now in the process of being remitted to the First Amendment. • • •

Id., 73, 74.

See Gibsoo v. Florida Legislative Investigating

'

Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).

!-:

"

14.
The broad language in Counselman relied upon by petitioners was
unnecessary to the Court~s decision, and must be COl18idered as
dictum.
In Murphyv. Waterfront Comm'n, 378

u. s.

52 (1964), the

taaue was whether the grant of transactlooal immunity by a state

would protect the coostitutlonal rights of the witness in a federal
prosecution. As no state has the power to forbid such a prosecution,
it was necessary for the Court to define for the first time the scope
d. immunity required by the Constitution. The ~ Y petitlooers were

subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission
of. New York Harbor.

After refusing to answer certain questions on the

ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them, petitioners were
granted immunity from prosecution under the Jaws of New Jersey and New
40

Yo:r)t.

They cootlnued to refuse to testify, however, oo the ground that

their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which

the immunity did not purport to extend. They were adjudged in civil
coo.tempt, and that Judgment was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme
41

Court.
This Court undertook an examlnatlcm of the policies and
purposes

of the privilege against self-incrimtnation,

J
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V

We retum to the central Inquiry In this case, namely, whether
use and derivative use immunity ls coextensive with the privilege•.
As the analysts of prior decisions indicates, this Court bas so

stated 1n Murphy (378

u. S.

79) and so Implied in subsequent declslona. •

But apart from preced~t, let us reexamine the arguments advanced
against this conclusion. We start from the premise~ repeatedly

affirmed by this Court, that an ·appropriately broad immunity grant
ls compatible with the Constitution.

It ls said that use and derivative us~ immunity does not protect

a witness from various possible incriminating uses of the compelled
testimony: the prosecutor or other law enforcement officials may
obtain leads, names of wttnes,.es or other information not otherwise
available wblcb might result ln a prosecution. It w1ll be difflcult
and perhaps impoaeib1', the argument goes, to Identify - by testimony
or cross-examination - the subtle ways in which the compelled
testimony may disadvantage a witness, espectally in the jurlsdlctian

•so2 u. s: ·a,e.

24.

granting the immunity. These arguments have appeal and merit
a thoughtful response. We start with the statutory language:
"••• no testim011y or other tnformatl011 compelled
under the order ( or any tnformat1011 directly or
indirectly derived from such testlm011y or other
informattcm) may be used against the wttnesms 1n
any criminal case."

7L__~~
~ ~ f of 1
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The 'Broad language in Counselman relied upcn by petitioners was
unnecessary to the Court's decision, and must be cc:msldered as
dictum.
In Murphy v. Waterfrcnt Comm'm, 3'78

u. S.

52 (1964),

the Court bad lta first opportunity to ccnsider carefully immunity
from use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.
The MprpbY petitioners were subpoeaaed to testify at a hearing
ccnducted by the Waterfrcnt Commlsslcn of New York Ha'Wbor.
After refluling to answer certain questlcns en the ground that the
answers might tend to Incriminate them, petitioners were granted
immunity from prosecutlcn under the laws of New Jersey and New

York.

40
They ccntinued to refuse to testify, however, en the ground

that their answers might tend,to lncrtmtnate them under federal
law, to whlch the immunity dld not purport to,extend. They·were
adjudged in civil contempt, and that judgment was affirmed by the
I

41

New Jersey Supreme Court.
I

This Court in Murphy undertook an eP-rntuatlon of the

pollcies and purposes of the privilege agtnst self-lncrlmtnation,

~
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Covert E. Pamell,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: March 22, 1972

No. 70-117 Kastigar
In view of your illness, and possible uncertainty as to the date
of your return, I reviewed again the first draft of our opinion and have

had Sally run it off so that we have a clean copy to work from.

This draft removes the ''history" from the text (which I believe
accords with your view), and it embodies the rearrangement which I
suggested In an earlier memorandum.
I attempted (beginning at the bottom of page 17) to address what
I understand to be Mr. Justice Brennan's position, namely, that the
rule is different U the immunity is granted by the same jurisdiction
which may later bring a prosecution. I am ntt Elldkfied with my
hurried treatment of this point and hope you will take a close look at
it. On the tther hand, I see no substantive merit for the view that
the rule should be different within a single jurisdiction.
I think this draft probably cootains an adequate discussion of
the most relevant authorities. The principal need is tD add a final
section which will face up to the arguments pro and con with respect
to the two types of immunity. Justice White addresses these

•-

.

~

,..

2.

-

arguments at coosiderable length 1n his concurring q,iDicn in Murphy.
The SG's brief also comments cm some of them. I am not thinking of

.

a protracted discussion, but rather a summary limited to a few pages•
L. F. P., Jr.

.. -

-

J,-4 ~

lfp/ss 2cc 3/27/72

MEMORANDUM
TO: .

Mr. Covert E. Parnell,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE:

March 27, 1972

No. 70-117 Kastlgar and blewart v. US.
This supersedes my memorandum last week with respect to
the draft of 3/21/72, as over the weekend I did some additional
"polishing" on the draft and added (i) a sedbln oo legislative history
(ii)

anqla final section.
I will deliver the master to you with this memorandum, and
hope that you can find the time this week to progress this to a printed
draft. Unless you have a different thought, I would like to circulate
an opinion on 701117 as soon as it is ready, without waiting for the
two companion opinions.
In reviewing this draft, you might have in mind the foil owing:

1. The footnctes - quite obviously - need to be coordinated
and renumbered. I simply added notes - indicated by an asterik at the bottom of pages.

a note based on Judge Shaefer' s discussioo of the privilege. You will
have to locate these notes at appropriate places.

.
2.

-

3. I am n«x sure that all relevant decisicms of the Court have
been menticmed or discussed. Please take a look at Prof. Dickson's
article, prepared for the Naticmal Commisslcm on Federal Criminal
Laws. This is referred to In the footnote m page 20 of tbe draft although I think Sally bas misspelled the professor's name. He cites
a number of cases, subsequent to. Murphy, several of which he thinks
add strength to the view that use immunity is constitutional I have
looked at several of these hurriedly, but Gardner is the only me that
ls explicit.

It would be well, however, for you to look at Prof.

Dlcksoo.'s citations and add such of them - lf any - Into our text or
foooiotes as you think appropriate. My recollection ls that the SG' s
brief does cite some of these.
4.

Petltloo.er relies c:n Albertsen v. subversive Activities

Control Boa~ 382 U. S. 70 (Petltlooer's brief 14). Do you think we
should distinguish this in a footnote?

I. You expressed your Intention of taking a look at some of
the more recent law review articles. Before we print a final draft,
I hope you have an opportunity to do this.
6.

What ls the English rule? Is there an act of Parliament

with respect to immunity? They have no Fifth Amendment, but
they probably do have an immunity statute.

-

3.
7. I recall your dim view of using legislative history In a
cmstltutional case. Here, where Cc:mgress adopted a n4w type of
statute after special study and a recommendatic:m from a national
commission, I think the history is a plus. fllould we not cite a case
or two to the effect that Congresslooal judgment is entitled to weight,
even on a constitutional issue?
8. As you. and I have worked on this opintc:m· sporadically
(it is, to a certain extent a ''paste-pd" job), it may be a little

repetitious In spots. This is not necessarily bad, unless it is over
dme.. Keep it in mind as you review it.
L. F. P., Jr.

-

j;u.µ-rmu Q}tturl ttf tJrr ~fub- j;ta±til
'Jlllasfyhtgton. !B. (!}. 2llffeJ.l,~
CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 1 O, 1972

7 0-11 7, Kastigar v. U. S.
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your excellent opinion
for the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

0~.

\'/

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

(!Jauri cf ±!rt ~ttltt~ jjtatts
Jfaglp.ttgton, 18. <!J. 2llffeJl..;l

~tmt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 11, 1972

Re:

No. 70-117 - Kastiga r v. U.S.

Dear Lewis:
This is an excellent opinion,
and I join it.
Sincerely,

A~--Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

~

lfp/ss 1cc 4/!1772

-

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Covert E. Parnell,

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

m

DATE: April 11, 1972

Re: Kastigar
Justice White has commended our opinioo in the abbve case,
and states that be wW join.

He expressed a preference to eliminate note 41, the one 1:ased
en Judge Schaefer's lectures at Northwestern.

Justice White, for

reasODS not clear to me, thinks this may possibly create problems in
the future - although be agrees substantially with Judge Schaefer's
viewpoint.
The ncte ts not essential in any sense, and I would remove it
from the next printing.
When you have finished your cert memos for the Friday Coo-

ference, I suggest Qlat you proceed with drafts of opintcns in the other
two immunity cases. I think these should take priority over the
further study I hope we can make eventually in Gelbard. Incidentally,
the SG has filed a supplemental memorandum in Belbard.

L. F. P., Jr.

C!fltlttt itf tlf~ ~tti:tt~ ~taftg
Jraslfittgfott. ~. C!f. 2.cJffeJ!,.;l

.hµ-rtmt

-

CHAMBERS OF

9 " J STICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 12, 1972

Re:

No. 70-117

-

Kastigar v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your painstaking and fine
opinion.
Sincerely,

;1ud ,
Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

~

-

Aprl.l 12 • 1972

Dear Mr. Putzel•
Re,

No. 70-117 • Charles Jlosepb Kast1gar and Michael
Gorean Stewart y, United Stat_es

Majority support for this opinion is reasonably
Mr • .Justlce Powell has asked me to send
yc,u c,,o coples for advance headnotlng.

assured.

Sincerely.

Covert E. Parnell, Ill
LaW Clerk

Enclosures• 2

✓

.
qf tqt ~t~ ~tatts
Jr:ud1ittgfon. J. Q+. 2!1.;iJ!..;l

~u:p-rttttt <!f!tttd

-

May 9, 1972

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

No. 70-117 - - Kastigar v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice Powell

CtA6)

Copies to Conference

P. S.

This is excellent! See very small suggestion
on attached tear sheet, page 21.

w.

-

-

~

-
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on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence proposed to be used is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.
This is very substantial protection,5° fairly comparable
to that resulting from invoking the privilege itself. The
most that the privilege does is to assure that the citizen
by remaining silent, does not incriminate himself by
his own testimony. This statute assures the same protection by assuring that compelled testimony can in no
way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties. The
Fifth Amendment, like the statute, grants neither pardon
nor amnesty. The government may always prosecute
using evidence from({fegitima~sources.
The Court's opinion in l',furphy characterized the constitutional rule therein enunciated as an "exclusionary
rule." 378 U . S., at 79. This brings to mind relevant
analogies. An inadmissible confession or illegally seized
evidence is excluded but does not bar prosecution per se. 51
Moreover, as MR. J usrrcE vVHITE, concurring in Murphy,
pointed out:
"A coerced confession is as revealing of leads as
testimony given in exchange for immunity and indeed is excluded in part because it is compelled incrimination in violation of the privilege. Malloy v.
Hogan [378 U.S. l]; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315; Brarn v. United States, 168 U. S. 532." 378U. S., at 103.
We perceive no significant difference between the position of a defendant against \\·horn incriminating evidence
See Murphy v. Waterfront Cornrn'n, 378 U. S. 52, 102-104J., concurring).
5 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); Jackson v ..
D enno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U .S. 278 (1936); Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383 (1914).
50

(WHITE,

/

I

I~~

May 14. 1972

HiMORANDUM TO THE PRINTER
The following 1& the llne• UP for two cases in
wblch Mr. _Justice Povel_l will deliver the opinion of
the Court•

~

--70- 117

K.astigar v. United Stacee

Powell, J. • delivered the op1n1on of the Court, 1n Which

Burger. c.J. • Stewart• Whlte. and Btackaun, JJ. • joined .
Douglas and Marshall, JJ., filed dissenting opinions.

Brennan and Rehnquist. JJ. • took no part 1n the conslderattilall
or declslon of the caae.

No. 69• 4 Z1care111 v. New Jersey State Comm ' n of Investigation
Powell,

J.,

Burger,

c.J. •

delivered the opinion of the Court, in ,mich

Stewart, White. and BlackmUn, JJ. • jolned.

Douglas and Marshall, JJ. • filed dlasentt.ng statements.

Brennan and Rebnqulat, .JJ., took no part ln the consideration
or deolalon of the case.

Sincerely ,

Covert E. Parnell, 111
Lav Clerk

"
j;u.pumt Q}aurl ttf tfyt 1!inittb j;tattg
~asftingfon, ~- Q}. 2!lffeJ-l.~

-

May 17, 1972

Dear Mr. Justice Powell:
Re: No. 70-117, Kastigar et al. v. United States
Attached is another copy of the page proof for the
syllabus as approved by you in connecti.on with your opinion
in the above case, to show the-line- up of Justices which has
been supplied by Mr. Parnell.

If there are no subsequ(:nt drafts necessitating syllabus

or line-up changes, please, at the appropriate time, advise
the Print Shop to release the syllabus and line-up with the
opinion.
Respectfully,

i~

1

J/4/tf~ y

Henry Putzel, j r.
Reporter of Decisions

Attachment
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice

\

MAY 1 7 1971 -11 ~o AM

~

-

NOTE: Wher e if .ts deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) will
be r eleased, as ls being done in connection with this case, at the time
t h e opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no par t of the opi nion
of t he Cour t but has been prepared by the Repo r ter of Decisions fo r
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber
Oo., 200 U.S. 321; 3'37,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

KASTIGAR

:ET AL. V .

UNITED STATES

,CERT~ORARI T.O THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 70-117.

Argued January 11, 1972-Decided May - , 1972

The United States c:111 compel testimony from an unwilling witness
who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination by conferring immunity, as provided by 18
U. S. C. § 6002, from use of the compelled testimony and evidence
derived therefrom in subsequent criminal proceedings, as such
immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the
scope of the privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over
a claim of the privilege. Transactional immunity would afford
broader protection than the Fifth Amendment privilege, and is
not constitutionally required. In a subsequent criminal prosecution, the prosecution has the burden of proving affirmatively that
evidence proposed to be used is derived from a legitimate source
wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Pp. 2-22.
440 F. 2d 954, affirmed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
. C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., jojned. DOUGLAS
and MARSHALL, JJ., filed dissenting opinions. BRENNAN and REHN,_ QUIST, JJ., took no part i.n the consideration or decision of the case.

5/20/72

-

Kastigar
This case, here on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit, involves an attack on the constitutionalitf

f

the New Federal Immunity statute.
This statute provides that the government may compel
testimony from an unwilling witness, /who invo kes the Fifth Amend•

ment privilege against compulsory seli-inz . .mination/ by conferring
on the witness ,c ertain immunity. Under iMs statute, the witness
•
~
weuJd lie granted immunity/ from use of the compelled testimony in

,..

r

-

any subsequent criminal proceedings/ as well a s immunit~/ from

-

use of evidence derived from the testimony.
We concludel that this type of immunity, although not as

-

broad as transactional immunity, is coextensive with the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the opinion, we
sustain the validity of the statutf and affirm the judgment of the
court below.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have filed
dissenting opinions.
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no
part in the considerationor decision of the case.

..

..

-

.§upuntt <qourt af ±4t ~t~ .:§taf.tg
'1asJringfon:, J.

<q.
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CHAM BERS OF

May 21, 1972

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
I have gone over the nine cases held for decision in No. 69-4,
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm 'n of Investigation, No. 70-7,
Sarno v. Illinois Crime Investigating Comm'n, and No. 70-117,
Kastigar v. United States.
-

These cases will appear on the Conference

List for May 29.
Three cases involve the New Jersey State Commission of

......_

_,

Investigation and its immunity statute, N. J. Rev. Stat.

§

52:9M-17.

---------.

These cases appear to be controlled squarely by the decision in No.

-~

69-4, Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm 'n of Investigation.

~ - No.
c..y.u1

~

,

70-84, Catena v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investiga-

:..--------

•

tion, and in No. 71-3laaloro v. New Jersey State Comm'n of

Investigation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the immunity
provided by N. J. Rev. Stat.

§

52:9M-17 was sufficient to supplant

the privilege and compel testimony.

-

I would affirm both cases.

•

~

------

-

- 2 -

/4.

No. 71-377, Elias v. Catena, the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit held that the immunity provided by N. J. Rev. stat.
§

52:9M-17 was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel

testimony.

I would grant certiorari and reverse.

Four cases involve 18 U. S. C. 6002, the federal witness
immunity statute.

These cases appear to be controlled squarely by

the deci;oo in No. 70 -117, Kastigar v. United states.

/ 1n No.

70-303, United states v. Korman, the Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit held that the immunity provided by 18 U. S. C.
-

6002 was not sufficient to supp~ant the privilege and compel testimony.

, I would grant certiorar

d reverse.

In No. 71-114, Bowden v. United states, and in No. 71-473,

/ 4eg v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the immunity provided by 18 U.S. C. 6002 was sufficient to
supplant the privilege and compel testimony.
in both cases.

I would deny certiorari

/

In No. 71-775, United states v. Cropper, the Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit held that the immunity provided by 18 U. S. C.
6002 was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony.
I would grant certiorari and reverse.

-

I

-

- 3No. 69-6, Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner
of Sanitation, involves the discharge of public employees, and grows
out of proceedings following an earlier reversal in this Court, 392
U.S. 280 (1968).

The individual petitioners were summoned in 1966

to appear before the Commissioner of Investigation of New York City
to testify with respect to their official conduct.
that in accordance with

§

Each was advised

1123 of the New York City Charter he would

be discharged if he refused to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination.

-

Each was also advised that his testimony could be used against

--

him in subsegu~nt criminal proceedings.

.

~

They were subsequently
.

/( <l_ischarged for invoking and refus ing to waive their constitutional
, ., privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

The discharges were

upheld by CA 2, and this Court reversed, holding that under Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), testimony cannot be compelled
by threat of discharge from public employment unless the compelled
testimony cannot be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the
witness.

After the decision in this Court, petitioners were reinstated. ·\}

They were then called to appear at an inquiry before the Deputy
,

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Administration con-

-

cerning the performance of their duties as employees of the City

-

of New York.

They were again advised that they would be subject to

-

- 4 -

disciplinary action by failure to answer material and relevant questions
relating to the performance of their official duties.

This time, however,

they were advised that:
". . . the answers you may give to the questions pro- \
pounded to you at this proceeding, or any information
or evidence which is gained by reason of your
answers, may not be used against you in a criminal
.
procee d mg
... "
CA 2 (Lumbard, Friendly and Feinberg) held that the discharges

following petitioners' refusals to testify under the grants of immunity
were proper.

-

This immunity is sufficient under our decision in No.

70-117, Kastigar v. United states. I would deny certiorari.

___..

No. 71-5327, Keilly v. United states, involves a federal
;

prosecution of a witness who testified before a New York grand jury
under a grant of transactional immunity.

The factual situation is

a close parallel to that in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964).

Petitioner's only substantial claim relating to immunity is

that .the United states did not carry its burden of showing convincingly
that the evidence used ~fgainst petitioner had a legitimate source
..r.

-------------------·

completely independent of petitioner's testimony before the state
grand jury.

-

CA 2 (Kaufman, Anderson and Mansfield) rejected

,

petitioner's contention, noting (1) that defense counsel never objected

,,

,.

-

- 5-

to admission of evidence on this ground, (2) that the doctrine of plain
error was not applicable because the circumstances surrounding the
acquisition and introduction of the evidence indicated that either there
was a legitimate independent source or that petitioner had waived any
claim of immunity, and (3) that petitioner himself used at trial much
of the documentary evidence to which he now objects. The legal
framework from which the CA 2 approached the issue is consistent
fully with the standards we set forth in No. 70-117, Kastigar v. United
States. I would deny certiorari.

-

L. F. P., Jr.

,.

-

C!fou:ri: cf tlrt ~ttitth j,ta.tts
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
I have gone over the nine cases held for decision in No. 69-4,
Zicarelli v. New Jersey state Comm'n of Investigation, No. 70-7,
Sarno v. Illinois Crime Investigating Comm'n, and No. 70-117,
Kastigar v. United states.

These cases will appear on the Conference

List for May 29.
Three cases involve the New Jersey state Commission of
Investigation and its immunity statute, N. J. Rev. Stat.

§

52:9M-17.

These cases appear to be controlled squarely by the decision in No.
69-4, Zicarelli v. New Jersey state Comm 'n of Investigation.
In No. 70-84, Catena v. New Jersey state Comm'n of Investigation, and in No. 71-318, Annaloro v. New Jersey State Comm'n of
Investigation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the immunity
provided by N. J. Rev. stat.

§

52:9M-17 was sufficient to supplant

the privilege and compel testimony.

I would affirm both cases.

-.

- 2 -

In No. 71-377, Elias v. Catena, the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit held that the immunity provided by N. J. Rev. stat.
§

52:9M-17 was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel

testimony.

I would grant certiorari and reverse.

Four cases involve 18 U. S. C. 6002, the federal witness
immunity statute.

These cases appear to be controlled squarely by

the decision in No. 70 -117, Kastigar v. United states.
In No. 70-303, United States v. Korman, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the immunity provided by 18 U. S. C.
6002 was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony.
I would grant certiorari and reverse.
In No. 71-114, Bowden v. United states, and in No. 71-473,

Weg v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the immunity provided by 18 U.S. C. 6002 was sufficient to
supplant the privilege and compel testimony.

I would deny certiorari

in both cases.
In No. 71-775, United states v. Cropper, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the immunity provided by 18 U.S. C.
6002 was not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony.
I would grant certiorari and reverse.

-.

- 3 -

No. 69-6, Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner
of Sanitation, involves the discharge of public employees, and grows
out of proceedings following an earlier reversal in this Court, 392
U.S. 280 (1968).

The individual petitioners were summoned in 1966

to appear before the Commissioner of Investigation of New York City
to testify with respect to their official conduct.
that in accordance with

§

Each was advised

1123 of the New York City Charter he would

be discharged if he refused to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination.

Each was also advised that his testimony could be used against

him in subsequent criminal proceedings.

They were subsequently

discharged for invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

The discharges were

upheld by CA 2, and this Court reversed, holding that under Garrity

v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), testimony cannot be compelled
by threat of discharge from public employment unless the compelled
testimony cannot be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the
witness.

After the decision in this Court, petitioners were reinstated.

They were then called to appear at an inquiry before the Deputy
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Administration concerning the performance of their duties as employees of the City
of New York.

They were again advised that they would be subject to

·- ·
- 4 -

disciplinary action by failure to answer material and relevant questions
relating to the performance of their official duties.

This time, however,

they were advised that:
" . . . the answers you may give to the questions propounded to you at this proceeding, or any information
or evidence which is gained by reason of your
answers, may not be used against you in a criminal
proceeding . . . "
CA 2 (Lumbard, Friendly and Feinberg) held that the discharges
following petitioners' refusals to testify under the grants of immunity
were proper.

This immunity is sufficient under our decision in No.

70-117, Kastigar v. United states. I would deny certiorari.
No. 71-5327, Keilly v. United states, involves a federal
prosecution of a witness who testified before a New York grand jury
under a grant of transactional immunity.

The factual situation is

a close parallel to that in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964).

Petitioner's only substantial claim relating to immunity is

that the United states did not carry its burden of showing convincingly
that the evidence used against petitioner had a legitimate source
completely independent of petitioner's testimony before the state
grand jury.

CA 2 (Kaufman, Anderson and Mansfield) rejected

petitioner's contention, noting (1) that defense counsel never objected

.

.
- 5-

to admission of evidence on this ground, (2) that the doctrine of plain
error was not applicable because the circumstances surrounding the
acquisition and introduction of the evidence indicated that either there
was a legitimate independent source or that petitioner had waived any
claim of immunity, and (3) that petitioner himself used at trial much
of the documentary evidence to which he now objects.

The legal

framework from which the CA 2 approached the issue is consistent
fully with the standards we set forth in No. 70-117, Kastigar v. United
states.

I would deny certiorari.

L. F. P., Jr.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 70-117
Charles Joseph Kastigar a nd j On Writ of Certiorari to
Michael Gorean Stewart,
the United States Court
Petitioners,
of Appeals for the
V.
Ninth Circuit.
United States.
[April - , 1972]
MR. JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opm1on of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether the United
States Government can compel testimony from an unwilling witness. who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring
on the witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the testimony.
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United
States grand jury in the Central District of California
on February 4, 1971. The Government believed that
petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment
privilege. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the Government applied to the District Court for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce
evi,d ence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U . S. C. § 6002-03.
Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending primarily that the scope of the immunity authorized by the
statute was not coextensive with the privilege against
self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient to
supplant the privilege and compel their testimony over

70-117-0PINION
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a claim of the scope of the privilege. The District Court
rejected this contention, and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand jury and answer its questions
under the grant of immunity.
Petitioners appeared but refused to answer questions.
They were brought before the District Court, and each
persisted in his refusal to answer the grand jury's questions. The court found both in contempt, and committed them to the custody of the Attorney General
until either they answered the grand jury's questions or
the term of the grand jury expirecl. 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Stewart v.
Unit ed States, 440 F . 2d 954 (CA9 1971). This Court
granted certiorari to resolve the important question
whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of the compelled testimony and
evidence derived therefrom ( "use and derivative use"
immunity) , or whether it is necessary to grant immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates ("transactional" immunity). 402 U. S.
971 (1971).
I
The power of government to compel residents to testify
in court or before grand juries and other governmental
agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence.~ The power with respect to courts was established by statute in England as early as 1562/ and Lord
Bacon observed in 1612 that all subjects owed the King
1

The contempt order was i&sued pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1826.
For a concise general history of t estimonial compulsion prior t o
the adoption of our Constitution, see 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2190,
nt 62-68 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See Ullman v. Unit ed Stat es,
350 U .S. 422 , 439 11. 15 (1956); Blair v. Unit ed Stat es, 250 U. S.
273 (1919).
3
Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz. I, c. 9, § 12 (1562).
~

70-117-OPINION
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their "knowledge and discovery."• ·w hile it is not clear
·when grand juries first resorted to compulsory process to
secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the
general common law principle that "the public has a
right to every man's evidence" was considered an "indubitable certainty" "·hich "cannot be denied" by 1742."
The power to compel testimony, and the corresponding
duty of residents to testify, are recognized in the Sixth
Amendment requirement that an accused be confronted
with the "·itnesses against him, and have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The first
Congress implemented the Sixth Amendment process
guarantee in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided
for compulsory attendance of witnesses in the federal
courts. 6 Mn. JcsTICE WHITE noted the importance of
this essential power of government in his concurring
opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52,
93-94 (1964):
"Among the necessary and most important powers:
of the States as well as the Federal Government to
assure the effective functioning of government in an
ordered society is the broad power to compel residents to testify in court or before grand juries or
agencies. See Blair v. United States, 250 U . S. 273.
Such testimony constitutes one of the Government's
primary sources of information."
4

Countess of Shreicsbury's Case, 2 Ho,vcll's State Trials 768,
778 (1612).
5
See the parliamentary debate on the Bill to Indemnify E,·idenre, particularly the remarks of the Duke of Argyle and Lord
Chancellor Hardwirkc, reported in 12 T. Hansa rd, Parliamentary
History of England 675, 693 (1812). See also Piemon te Y. United
States, 367 U. S. 556, 559 n. 2 (1961); Ullman v. United States,
350 U. S. 422, 439 n. 15 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
600 (1896).
6
1 Stat. 73, 88 (1789).
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But the po,Yer to compel testimony is not absolute.
There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial
duty,7 the most important of "·hich is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations,8 and "registers an
important advance in the development of our liberty'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make
himself civilized.' " 0 It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; 1 0 and it protects against any
disclosures ·which the witness reasonably believes could
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other
evidence that might be so used. 11 This Court has been
zealous to safeguard the values which underlie the
privilege. 1 "
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep
in Anglo-American jurisprudence,13 are not incompatible
7

See Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); 8
J. Wigmore, EYidence §§ 2192, 2197 (McNaugton rev. 1961).
8
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1954).
0
Ullman v. United Stat es, 350 U. S. 422, 426 (1956) , quoting
from E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 7 (1955) .
10
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 94 (1964)
(VVHITE, J., concurring); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34,
40 (1924); United Stat es v. Saline Bank, 26 U. S. (1 Peter.;) 100
(1828) ; cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
11
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v.
United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917).
12
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 443-444 (1966).
13
Soon after the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
became firmly established in law, it was recognized that the pri\·ilege
did not apply when immunit~·, or "indemnity," in the Engli8h usage,
had been granted. See L. LeYy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment
328, 496 (1968). Parliament enacted an immunity stRt ute in 1710
directed against illegal gambling, 9 Anne. c. 14, §§ 3-4 (1710),
which became the model for an identical immunity statute enacted
in 1774 by the Colonial Legislature of New York. Law of March 9,
1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621 , 623 (1894) . These
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with these values. Rather they seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and
the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens
statutes provided that the loser could sue the winn er, who was
compelled to answer t he loser's charges. Aft er the winner responded and returned his ill-gotten gains, he was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and discharged from any further or otherpunishment, forfeiture or penalty, which he ... may have incurred
by the playing for , and winning such money . .. ." 9 Anne, c. 14,
§ 4 (1710) ; Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial Laws of New
York 621 , 623 (1894) .
Another notable instance of the ea rly use of immunity legislat ion
is the 1725 impea chment trial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield. The·
Lord Chancellor was accused by the House of Commons of the
sale of public offices and appointments. In order to compel the
testimony of Mast ers in Chancery who had allegedly purchased their·
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could incriminate themselves by t estifying that they had purchased their offices, Parliament enacted a statut e granting immunity to persons then holding
office as Mast ers in Chancery. Lord Chancellor M acclesfield's
Trial, 16 Howell's Stat e Trials 767 , 1147 (1725). See 8 J. Wig.more, E vidence § 2281, at 492 (McNaugton rev. 1961). See also
Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 Howell's Stat e Trials 323 . 604-605
(1723). The legislatures in colonial P ennsylvania and New York
enact ed immunity legislation in the 18th century. See, e. g.,
R esolution of J anuary 6, 1758, in Vot es and Proceedings of theHouse of R epresentatives of the Provin ce of Pennsylvania ( 16821776) , 6 Penm,ylvania Archives (8th series ), 4679 (C. Hoban ed .
1935) ; Law of March 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of New
York 351 , 353-354 (1 894) ; Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1651 , 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621 , 623 (1894) ; Law of March 9, 1774,
c. 1655, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 641-642 (1894). Seegenerally L. Levy,. Origins of the Fifth Amendment 359, 384-385,
389, 402-403 (1968) . F ederal st atutes have exist ed since 1857.
Act of Jan. 24, 1857, c. 19, 11 Stat. 155. For a history of the ·
various federal immunity statut es, see Comment , The F ederal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Pra ctice : Treading the Constit u- tional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J . 1568 (1963) ; Wendel, Compulsory
Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Pri\'ilege : New
De,·elopments and New Confusion , 10 St. Louis U. L. R ev. 327
(1966); and National Commission on R eform of F ederal Criminal
Laws, Working Papers, 1406-1411 (1970) .
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to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the
importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses
are of such a character that the only persons capable of
giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.
Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, 14
and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses.1 5 Congress included immunity statutes in many
of the regulatory measures adopted in the first half of
this century, 1 c and this Court on several occasions has
14 See, e. g., Resolution of Jan. 6, 1758, in Votes and Proceedings,
of the House of Representatirns of the Prm·ince of Penns~·lrnnia:
(1682-1776), 6 Penns~·lrnnia Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban
ed. 1935); Law of March 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of
New York 351, 354 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1655,
5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 642 (1894). Bishop Atterbury's
Trial, 16 Howell's State Trial 323 (1723), for which the House of
Commons passed immunit~· legislation, was a prosecution for treasonable conspirac~·- Sec 16 Howell's State Trials, at 604-605 (1723).
Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767
( 1725) , for which Parliament passed immunity legislation, was a
prosecution for political bribery inrnh·ing the sale of public offices
and appointments. See 16 Howell's State Trials, at 1147 (1725).
The first federal immunity statute was enacted to facilitate an
investigation of charges of corruption and vote buying in the House
of RepresentatiYes. See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity
Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J. 1568, 1571 (1963).
15 See 8 J. Wigmore, EYidence § 2281, at 492 (McNaughton rev.
1961). MR. ,Jus·rrcE WHITE noted in his concurring opinion in
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 92 (1964), that
immunit~· statutes "haYe for more than a century been resorted to
for the im·estigation of man~· offenses, chiefly those whose proof and
punishment were otherwise impracticable, such as political bribery,
extortion, gambling, consumer frauds , liquor Yiolations, commercia[
larcen~·, and n1rious forms or racketeering." 378 U. S., at 94-95.
Seen. 14, supra.
ic See Comment, The Federal ·witness Immunit~, Acts in Theory
and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J.
1568, 1576 (1963).

70-117-0PINION
KASTIGAR v . UNITED STATES

7

characterized such statutes as essential to the effective
enforcement of various federal regulatory acts. 11 The
commentators also have recognized the critical importance
of immunity statutes in investigating certain types of
crimes." Mr. Justice Frankfurter. speaking for the
Court in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
observed that such statutes have "become part of our
constitutional fabric." rn 350 U. S. , at 438. Prior to
the enactment of the statute under consideration in this
case, there were in force over 50 fed eral immunity statutes.~0 In addition, every State in th e Union. as well as
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico . has one or
more such statutes.~ 1
II
Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which
is that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against him self. "deprives Congress
of power to enact laws which compel self-incrimination ,
even if complete immunity from prosecution is granted
prior to the compulsion of the incriminatory testimony.
In other words, petitioners assert that no immunity statute, however drawn, can afford a lawful basis for comi . See Hale v. H enkel, 201 U.S . 43, 70 (1906) ; Brown v. Walk er,
161 U. S. 591, 610 (1896 ).
18
See, e. g., 8 J. Wigmore, E ,·idcnce § 2281, at 501 (3d ed. 1940) ;
~ J . ·wigmon', EYidence § 2281, at 496 (McNaughton rcY. 1961).
1
~ This statement was made with specific refe rence to the Immunity Act of 1893, 27 Stnt. 443, the model for almost all federal
immunity sfatut es prior to th e enactment of the statute under
consideration in this case.
~° For a list ing of these statutes, see National Commission on
R eform of F eder:11 Criminal L:-iws, Working Papers, 1444-1445
( 1970).
1
~ For a listing of these statutes, sec 8 J. Wigmore, EYidencc
§ 2281, at 495 n. 11 (McNaughton reY. 1961).
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pelling incriminatory testimony. They ask us to reconsider and overrule Brown Y. Walker, 161 U. S. 491
(1896) , and Ullman Y. United States, 350 U. S. 422
( 1956). decisions n·hich uphold the constitutionality of
immunity states."" "\Ve find no merit to this contention
and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullman.

III
Petitioners' second contention is that the scope of immunity provided by the federal witness immunity statute, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, is not coextensive with the scope
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, and therefore is not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony over a claim of
the privilege. The statute provides that when a witness
is compelled by district court order to testify over a
claim of the privilege:
"[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order ( or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply "·ith the order." 23 18 U. S. C. § 6002.
The constitutional inquiry, rooted in logic and history,
as well as in the decisions of this Court, is whether the
immunity granted under this statute is coextensive \Yith
22 Accord, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 276 (1968);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924) (Brendeis, J.); H eike v. United
States, 227 U.S. 131 , 142 (1913) (Holmes, J.).
23 For other provisions of the 1970 Act relative to immunity
of witnesses, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 6001-6004 .

•
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the scope of the privilege. 2 1 If so, petitioners' refusals
to ans,ver based on the privilege ,vere unjustified, and
the judgments of contempt were proper, for the grant of
immunity has removed the dangers against which the
privilege protects. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591
(1896). If, on the other hand, the immunity granted
is not as comprehensive as the protection afforded by
the privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing to
answer and the judgments of contempt must be vacated.
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1942).
Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes which
confer transactional immunity and those which provide,
as does the statute before us, immunity from use and derivative use. 2 5 They contend that a statute must at a
minimum grant full transactional immunity in order to
be coextensive with the scope of the privilege. In support of this contention, they rely upon Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) , the first case in which
this Court considered a constitutional challenge to an
immunity statute. The statute, the Immunity Act of
1868, provided that no "evidence obtained from a party
or witness by means of a judicial proceeding ... shall
be given in evidence, or in any manner used against
him ... in any court of the United States.... " 2 6 Not-withstanding a grant of immunity and order to testify
under the 1868 Act, the witness, asserting his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, refused to testify
before a federal grand jury. He was consequently adjudged in contempt of court.2 • On appeal, this Court
construed the statute to protect a witness only against
24
See, e. g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 42, 54, 78
(1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892) .
25
See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548 (1971).
6
"
15 Stat. 37. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 560,,
(1892).
27
In re Counselman, 44 F ed. 268 (CCND Ill. 1890).
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the use of the specific testimony compelled from him
under the grant of immunity. This construction meant
that the statute "would not prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him." ~8 Since the 1868 Act, as construed
by the Court. ,rnuld permit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derfred from his compelled
testimony, it did not protect the witness to the same
extent that a claim of the privilege ,rnuld protect him.
Accordingly, under the principle that an immunity statute cannot supplant the privilege, and a grant of immunity cannot compel testimony over a claim of the
privilege, unless the scope of the grant of immunity is
coextensive ,Yith the scope of the privilege,w the witness'
refusal to testify ,rns held proper. In the course of its
opinion, the Court made the follo,Ying statement. on
which petitioners heavily rely:
"We are clearly of opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States.
[The immunity statute under consideration] does
not supply a complete protection from all the perils.
against which the constitutional prohibition ,rns designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that
prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision,
a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offense to ,Yhich the question relates." 142 U. S.,.
at 585-586.
Counselman Y. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 564 (1892).
Precise]~-, the Court held "that legislation cannot abridge a
constitutional pri,·ilcge, and that it cannot replace or supply (sic)
one, at least unless it is so broad as to haYe the same extent in
scope and effect." 142 U. S., at 585. See Murphy v. Wat erfront
Comm'n, 378 U. S. 42, 54, 78 (1964).
28
20
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Sixteen days after the Counselman decision , a new immunity bill was introduced by Senator Cullom,3° who
urged that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act
would be impossible in the absence of an effective immunity statute."' The bill. which became the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893."" was drafted specifically
to meet the broad language in Counselman set forth
above."'' The new Act provided that:
"no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction , matter or thing, concerning which he may
testify, or produce evidence. documentary or other\Yise .... " Act of Feb. 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
This transactional immunity became the basic form for
the numerous fed eral immunity statutes 3 4 until 1970
when , after re-examining applicable constitutional principles and the adequacy of existing law, Congress enacted
the statute here und er consideration.~--. The new statute,

° Counselman wa s decided Jan. 11, 1892 . Senator Cullom introduced tho ne,Y bill on J an. 27, 1892. 93 Cong. Rec. 573 (1 892).
31
23 Cong. Rec. 6333 (1892).
32
Act of February 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (1893), repealed
by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. No. 91-452,
§ 245, 84 Stat. 931.
33 See the remarks of Senator Cullom, 23 Cong. Rec. 6333 (1892),
and Congressman Wise, who introdu ced the bill in the House. 24
Cong. Rec. 503 (1893) . See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1,
28--29 and n. 36 (1948).
34 Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 438 (1956) ; Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U. S. 1, 6 (1948). There was one minor exception. See Piccirillo v. New York , 400 U. S. 548, 571 and n. 11
(1971) (BREKN AK, J ., di ~senting): Arndstein v. M cCarthy, 254 U.S.
71 , 73 (1920).
35 The statute is a product of careful study and consideration
b~- the National Commission on R eform of Federal Criminal Law:<,
as well as b;o-- Congress. The Commission recommended legislation
to reform the federal immunity laws which served as the model for
3
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which does not "afford [the] absolute immunity against
future prosecution" referred to in Counselman, "·as
drafted to meet what Congress judged to be the conceptual basis of Coun selman, as elaborated in subsequent
decisions of the Court. namely, that immunity from the
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with the scope of the privilege.~n
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any
criminal case of "testimony or other information compelled under the order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)" is consonant with Fifth Amendment standards.
We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use
is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination , and therefore is sufficient to compel testithis statut e. In commenting on its proposal in a special report
to the P resident, the Commission said:
"We are satisfied that our substitution of immunity from use for
immunity from prosecution meets constitutional requirements for
0Yerc01ning the claim of p1-i\-ilege. Immunity from use is the only
consequence flowing from a violation of the individual's constitutonal rights to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizmes,
his constitutional right to counsel, and his constitutional right not to
be coerced into confessing. The proposed immunity is thus of the
same scope as that frequently, even though unintentionally, conferred as the result of const itutional violations by law enforcement •
officers." Second Interim Report of the National Commission on •
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, March 17, 1969, Working P apers
of the Commission, 1445-1448 (1970) .
The Commission's recommendation was based in large pa rt on a
comprehensiYe study of immunit:v and the relevant deci~ions of this
Court prepared for the Commission by Prof. Robert G. Dixon , Jr .,
of the George Washington UniYersity Law Center, and transmitted
to the President with the recommendations of the Commission.
See National Commission on R eform of F ederal Criminal La,vs,
Vi'orking Pa pers, 1405-1444 (1970) .
3 c See S. R ep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 51-56, 145 (1969) ;
H. R.. R ep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong. , 2d Sess., 42 ( 1970) .
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mony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of
immunity must afford protection commensurate with
that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader.
Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity
from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled
testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broaderprotection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The privilege has never been construed to mean that
one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.
Its sole concern is to afford protection against being·
"forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of
'penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.' " 3 7 Immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from
using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it
therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
Our holding is not inconsistent with the conceptual
basis of Counselman. The statute then before the Court,
as construed by it, was plainly deficient in its failure toprohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony. The Court
repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the
statute:
"could not and would not, prevent the use of his
testimony to search out other testimony to be used
in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding .... " 142 U. S., at 564.
that it:
"could not prevent the obtaining and the use of
witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
3 7 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S . 422, 438-439 (1956), quotiug
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886) . See Knapp v...
Schweitzer, 357 U . S. 371, 380 ( 1958) .
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directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when
othern·ise, and if he had refused to answer, he could
not possibly have been convicted .... " 142 U. S.,
at 564,
and that it:
"afford no protection against the use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a
knmYledge of the details of a crime, and of sources
of information which may supply other means of
convicting the witness or party." 142 U. S., at 582.
This reasoning ,rns reiterated in Ullman v. United States,
350 U. S. 422 ( 1956) , ,Yhen the Court recognized that
the Counselman statute ,Yas insufficient:
"because the immunity granted was incomplete, in
that it merely forbade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of inf orrnation obtained from the compelled testimony."
350 U. S., at 436-437. (Emphasis supplied.)
See alrn Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 73 (1920).
The broad language in Counselman relied upon by petitioners was unnecessary to the Court's decision , and cannot be considered binding authority.~8
38 Cf. The Supreme Court, 1963 T erm, 78 Han ·. L . Rev. 179, 230
( 1964). Language similar to the Counselman dictum can be found
in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896), and Hale v. H enk el,
201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906). Brown and HaLe, however, inrnh·ed stat ut es which were clea rly ~ufficient to supplant the pri,·il ege aga inst
self-in crimination , as they provided full immunity from prosecution
"for an d on accoun t of any transaction , mntter or thing. co ncrrning :.
which he mny testify or produce evidence . . . . " 161 U.S ., at 594; '
201 U . S., at 66. The same is true with rc~pect to the bron c! language used in Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137, 146 (1049) ;
nncl in United States v. M ania, 317 U .S. 424, 428 (1943) , nncl the
immunity statut es inrnh·ed in these cnses . In Albertson v. Sub-
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Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52
( 1964), the Court carefully considered immunity from
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom. The lvlurphy petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. After refusing to answer
certain questions on the ground that the answers might
tend to incriminate them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey
and NeYv York.'30 They continued to refuse to testify,
however, on the ground that their answers might tend
to incriminate them under federal law, to which the
immunity did not purport to extend . They were adjudged in civil contempt, and that judgment was affirmed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 10
Y.

versive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70 ( 1965) , some of the
Counselman l:rngunge urged upon us b>' petitioners \\·ns agnin quoted.
But Albertson, like Cmmselman, im·olved an immunity statute
which wns held insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of "investign tor_,· lel\ds" l\nd other e,·idenee deriYed from compelled admissions.
::!82 U . S., at 80.
In Adam s '"· Jfarylcwd. 3-l7 U.S . 179, 182 (195-t). and in United
States v. Murdoch, 2R4 U. S. 141. 149 (1931). the Counselman
dictum ,rn:a referred to as the principle of Counselman. The references were in the context of ancillnr>· points not essential to the
derisions of the Court. The Adams Court did note. ho,YeYcr, that
the Fifth Amendment pri,·ilege prohibited the "use" of compelled
,elf-incriminntor>' t est imon>·· 347 U. S., at 181. In an>' e,·ent the
Court in Ullman v. United States. 350 U. S. 422, 436-437 (1956),
recognized that the ratio1rnle of Counselman wn s that the statute
WI\S insufficient for failnre to prohibit use of evidence derived from
compelled te"timon~·- See nlso Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S.
71. 73 (1920).
39
The 1Yaterfront Commi,sion of New York Harbor is a bistntc>
body e~tabli~hed under an interstate compact appro,·cd by Congress.
o7 Stnt. 451.
0
• In re Application of Waterfront Comrn'n of N. Y. Harbor,
39 N. J. 436, 189 A. 2d 36 (1963).
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The issue before the Court in Murphy was whether
New Jersey and Ne,y York could compel the witneses,
whom these States had immunized from prosecution
under their laws, to give testimony which might then
be used to convict them of a federal crime. Since New
Jersey and New York had not purported to, and indeed
could not, confer immunity from federal prosecution,
the Court was faced with the question what limitations
the Fifth Amendment privilege imposed on the prosecutoria.l powers of the Federal Government, a nonimmunizing sovereign. After undertaking an examination of the
policies and purposes of the privilege,•1 the Court overturned the rule that one jurisdiction within our federal
structure may compel a witness to give testimony which
could be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction. The Court held that the privilege protects
state witnesses against incrimination under federal as
well as state law, and federal witnesses against incrimination under state as well as federal law. Applying
this principle to the state immunity legislation before
it. the Court held the constitutional rule to be that:
"a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
41
Many of the rnlues which were originally emphasized are now
protected in major part b)· the First Amendment. The historic
origin and purpose of the privilege was partly to protect against the
evil of governmental suppression of ideas. In both England and
the Colonies the privilege ,ms primarily a means of assuring that
expression of di,·erse religious and political Yiews would not be
punished or suppressed. See W. Schaefe r, The Suspect and Society,
71-73 (1967) ; Pittman, The Colonial an d Constitutional History
of the Privilege against Self-In crimination in America, 21 Va. L .
R ev. 763, 783 ( 1935). As .Justice Schaefer commented: " Protection
for unpopular and heretical politica l and religious ideas is now in
the process of being remitt ed to the First Amendment ... ."
W. Schaefer, The Suspect nnd Societ)•, 73, 74 (1967). See Gibson v.
Florida Legislative I nvestigating Comrnitt ee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963) .
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unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot
be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement
this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Government in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use
of compelled testimony and its fruits." 42 387 U. S.,
at 79.
The Court went on to emphasize that this rule left the·
state witness and the Federal Government, against which
the witness had immunity only from the use of the
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom, "in
substantially the same position as if the witnes had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant
of immunity." 378 U. S., at 79.
Reconsideration of the rule that the Fifth Amendment
privilege does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction
against being compelled to give testimony which could
be used to convict him in another jurisdiction was made
necessary by the decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S.
1 ( 1964) ,4 3 in which the Court held the Fifth Amendment privilege applicable to the States through the Fourteent h Amendment. The Malloy Court also held that
the same standards would determine the extent or scopeof the privilege in state and in federal proceedings, be42
At this point t he Court added t he following footnot e : " Once
a defendant demonstrat es tha t he has t estified, under a state grant
of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecut ion, the·'
federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence
is not tainted by est ablishing that they had an ind ep endent, legitimate source for the disputed eviden ce." 378 U. S., at 79 n. 18 ..
If t ransa ctional immunit y had been deemed to b e the "consti tutional
rule" there could be no federal prosecution .
48
Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 57 (1964) .
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cause the same substantive guarantee of the Bill of
Rights is involved.'14 The Murphy Court emphasized
that the scope of the privilege is the same in state and
in federa.1 proceedings, and held that a state witness'
privilege against self-incrimination is secured when the
Federal Government is prohibited from using the compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom.• "
It is true that in Murphy the Court was not presented
with the precise question presented by this case, whether
a jurisdiction seeking to compel the testimony may do
so by granting only use and derivative use immunity, for
New Jersey and New York had granted petitioners transactional immunity. The Court heretofore has not
squarely confronted this question,4 6 because post-Counselman immunity statutes reaching the Court have followed the pattern of the 1893 Act in providing transactional immunity.•· But both the reasoning of the
Court in Murphy and the result reached compel the
conclusion that use and derivative use immunity is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege. Since the scope of the privilege is the
same whether it is invoked in a state or in a federal
jurisdiction, the Murphy conclusion that a prohibition
on use and derivative use secures a witness' Fifth
Amendment privilege against infringement by the Federal Government demonstrates that immunity from use
Malloy v. Il agan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (196-l).
4
a See, e. g., California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 42-l, 442 n. 3 (1971)
(Harlan, J., con curring), United States Y. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 ,. 606
n. 11 (1971) ; Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) ; St even:,;
v. Marks, 3S3 U. S. 234, 244 (1966).
47 E. g., Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'11 , 378 U. S. 52 (1964) ;
Smith '"· r; nited Stat es, 337 U. S. 137 (1949); Ullman v. United·
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Hale '°· Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ;
Jack Y. Kan sas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905) ; Br01cn Y. Walker, 161 U . S:
591 (1896).
44
4
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and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the
privilege. Moreover, the Murphy Court noted that immunity from use and derivative use would leave "the
witness and the Federal Government substantially the
same position as if the ,Yitness had claimed his privilege
in the absence of a state grant of immunity." 1 8 This
coextensiveness with the privilege is the degree of protection which the Constitution requires, and is all that
the Constitution requires, even against a jurisdiction
compelling testimony by granting immunity. As the
Court noted in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 276
(1968), "[a]nswers may be compelled regardless of the
privilege if there is immunity from federal and state
use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person
testifying."

IV
Although an analysis of prior decisions indicates that
use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with
the privilege, we must consider additional arguments advanced by petitioners against the sufficiency of such
immunity. We start from the premise, repeatedly affirmed by this Court, that an appropriately broad immunity grant is compatible with the Constitution.
Petitioners argue that use and derivative use immunity does not protect a witness from various possible
incriminating uses of the compelled testimony: for example, the prosecutor or other law enforcement officials
may obtain leads. names of ,Yitnesses or other information not otherwise available which might result in a
prosecution. It will be difficult and perhaps impossible,
the argument goes, to identify, by testimony or crossexamination, the subtle ways in ,Yhich the compelled tes'8

Murphy

Y.

Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964) .
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timony may disadvantage a witness, especially in the
jurisdiction granting the immunity.
These arguments have appeal and merit a response.
We start with the statutory language:
" . . . no testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witnesses in any
criminal case." 18 U. S. C. § 6002.
This is a s,veeping proscription of any use, directly or
indirectly, of the compelled testimony or any information derived therefrom. This total prohibition on use
provides a comprehensive safeguard, barring the use of
compelled testimony as an "investigatory lead," 40 and
barring the use of any evidence obtained as a result of
focusing investigation on a witness as a result of compelled disclosures.
A witness accorded this immunity under 18 U. S. C.
§ 6002, and subsequently prosecuted, is not dependent
for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and
good faith of the prosecuting authorities. As stated in
Murphy:
"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters
related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had
an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence." 378 U. S., at 79 n. 18.
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate,
is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes
See, e. g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382
U.S. 70, 80 (1965).
4D

70-117-0PINION
KASTIGAR v. UNITED STATES

21

on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence proposed to be used is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.
This is very substantial protection,5° fairly comparable
to that resulting from invoking the privilege itself. Themost that the privilege does is to assure that the citizen
by remaining silent, does not incriminate himself by
his own testimony. This statute assures the same protection by assuring that compelled testimony can in no
way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties. TheFifth Amendment, like the statute, grants neither pardon
nor amnesty. The State may always prosecute using
evidence from legitimate sources.
The Court's opinion in JJ1urphy characterized the constitutional rule therein enunciated as an "exclusionary
rule." 378 U. S., at 79. This brings to mind relevant
analogies. An inadmissible confession or illegally seized
evidence is excluded but does not bar prosecution per se. 5 1
Moreover, as MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in Murphy,
pointed out:
"A coerced confession is as revealing of leads as
testimony given in exchange for immunity and indeed is excluded in part because it is compelled incrimination in violation of the privilege. Malloy v..
Hogan [378 U.S. 1]; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315; Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532." 378.
U. S., at 103.
We perceive no significant difference between the position of a defendant against whom incriminating evidence
50

See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 102-104

(WHITE, J., concurring).
51 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); Jackson v.
D enno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) ; Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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has been obtained through a coerced confession or an
unlawful search and seizure, and that of a defendant
against whom incriminating evidence has been obtained
through a grant of immunity from its use and derivative
use. In each of these cases, the State remains free to
prosecute and the defendant's constitutional rights are
adequately protected by the exclusionary rule. There
can be no justification in reason or policy for arguing
that the Constitution requires an amnesty grant where,
acting pursuant to statute, testimony is compelled in
exchange for immunity from use and derivative use when
no such amnesty is required where the State, acting ,Yithout colorable right, coerces a defendant into incriminating himself or violates his Fourth Amendment rights.
We conclude that the type of immunity provided by
18 U. S. C. § 6002 leaves the "·itness and the prosecutorial
authorities in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege
and suffices to supplant it. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accordingly is
Afjirrned ..

and MR. J u sTICE REHNQUIST
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case_
Mn. J U STICE BRENNAN
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether the United
States Government
compel testimony from an un- _,
,villing witness, who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring
on the witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the testimony.
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United
States grand jury in the Central District of California
on February 4, 1971. The Government believed that
petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment
privilege. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the Government applied to the District Court for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce
evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U. s. C. §. 6002-r i (ooO .3
Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, con;..:t:::e.:.:n.:;:d~i1~1g12..J:p:.;r~1-_ __,,__ ";;-----,
1
marily that the scope of the immunity~ ~ by the
statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege
~f___
against self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient
to supplant the privilege and compel their testimony
--@)-.-0--..
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a ehtim of the r,1 ivileg~
he District Court rejected
this contention , and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand jury and ans,rnr its questions under the
grant qf immunity.
--i'>etitioners appeared but refused to answer questions
They were brought before the District Court, and each
p.ersisted in his refusal to ans\\·e.r the grand jury's ques---,---:--:--:---f~t1,....o-n-.
s1 The court found both 111 contempt, and comrnitted them to the custody of the Attorney General
until either they answered the grand jury's questio~
the term of the grand jury expired.' The Court of
Appeals for the Xinth Circuit affirmed. Stewart Y.
United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA.9 1971). This Court
granted certiorari to resolve the important question
whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of the compelled testimony and
evidence derived therefrom ("use and derivative use"
immunity). or ,Yhether it is necessary to grant immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates ("transactional' ' immunity). 402 U. S.
971 (1971).

.
}~

pv-i\/16e.

The power of government to compel i;:.Qsi~ to testify
in court or before grand .i uries and other governmental
agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American j urisprudence." The power with respect to courts was established by statute in England as early as 1562." and Lord _
Bacon observed in 1Gl2 that all subjects o,Yed th e King
-

_rd

~• t'

incn mino~o1l•

/

v'

,/

~

_ , The contempt order ,n1 s is.sued pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1826 .
"For a concis~ history of testimoninl compubion prior to _
~
the ndoption of our Constitution, see 8 J. \Vigmore, EYidcnce 2 1 9 0 ~
11t 62 ~ (:\lcNaughton re\'. 1961). See Ullman \'. United States.
-rt.
350 U. S . ..J.22 , 439 n. 15 (1956); Blair "· Unit ed Stat es, 250 U. S.
973 (1919).
" Stntutc~of Eliznbcth. 5 Eliz. I, c. 9, § 12 (1562).
......_____

~
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their "knO\dedge and discovery. " , \Yhile it is not clear
when grand juries first resorted to compulsory process to
secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the
general common law principle that "the public has a
right to every man's evidence" ,Yas considered an "indubitable certainty"' which "cannot be denied" by 1742.r.
The power to compel testimony. and the corres~nding ~
duty e+- r.i~idQntlto testify, are recognized in the Sixth
Amendment requirementlthat an accused be confronted
with the witnesses against him. and have compulsory
process for obtaining "·itnesses in his favor. The first
Congress lmp)emonteEl tAe 8i.d,I,: AllrCl~SlttJ prncer
at....~illlnrn~ee in the Judiciary Act of 1789. ,Yhic 1 provided
for compulsory attendance of witnesses in the federal
courts." :iVIn . .Jn,TI CE; WHITE noted the importance of
this essential power of government in his concurring
opinion in Jl,furphy Y. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
93-94 (,22.U4) :

@

V

"Among the necessary and most important/powers
of the States as well as the Federal Governfuent to
assure the effective functioning of government in an
ordered society is the broad power to compel residents to testify in court or before grand juries or
agencies. See Blair Y. United States, 250 U. S. 273.,,.Such testimony constitutes one of the Government's
primary sources of information."
~
' Count ess of Shre1csbury's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials .
·
778 (1612) .
.; See the parliamentary debate on the Bill to Indemnif~- E\·i~
dencc, particularly the remarks of the Duke of Argyle and Lord
Chamcllor Hardwicke, reported in 12 T. Hansard, Parliamentary
History of England 675, 693 (1812). Sec also Piemonte \". United ✓
States, 367 U. S. 556, 559 11. 2 (1961); Ullman~v. United States, .,,:350 U. S. 422, 439 n. 15 (1956) ; Brou·n v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 , ✓
600 {1896).
✓

'b'f>
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But the po,Yer to compel testimony is not absolute.
There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial
duty,7 the most important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
~
privilege reflects a complex of our fundament.~
.-b
values and ~
~
aspirations,' and ~ i , 1 , ~ a
LMa
important advance in the development of our liberty. l B
\'ttie ef tlaie ~n~at lauclmacks in ma,~ '., i.trwggl@ ~8 lil1M~
:hin~milf <JiHilh'il-1~
t can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal. administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; 10 and it protects against any
disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other
evidence that might be so used. 11 This Court has been:
zealous to safeguard the val~es which underlie the
pri vilege. 1 "
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep
in Anglo-American jurisprudence,' " are not incompatible
7

;;;)
411

-- -h-

See Blair v. United States, 250 U . S. 273 , 281 1919) ; 8
J. Wigmore, E,·idence §§ 2192 , 2197 (lVIcNau on rev. 19~6 1).
-le,·
' ee Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U . . 52, 55 (19 4).
9
llman v. United States, 350 U . S. 422, 426 (1956)
· ,,,
•
i.,;Jr E. Griswold , The Fifth Amendment Today 7 ( 1955).
>
10
Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n , 378 U . S. 52, 94 (1964)
(WHITE. J., concurring) ; M cCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U . S. 34,
40 (192-1) ; United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U. S. (1 Peters) 100
(1 828) ; cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U .S. 273 (1968). _ _ __ ...,...---:-:---:-.~n~
11
Hoffman v. Unit ed States, 3-11 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v.
f31MA-- V, IJ..1'• etll
United St,JJt.gs, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917).
5{~ 1 3 1/0 (/ .s ,
2
,
See, e. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 443-4-l4 (1966) f'\. 1 ;~q { lt/£tJ).:,
13
Soon after the privilege against compulsory self-incriminntio1~ \
became firmly established in law, it was recognized that the privilege
did not apply when immunit ~·, or " indemnity, " in t he English usage,
had been grant ed. See L. Levy , Origin~ of the Fifth Amendment
(1968). Parliament enacted an immunity sta t ut e in 1110:_
clir~ct:ci against illegal gambling. 9 Anne, c. 14, §§ 3-4 (1710),
which became the model for an identical immunity stat ut e ena ct ed
in 1774 by the Colonial Legi~lature of New York. Law of March 9, .
177-1, c. 1651 , 5 Colonial Laws of N ew York 621,623 (1 894). These

✓

✓
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with these values. Rather they seek a rational accommodation bet\\'een the imperatives of the privilege and
the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens

--

cAf.

0

.JL----

Another notable instance of the ea rl~· use of immunity legi~lation
is t he 1725 impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield . The
Lord Chancellor was accused by the House of Commons of t he
sale of publi c offices and appointments. In order to compel the
testimony of :Masters in Chancer~· who had allegedly purchased their
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could incriminate them:
selves b)1t estif~·ing tlu1t the,. lit1t!I r,e1rel~AseEl thcit offi:1;e:?," Parliament enacted a statut e granting immunity to persons then holdingoffice as Masters in Chancery. Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's
Tiial, 16 Howell 's State Trials 767. 1147 (1725). See 8 J. Wig.more, E,·idence § 2281. at 492 (:\IcNau on rev. 19
ee a so
Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 Howell's tate Trials 323, 604-605
(1723). The legidat ures in colonial Penns~•lvania and New York
enacted immunit~· legislation in the 18t h century. See, e. ·g.,
Resolution of January 6, 1758, in Vot es and Proceedings of ~
House of R epresentat ives of the Province of Pennsylvania (1682- 1776), 6 P enns~·lvania Archives (8th series ))'1679 (C. Hoban ed. 1935) ; Law of ?\larch 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of NewYork 351, 353-354 (1894); Law of l\Ia rch 9, 1774, c. 1651 , 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621, 623 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774,
c. 1655, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 641-642 (1 894). See
generally L. Levy, Origins of t~h~e_F
~ if~tl!?,1_A~m~e~n~d!,lI~Q.L.,~~~~~~
389, 402-403 (1968). Federa l stat ut es have existed since 1857.
Act of Jan . 24, 1857, ~ 11 Stat. 155. For a history of the
various federal immunity statut es, see Com ment, The F ederal Witness Immunit~· Act~ in Theor~· and Practice: Treading the Const itutional Tightrope. 72 Yale L. J. 1568 (1963); vVendel. Compubory
Immunity Legi~lation an d the Fifth Amendment Pri,·ilege: New
De,·elopments and New Con fusion , 10 St. Louis U. L. Re,·. 327
(1966); and National Commission on Reform of F ederal Criminal
Laws, Working Papers, 1406-1411 (1970).
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to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the
importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses
are of such a character that the only persons capable of
giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.
Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, 14
and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses.1" Congress included immunity statutes in many
~
he regulatory mea_surcs adopted in the first_ half of
/ tins century.!," ?HQ ~liJ.1B Co~Pt on sxcerni oeettettlll'16 11c:·

e--

14 See, e. g., Resolution of ,¥6, 1758, in Votes and Proceedings
of the House of Represcntatin~s of the Province of Pennsylrnnia
(1682-1776), 6 Pennsylrnnia Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban
ed. 1935); Law of March 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of
New York 351, 354 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1655,
5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 642 (1894). Bishop Atterbury's
Trial, 16 Howell's State Triall323 (1723), for which the House of
Commons passed immunity legislation, was a prosecution for treasonable conspiracy. Sec 16 Howell's State Trials, at 604--605 (1723)l
Lord Chancellor Macclesfield' s Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767
( 1725), for which Parliament passed immunity legislation, was a
prosecution for political bribery im·oh-ing the sale of public offices
nnd appointments. See 16 Howell's State Trials, at 1147 (1725).
The first federal immunity statute was enacted to facilitate an
investigation of charges of corruption and vote buying in the House
of Representatives. See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity
Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J . 1568, 1571 (1963).
15 See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 492 (McNaughton rev. ;
1961). MR. JusncE WHITE noted in his concurring opinion in
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 92 (1964), that
immunity statutes "haYe for more than a century b~en resorted to
for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those whose proof and
punishment were othcrll"ise impracticable, such as political bribery,
extortion, gambling, consumer frauds, liquor Yiolations. commercial
larceny, and various forms
racketeermg." 378 U. S., at 94--95.
See n. 14, supra.
16 See Comment. The Federal \Yitness Immunity Acts in Theory
and Practice: Treacling the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J_
1568, 1576 (1963).
.
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~

This is very substantial protection~ commensurate with
that resulting from invoking the privilege itself.

The privilege

assures that a citizen is not compelled to incriminate himself
by his own testimony.

It usually operates to allow a citizen to

remain silent when asked a question requiring an incriminatory
answer.

This statute, 18 U.S. C.

§

6002, which operates after

a witness has given incriminatory testimony, affords the same
protection by assuring that the compelled testimony can in no
way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties.

The statute, like

the Fifth Amendment, grants neither pardon nor amnesty.
the statute and

Both

he Fifth Amendment allow the government to

prosecute using evidence from legitimate independent sources.
The statutory proscription is analogous to the Fifth
52

Amendment requirement in cases of coerced confessions.
A coerced confession, as revealing of leads as testimony given

53
in exchange for immunity,

is inadmissible in a criminal trial,
54

but it does not bar prosecution.

Moreover, a defendant against

..,
'

2.
whom incriminating evidence has been obtained through a grant
of immunity may be in a stronger position at trial than a defendant
who asserts a Fifth Amendment coerced confession claim.

One

raising a claim under this statute need only show that he testified
under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the

hea~~

kburden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was
55

derived from legitimate independent sources.

On the other hand,

a defendant raising a coerced confession claim under the Fifth
Amendment must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing before
56

his confession and evidence derived from it become inadmissible.

Footnotes p. 21 (Kastigar) 5/16/72
51.

See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 102-104

( 1964) (White , J., concurring).
52.

Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954); Bram

v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
53.

As Mr. Justice White, concurring in Murphy, pointed

out:
"A coerced confession is as revealing of leads as
testimony given in exchange for immunity and indeed
is excluded in part because it is compelled
incrimination in violation of..:t:JJ.£e_w...l,J(.~,a,!ii:.ir....-----,.,--.
Malloy v. Hogan, {? 78 U. S. , Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315; Bram v. Unit, States, 168 U.S.
532. " 378 u. s.>at 103.
54.

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

55.

See p. 20, supra; Brief for Respondent at 37; Cf.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
56.

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence ~~~"'-li;Q,,,,11@--lTS~ is derived from a legitimate source wholly in ependent of the compelled
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characterized

)
I
case, tl.1,~re \Yere in force over 50 federal immunity statutes~ VIn addition, every State in the Union, as well as
the District of Colun::\11i~ and Puerto R..ic..P/ has 1~1?e or
more such statutes.~e. C<!l"olO'-~~~i-or~2tN.l. -rN6

>,\ ~

,4.r· ~-1

"I,,

C,o,~.r+

f

O~

~e-Je\'GU

-~•D~Ve

Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which
is that "no person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," deprives Congress
of power to enact laws which compel self-incrimination,
even if complete immunity from prosecution is granted
prior to the compulsion of the incriminatory testimony.
, In other words, petitioners assert that no immunity stat~ u~ however drawn, can afford a lawful basis for comSee Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 70 (1006) ; Brown v. Walk er,
U.S. 591,610 (1896) .
See, e. g., 8 J. vVigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 501 (3d ed. 1940);
~\
Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 496 (McNaughton rev . 1961).
This statement was made with specific reference to the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443 , the model for almost all
federal immunity statutes prior to the enactment of the statute under
consideration in this case. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U. S. 52, 95 (1964) (WHITE, J ., concurring).
\J7 LA For a listing of these statutes, see National Commission on
.VRefurm of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers, 1444-1445
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For a listing of these statutes, see 8 J . Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2281 , at 495 n. 11 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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pelling incriminatory testimony. They ask us to f
ref;;@
consider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.
5~ /
(1896), and UllmaniY. United States, 350 U . S. 422
(1956), decisions "foch uphold the constitutionality of
immunity statutes.2 " We find no merit to this contention
and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ull11ia~

III
Petitioners' second contention is that the scope of immunity provided by the federal witness immunity statute, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, is not coextensive with the scope
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, and therefore is not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony over a claim of
the privilege. The statute provides that when a witness
is compelled by district court order to testify over a
claim of the privilege:

./'

"the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order ( or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution forperjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." 23 18 U. S. C. § 6002.

✓

The constitutional inquiry, rooted in logic and history,
as well as in the decisions of this Court, is whether the
immunity granted under this statute is coextensive with
Accord, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 276 (1968);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 1964); McCarthi v.
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924) (Br ndeis, J.) ; H eike v. United
States, 227 U. S. 131, 142 (1913) (Holmes, J.).
23 For other provisions of the 1970 AQ.t relative to immunity
of witnesses, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 600122

✓
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the scope of the privilege. 2 " If so, petitioners' refusals
to answer based on the privilege were unjustified , and
the judgments of contempt were proper, for the grant of
immunity has removed the dangers against which the
privilege protects. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591
( 1896) . If, on the other hand, the immunity granted
is not as comprehensive as the protection afforded by
the privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing to
answer, and the judgments of contempt must be vacated.
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924).
Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes which
transactional immunity and those which provide,
es the statute before us, immunity from use and derivative use. 2 5 They contend that a statute must at a
minimum grant full transactional immunity in order to
be coextensive with the scope of the privile e. In support of this contention, they rely
Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 54 7 (1892) , the rst case in which
:if, this Court considered a constitutional challenge to an
'7mmunity statute. The statute, ( the Immunity Act of
is681provided that no "evidence obtained from a party
or witness by means of a judicial proceeding .. . shall
be given in evidence, or in any manner used against
him .. . in any court of the United States . . . ." 1, Not-withstanding a grant of immunity and order to testify
under the )2.868 Act, the witness, asserting his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, refused to testify
before a federal grand jury. He was consequently adjudged in contempt of court.·
On appeal, this Court
construed the statute
only~against

(1it:ir1)

g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S.
(1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,585 (189
2 5 See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U
971 .
eo 15 Stat. 37/. See
ounselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 56().. )
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In re Counselman, 44 Fed. 268 (CCND Ill. 1890).
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the use of the specific testimony compelled from him
under the rant of immunity. This construction meant
that the statute " ·ould no~ prevent the use of his testiQ1ony to s~arch o t other testimon to be used in e viJ:;";;ce against him."· , Since the 1868 Act, as construed
by the Court. would permit the use against the imnrnnized witness of evidence derived from his compelled
testimony. it did not protect the witness to the same
extent that a claim of the privilege would protect him.
Accordingly, under the principle that a grant of immunity cannot supplant the privilege, and is not sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege,
unless the scope of the grant of immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege} ; the witness'
refusal to testify ,ms held proper. In the course of its
opinion, the Court made the follo,Ying statement. on
which petitioners heavily rely:
"·We are clearly of opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States.
[The immunity statute under consideration] does
not supply a complete protection from all the perils
against \Yhich the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that
prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision,
a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
~ e to which the question relates. " 142 U. S.,
at 585-586.

.I

t

~ Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 564 (1892).
~ Precisely, the Court held "that legislation cannot abridge a
constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replitce or supply [sic]
one, at lea st unless it is so broad as to ham the same extent in
scope and effect." 142 U . S., at 585 . See Murphy v. Wat erfront
Comm'n, 378 U. S.
54, 78 (1964).

@
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Sixteen days after the Cou11selman decision , a new immunity bill was introduced by Senator Cullom, 3 who
urged that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act
\YOtild be im )ossible in the absence of an effective immunity statute." The bill, " ·l:!lch became the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893,i\rns drafted specifically
to meet the broad language in Counselman set forth
a ove.' · Th e new Acthxovided that:
"no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction. matter or thing, concerning which he may
testify, or produce evidence, documentary or other~·ise.... " Act of Feb. 11. 1893, ~ 7 Stat. ~ .. ~.

l

2>➔

~
3.

a~D•"s-\-

..Ue fri11,leqeself- ;>1c.r-,m•""'--

fio.,i
\,&)t"i I'?.•
rie-0,re 4-te L°ifen,hif~
IV\

vv ""\.. ~

IYl~~r'~e ~IM~s~itill

~

This transactional immunity }?_ecame the basic form for
the numerous federal immunity statutes
until 1970,
when, after re-examining applicable constitutional principles and the adequacy of existing law. Congress enacted
. ~\ the statute here under consideration.f The new statute,

t

'\): t Counselman was decided Jan. 11 , 1892. Senator Cullom introthe new bill on Jan. 27,. 1892. e/ Cong. Rec. 573 (1892). @

8 23

.,;"

✓

?,_!'I du~cd

Cong. Rec. 6333 (1892).
e,/
a,,/"
Act of February 11, 1893, ~ 27 Stat. 443 ~.__i:__e1ealed
by he Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. No. 91-452,
)r § 245,,_84 Stat. 931.
$"?, >
11 See the remarks of Senator Cullom, 23 Cong. Rec.J!i333 (1892) ,
and Congressman Wise, who introduced the bill in the House. 24
Cong. Rec. 503 (1893). See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1,
'§:29 and n. 36 (1948).
'1,Ullmanlv. United States, 350 U . S. 422, 438 (1956) ; Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U. S. 1, 6 (1948). There was one minor except.ion. See Piccirillo Y. New York , 400 U. S. 548, 571 and n. 11
(1971) (BRENNAN , J., dissenting): Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S.
71 , 73 (1920).
~ The statute is a product of careful study and consideration
by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
as well as by Congress. The Commission recommended legislation

v
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which does not "afford [ the] absolute immunity against
future prosecution" referred to in Counselman, was
drafted to meet " ·hat Congress judged to be the con~
ual basis of Counselman, as elaborated in subsequent
decisions of the Court, namely. that immunity from;
the
µ
3
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive ·with the scope of the privilege.' ·
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any
criminal case of "testimony or other information compelled under th e order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) " is consonant with Fifth Amendment standards.
We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use
is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel t esti/
~

Y

.,..,,-

✓

~ statute.

In commenting on its proposal in a special report
1e-President, t he Commission said:
"We are satisfi ed that our substitution of immunity from use for
immunit y from prosecution meets constitut iona.l requirements for
O\·ercoming the claim of priYilege. Immunity from use is the only
onsequen~e jlowing from a. violation of the individual's constitunal rightft o be protect ed from unreasonable searches and seizures,
s constitutional right to counsel, and his constitutional right not to
be coerced into confessing. The proposed immunity is thus of t he
same scope as t hat frequently, even though unintent ionally, confe rred as the result of constitutional violations by law enforcement
officers." Second Int erim R eport of the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, March 17, 1969, Working Papers
of the Commission, i4<J.ci ~ 44~ ( 1970) .
The Commission 's recommendation was based in large part on a
comprehensive study of immunity and the relevant decisions of t his
Court prepared for the Commission by Prof. Robert G. Dixon , Jr.,
of the George Washington University Law Cen ter, and transmitt ed
to the President with the recommendations of the Commission ..
See National Commission on R eform of F ederal Criminal Laws,
rking Papers, 1405-1444 (1970).
n See S. R ep. No . 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 51-56, 145 (1969) ;
H . R. R ep . No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 42 (1970).
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mony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of
immunity must afford protection commensurate with
that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader.
Transactional immunity, '\'vhich accords full immunity
from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled
testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broaderprotection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The privilege has never been construed to mean that
one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.
I ts sole concern is to afford protection against being
"forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of
'penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.'"
Immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from
using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it
therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
al J
Our holding is ~consistent with the concept[
basis of Co1tnselman. The Co1tnselman statute, as construed by the Court, was plainly deficient in its failure to
prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony. The Court
repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the
statute:
"could notJ and would not, prevent the use of his
testimony to search out other testimony to be used
in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding . . " 142 U. S., at 564[

f

JJ---
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that it:
"could not prevent the obtaining and the use of
witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
Ullman)_v . United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-439 (1956), quo ting
'Boyd \". United Stat es, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886). See Knapp v_
Schweitzer, 357 U . S. 371, 380 (1958) .
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directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on ,vhich he might be convicted, when
otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could
not possibly have been convicted." 142 U. S., at
564,
and that it:
"affords no protection against that use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a
knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources
of information which may supply other means of
1wicting the witness o_iyarty." 142 U. S. at 586.

4ke.
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t•ei-tet>arelin Ullman '· United States,
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350 U. S. 422 (1956) , ~P,,!'l-''f,11e Cour ~
the Counselman statute was insufficient:
"because the immunity granted was incomplete, in
that it merely forbade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from, the compelled testimony."
350 U. S., at ~ 37.
(Emphasis supplied.)

J_,/

See also Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 73 (1920).
The broad language in Counselnian relied upon by petitioners was unnecessary to the Court's decision, and cannot be considered binding authority."
~

Cf.The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Han-. L. Rev. 179, 230
(1964). Language similar to t he Couns elman dictum can be found in
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 594-595 (1896), and Hale v. Henkel,
:201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906). Brown and Hale, howeYer, ul\"olrnd statutes which were clea rly sufficient to supplant the priYil ege against
self-inc rimination, as they pro,·ided full immunity from prosecution
" for and on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning,
which he may testify or produce evidence... ." 161 U. S., at 594;
201 U. S., at 66. The same is true of Smith v. Unit ed States, 337
U. S. 137, 141 , 146 (1949) , and United States v. Mania, 317 U.S.
424, 425, 428 (1943). In Albertson v. Subv ersive Activities Con-
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In Murphy v. Waterfront C01nm'n, 378 U. S. 52
( 1964), the Court carefully considered immunity from
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom. The Murphy petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. After refusing to answer
certain questions on the ground that the answers might
tend to incriminate them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey
ai1d New York.f They continued to refuse to testify,
however, on the ground that their answers might tend
to incriminate them under federal law, to which the
immunity did not purport to extend. They were adjudged in civil contempt, and that judgment was affirmed
by the New Jersey Supreme Courtf

~
,/

trol Board, 382 U. S. 70 (1965) , some of the Counselman language
urged upon us by petitioners was again quoted. But Albertson,
like Counselman. involve_9p_an immunity statute which was held
/
sufficient for failure to P1\eibit the use of tf.i~'oH·t1~1r'tt~!!~ti~11:t~11;r~.,;#le~11~g!§s:":!a~J~-...::~{_,,--'.'t.:t":"::-"".~,;;-~r--.....
~ evidence derived from compelled admission,
382 U. S., at 80.
oJ1.
e. !.(-Se. . • \ ,I'
In Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (19 4), and in United
eornpelleJ oJ,tt,.sf'CllS\ ✓1
States "· 1lfordoc , 284 U . S. 141 , 149 (1931). the Counselman .
~ a.fl ''int1e.s.J.iflf&rJ
dictum was referre to as the principle of Counselman. The refer,t
ences were in the context of ancillary points not cs~cntial to the
/e •
~
ons of the Court. The Adams Court did note ho"·ever tha
✓
he "use" of compelled
the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibit
self-incriminatory testimony. 347 U. S., a 181. In an>' c w · n t ~
/
Court in Ullmmi).. v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 436-437 (1956),
_:.:::---..----~
recognized that the rationale of Counselman was that th statute
u;uflselt\~!!
was insufficien~ for failure to prohibi'Qu~e of evidence deri~rd from
,/
I compelled test1mon>·· Sec abo Arndstein v. McCarthy. 2a4 U. S .
11 13 (1920).
-,
---, The Wat erfront Commission of New York Harbor is a bistate
-bod establi~hed under an interstate compact apprm·ed by Congress.
✓
67~tat. '=-- _.
In re 'Application of Waterfront Comm'n of N. Y. Harbor,
39 .N. J. 436, 189 A. 2d 36 (1963).
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The issue before the Court in Murphy was whether
New Jersey and Kew York could compel the witnesses,
whom these States had immunized from prosecution
under their laws, to give testimony which might then
be used to convict them of a federal crime. Since New
Jersey and New York had not purported to confer immunity from federal prosecution, the Court was faced
with the question what limitations the Fifth Amendment privilege imposed on the prosecutorial powers of
the Federal Government, a nonimmunizing sovereign.
After undertaking an examination of the policies and
purposes of the privilege.+Ythe Court overturned the
rule that one jurisdiction within our federal structure
may compel a witness to give testimony which could
be used to convict him of a crime in another j urisdiction.42 The Court held that the privilege protects

ative- 1nvestigating l,'omrnittee,
Reconsideration of the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege
does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony which could be used to convict him in
another jurisdiction was made necessary by the decision in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) , in which the Court held the Fifth
Amendment privilege applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Murphy v. Waterfront Cornrn'n, 378 U. S. 52, 57
(1964).

__p.---

42
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state witnesses against incrimination under federal as
well as state law, and federal witnesses against incrimination under state as well as federal law. Applying
this principle to the state immunity legislation before
it, the Court held the constitutional rule to be that:
"a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot
be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement
this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Government in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use
of compelled testimony and its fruits." 4 3 ~ U. S.,
at 79.

/

/

N

---

~

The Court weHt 0R. to '3~13aasig0 that this rule left the
~
tness and the Federal Government, against which
the witness had immunity only from the use of the
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom, "in
substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant
of immunity." 378 U. S., at 79.
It is true that in Murphy the Court was not presented
with the precise question presented by this case, whether
urisdiction seeking to compel ~
mony may do

~

4 3 At this point the Court added t he following
"Once
a defendant demonstrates t hat he has testified, under a state gra nt
of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecutio'i'i,'""'tlie
federal authorities have the burden of showing t hat t heir evidence
is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 378 U. S., at 79 n. 18.
If tra nsactional immunity had been deemed to be the "constitutional
rule" there could be no federal prosecut ion.

✓
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/ so by granting only use and derivative use immunity, for
~ Jersey and New York had granted petitioners transactional immunity. The Court heretofore has not
squarely confronted this question,-' 4 because post-Counselman immunity statutes reaching the Court either have
follo,Yed the pattern of the 1893 Act in providing transactional immunity;'" or have been found deficient for,...--failure to prohibit the use of all evidence derived from 1
compelled testimony.'"' But both the reasoning of the
Court in Murphy and the result reached compel the
conclusion that use and derivative use immunity is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege. Since the privilege is fully applicable
and its scope is the same whether invoked in a state or
in a federal jurisdiction." the Murphy conclusion that a
prohibition on use and derivative use secures a "·itness'
Fifth Amendment privilege against infringement by the
Federal Government demonstrates that immunity from
use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of
the privilege. As the Nlurphy Court noted, immunity ,

~""~ "· u..,-,\eJ. s~f~,
3s7 U ,S. 13'7 (lq't'U:,

~,+d s+c,~ ". M-,":aj

31'7

l{ ,s,

42¥ (.1443.)_;

44 See, e. g., Califo rnia v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 442 n. 3 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring), United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 , 606
n . 11 (1971); Piccirillo v. N ew York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971); Stevens
v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, ~ (1966).
4 5 E. g., Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52
1964 ·
&-1\leth \. o'niLi ~trztes, 331 U S ]31 (lQi9'n Ullman V. United
'States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956) ;l Hale v. H enkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906);
Jack v. Kansas, 199 U . S. 372 (1905); Brown v. Walk er, 161 U.S.
591 (1896). Seek1.
4 6 E. g., Albertson v. Sub versive Activities Control Boa.rd, 382
U.S. 70, 80 (1965) ; Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 , 73 (1920).
4 7 In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 10-11 (1964) , the Court held
that the snme standards would determine the extent or scope of
the privilege in state nnd in federal proceedings, because the same
substantive guarantee of the Bill of Rights is involved. The Murphy
Court emphasized that the scope of the privilege is the snme in
state and in federal proceedings. Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n,
378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964).

✓

Ci:'l'l·2tfj)

✓
✓

't:aapia.,

✓

✓
✓

......

70-117-OPINION
KASTIGAR v . UNITED STATES

19

from use and derivative use "leaves the witness and the
Federal Government in substantially the same position
as if the witness had claimed his privilege" 4 8 in the
absence of a grant of immunity. The Murphy Court
was concerned solely with the danger of incrimination
under federal la\\-, and held that immunity from use and
derivative use was sufficient to displace the danger.
This protection coextensive ,rith the privilege is the degree of protection which the Constitution requires,~ and- --"',__
is all that the Const1tut1on reqmre~ even against JU~ii:-:;;11:::::--'
diction compelling testimony b 0 ·ranting immunity. As
the Court noted in Gardner Y. Bro erick, 392 U. S. 273,
276 (1968), "[a]nS\Yers may be compelled regardless of
the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state
use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a crin1inal prosecution against the person
testifying."

./

__

~l~'fc~ ~ /vtt1\l-.'t
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Although an analysis of prior decisions indicate,' that
use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with
the privilege, we must consider additional arguments advanced by petitioners against the sufficiency of such
immunity. We start from the premise, repeatedly affirmed by this Court, that an appropriately broad immunity grant is compatible with the Constitution.
~ etitioners argue that use and derivative use immumty
noiJProtect a witness from various p~
e
incriminatmg uses of the compelled testimony: for example, the prosecutor or other law enf~o;!!r.!;;c!::.e1!!n!!e::!n!J.\-,w.i.u.......:'-t-'7".~
may obtain leads, names of witnesses or other informa•
tion not otherwise available which might result in a
prosecution. It will be difficult and perhaps impossible,
the argument goes, to identify, by testimony or cro'ssexamination, the subtle ways in which the compelled tes-

~
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Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964).
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This argument presupposes that the statute's S8 □ peo
he RM:Ve prohibition ea-~se-e~-@effl~e.ilea-eeseiffl@RY will prove
impossible to enforce, The statute provides a sweeping
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the com pe lled tes timony and any information derived therefjrom ~
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timony may disadvantage a witness, especially in the
jurisdiction granting the immunity.
6

Woe ~tary----y~~h -4h~~ ~ ~

"#Trio

~_J/;./

testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other in_--:!,.~-~f.:::o~rm
~ a:t~io~1~1)~ may be used against the witness~1 any
criminal caset
18 U. S. C. § 6002.

,/'

~ -p._?9,

- - - - - 'F:his-is- a- swoo13i+1g-1C)FOscript,ion- 0f- any- use, dir
indirectly, of the ·"Cnm lled testimony--or-any-i-n-f orm
t-ipn derivea- therefro
This total prohibition on use
provides a comprehensive ·safeguard, barring the use of
compelled testimony as an "investigatory lead,"
resu.(f of
barring the use of any evidence obtained as a result of
discl.ostJ.lf'S. ocusing investigation on a _witness ~-it,-~~ttl"'fflll--et~'"""

f

CtS

Cl

f an~

A1witno@s accorded this immunity under
§ 6002, and subsequently prosecuted, is not dependent

for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and
good faith of the prosecuting authorities. As stated in
Murphy:
"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified , under a state grant of immunity, to matters
related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had
an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence." 378 U. S., at 79 n. 18.

I

This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate,
is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes

:!!h

See, e. g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382·
U.S. 70, 80 (1965).

✓

•.
~

"

22

has been

'"

can be no JUStlhcation ~ll1 reason or po1icy for arguing
that the Constitution requires an amnesty grant where,
acting pursuant to statut~ testimony is compelled in
exchange for immunity from use and derivative use when
no such amnesty is required where the government, acting without colorable right, coerces a defendant into incriminating himself, i,t , iolates his F'om bh Arnem:hli)0,R ~
I!~

We conclude that the ~ m u n i t y provided by
18 U. S. C. § 6002 leaves the ,...-itness and the prosecutorial
au tl; ;ities in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege
and suffices to supplant it. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accordingly is
Affirmed.

and lVlR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
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This case presents the question whether the United
States Government may compel testimony from an unwilling witness, who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring
on the witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the testimony.
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United
States grand jury in the Central District of California
on February 4, 1971. The Government believed that
petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment
privilege. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the Government applied to the District Court for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce
evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002-6003.
Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending primarily that the scope of the immunity provided by the
statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient
to supplant the privilege and compel their testimony.
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The District Court rejected this contention, and ordered
petitioners to appear before the grand jury and answer
its questions under the grant of immunity.
Petitioners appeared but refused to answer questions,
asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. They were brought before the District Court,
and each persisted in his refusal to answer the grand
jury's questions, notwithstanding the grant of immunity.
The court found both in contempt, and committed
them to the custody of the Attorney General until
either they answered the grand jury's questions or
the term of the grand jury expired. 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Stewart v.
United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA9 1971). This Court
granted certiorari to resolve the important question
whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of the compelled testimony and
evidence derived therefrom ( "use and derivative use"
immunity), or "·hether it is necessary to grant immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates ("transactional" immunity). 402 U. S.
971 (1971).
I
The power of government to compel persons to testify
in court or before grand juries and other governmental
agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence." The power with respect to courts was established by statute in England as early as 1562,3 and Lord
Bacon observed in 1612 that all subjects owed the King
The contempt order was issued pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1826.
For a concise histor~· of testimonial compulsion prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, see 8 J. Wigmore, EYidence § 2190
(McNaughton re,·. 1961). See Ullmann\'. Unit ed States , 350 U .S.
422 , 439 11. 15 (1956): Blair v. Unit ed States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919) .
3
Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz. I, c. 9, § 12 (1562) .
1

~
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their "knowledge and discovery." 4 While it is not clear
when grand juries first resorted to compulsory process to
secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the
general common law principle that "the public has a
right to every man's evidence" " 'as considered an "indubitable certainty" which "cannot be denied" by 1742."
The power to compel testimony. and the corresponding
duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The first Congress recognized the testimonial duty in the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which provided for compulsory attendance
of witnesses in the federal courts.6 MR. JusTICE WHITE
noted the importance of this essential power of government in his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 93-94 (1964):
"Among the necessary and most important of the
powers of the States as well as the Federal Government to assure the effective functioning of government in an ordered society is the broad power to
compel residents to testify in court or before grand
juries or agencies. See Blair v. United States, 250
U. S. 273. Such testimony constitutes one of the
Government's primary sources of information."
• Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials 769,
778 (1612).
5
See the parliamentary debate on the Bill to Indemnify E\·idence, particularly the remarks of the Duke of Argyle and Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke, reported in 12 T. Hansard, Parliamentary
History of England 675, 693 (1812). See also Piemonte v. United
States, 367 U. S. 556, 559 n. 2 (1961); Ullmann v. United States,
350 U. S. 422, 439 n. 15 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
600 (1896).
6
1 Stat. 73 , 88-89 (1789) .
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But the power to compel testimony is not absolute.
There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial
duty,7 the most important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental
values and aspirations,8 and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. 9 It can be
asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; 10 and it
protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or
could lead to other evidence that might be so used. 11
This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values
which underlie the privilege. 12
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep
in Anglo-American jurisprudence,13 are not incompatible
7
See Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); 8
J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2192, 2197 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
8
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
9
See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426 (1956) , E.
Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Toda~, 7 (1955).
10
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 94 (1964)
(WHITE, J., concurring); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34,
40 (1924); United Stat es v. Saline Bank, 26 U. S. (1 Peters) 100
(1828); cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S . 273 (1968).
11
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951); Blau v.
United States, 340 U. S. 159 (1950) ; Mason v. United States, 244
U.S . 362, 365 (1917).
12
See, e. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 443-444 (1966);
Boyd v. Unit ed States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
13
Soon after the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
became firmly established in law, it was recognized that the privilege
did not apply when immunity, or "indemnity," in the English usage,
had been granted. See L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment
328, 495 (1968). Parliament enacted an immunity statute in 1710
directed against illegal gambling, 9 Anne, c. 14, §§ 3-4 (1710),
which became the model for an identical immunity statute enacted
in 1774 by the Colonial Legislature of New York. Law of March 9,
1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621,623 (1894) . These
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with these values. Rather they seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and
the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens
statutes provided that the loser could sue the winner, who was
compelled to answer the loser's charges. After the winner responded and returned his ill-gotten gains, he was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and difcharged from any further or other
Punifhment, Forfeiture or Penalty, which he ... may have incurred
by the playing for, and winning fuch Money .... " 9 Anne, c. 14,
§ 4 (1710); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1651 , 5 Colonial Laws of New
York 621 , 623 (1894).
Another notable instance of the early use of immunity legislation
is the 1725 impeachment t rial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield. The·
Lord Chancellor was accused by the House of Commons of the
sale of public offices and appointments. In order to compel the
testimony of Masters in Chancery who had allegedly purchased their·
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could incriminate themselves by so testifying, Parliament enacted a statute granting immunity to persons then holding office as Masters in Chancery. Lord·
Chancellor Macclesfield's Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767, 1147
(1725). See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 492 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). See also Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 Howell's State·
Trials 323, 604-605 (1723). The legislatures in colonial Pennsylvania
and New York enacted immunity legislation in the 18th century. See,
e.g., Resolution of January 6, 1758, in Votes and Proceedings of the
House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania ( 16821776), 6 Pennsylvania Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban ed_
1935); Law of March 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of New
York 351, 353- 354 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621, 623 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774,.
c. 1655, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 641-642 (1894). See·
generally L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 359, 384-385,
389, 402-403 (1968). Federal immunity statutes have existed since
1857. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155. For a history of the·
various federal immunity statutes, see Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitu-tional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J. 1568 (1963); Wendel, Compulsory
Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New
Developments and New Confusion, 10 St. Louis U. L. Rev. 327
(1966); and National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Working Papers, 1406-1411 (1970).
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to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the
importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses
are of such a character that the only persons capable of
giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.
Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses,1'
and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses.15 Congress included immunity statutes in many
of the regulatory measures adopted in the first half of
this century. 16 Indeed, prior to the enactment of the
14 Sec, e.g., R esolution of .January 6, 1758, in Votes and Proceedings
of the House of R epresentatives of the Province of Pennsylvania
(1682-1776) , 6 Pennsylvania Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban
ed. 1935); Law of March 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of
New York 351 , 354 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1655,
5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 6-J.2 (1894) . B~hop Atterbury's
Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 323 (1723), for which the House of
Commons passed immunity legislation , was a prosecution for treasonable conspiracy. See 16 Howell's Stntc Trials, at 604-605 (1723) ;
8 J. Wigmore. fa·idcnce § 2281 , at 492. n. 2 (McNaughton rev . 1961);
Lard Chancellor Macclesfield's Ti·ial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767
(1725) , for which Parliament passed immunity legislation, was a
prosecution for political bribery invoh·ing the sa]e of public offi ces
and appointments. See 16 Howell's State Trials, at 1147 (1725) .
The first federal immunity statute was enacted to facilitate an
investigation of charges of corruption and Yote buying in the House
of Representatives. Sec Comment, The F ederal Witn ess Immunity
Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J. 1568. 1571 (1963).
15See 8 J. Wigmore, E,·idence § 2281, at 492 (McNaughton rev.
1961). MR. JUSTICE WHITE noted in his concurring opinion in
Murphy v. Wat erfront Comrn'n, 378 U. S. 52, 92 (1964) , that
immunity statutes "have for more than a century been resorted to
for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those ,,·hose proof and
punishment were otherwise impracticable, such as political bribery,
extortion, gambling. consumer frauds, liquor violations, commercial
l:ucen~•, and various form~ of racketeering ." 378 U. S., at 94-95.
See n. 14, supra.
16
See Comment, The F ederal Witn ess Immunity Acts in Theory
and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J.
1568, 1576 (1963) .
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statute under consideration in this case, there were in
force over 50 federal immunity statutes. 17 In addition,
every State in the Union , as well as the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one or more such statutes.1 8 The commentators,'n and this Court on several
occasions,2° have characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal
statutes. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, speaking
for the Court in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422
(1956). such statutes have "become part of our constitutional fabric." 2 1 350 U. S., at 438.

II
Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which
is that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." deprives Congress
of power to enact laws which compel self-incrimination,
even if complete immunity from prosecution is granted
prior to the compulsion of the incriminatory testimony.
In other words. petitioners assert that no immunity statute, however drawn, can afford a lawful basis for com17 For a listing of these ~tatutr8.

8cc National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers, 1444-1445
( 1970).
18For a listing of these stntutes, sec 8 J . Wigmorc, Evidence
§ 2281, at 495 n. 11 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
19
Srr. e. g., 8 J. Wigmorc, E,·idenre § 2281, at 501 (3d ed. 1940) ;
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 496 (McNaughton rev. 1961) .
0
~ Sec Hale v. Henk rl, 201 U. S. 43, 70 (1906); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
1
~ This statement w:i s m:iclr with specific reference to the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, the model for almost a!I
federal immunity statutes prior to the enactment of the statute under
consideration in this case. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 95 (1964) (WHITE, J., concurring).
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pelling incriminatory testimony. They ask us to reconsider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591
(1896), and Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422
(1956), decisions which uphold the constitutionality of
immunity statutes.21 We find no merit to this contention
and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullmann.

III
Petitioners' second contention is that the scope of immunity provided by the federal ·witness immunity statute, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, is not coextensive with the scope
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, and therefore is not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony over a claim of
the privilege. The statute provides that when a witness
is compelled by district court order to testify over a
claim of the privilege :
"the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order ( or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." 23 18 U. S. C. § 6002.
The constitutional inquiry, rooted in logic and history,
as well as in the decisions of this Court, is whether the
immunity granted under this statute is coextensive with
22
Accord, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 276 (1968);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924) (Brandeis, J.); H eike v. United
States, 227 U. S. 131, 142 (1913) (Holmes, J.) .
23
For other provisions of the 1970 Act relative to immunity
of witnesses, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005.
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the scope of the privilege. 2 • If so. petitioners' refusals
to answer based on the privilege were unjustified, and
the judgments of contempt ,vere proper, for the grant of
immunity has removed the dangers against which theprivilege protects. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591
( 1896). If, on the other hand, the immunity granted
is not as comprehensive as the protection afforded by
the privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing toanswer, and the judgments of contempt must be vacated~
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924).
Petitioners dravv a distinction between statutes which
provide transactional immunity and those which provide,
as does the statute before us, immunity from use and derivative use. 25 They contend that a statute must at a
minimum grant full transactional immunity in order to
be coextensive with the scope of the privilege. In support of this contention, they rely on Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), the first case in which
this Court considered a constitutional challenge to an
immunity statute. The statute, a re-enactment of theImmunity Act of 1868,V; provided that no "evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial
proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any
manner used against him ... in any court of the United
States. . . . " 27 Notwithstanding a grant of immunity
and order to testify under the revised 1868 Act, thewi tness, asserting his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, refused to testify before a federal grand
jury. He was consequently adjudged in contempt of
court. 28 On appeal, this Court construed the statute as
24

See, e. g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 54, 78
(1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547,585 (1892).
25
See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971).
20
15 Stat. 37 (1868).
27
See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 560 (1892).
28
In re Counselman, 44 Fed. 268 ( CCND Ill. 1890).
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affording a witness protection only against the use of the
specific testimony compelled from him under the grant of
immunity. This construction meant that the statute
"could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him." ~9 Since the revised 1868 Act, as construed by the Court, would permit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled
testimony, it did not protect the witness to the same
extent that a claim of the privilege would protect him.
Accordingly, under the principle that a grant of immunity cannot supplant the privilege, and is not sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege,
unless the scope of the grant of immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege,3° the witness'
refusal to testify was held proper. In the course of its
opinion, the Court made the following statement, on
which petitioners heavily rely:
"We are clearly of opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States.
[The immunity statute under consideration] does
not supply a complete protection from all the perils
against which the constitutional prohibition ,vas designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that
prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision,
a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offence to which the question relates. " 142 U. S.,
at 585-586.
9

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 564 (1892).
Precisely, the Court held "tha t lcgisla tion cannot abridge a
constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replace or supply [sic]
one, at least unless it. is so broad as to ham the same extent in
scope and effect." 142 U. S., at 585. See Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 54, 78 (1964).
~

30
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Sixteen days after the Counselman decision, a new immunity bill was introduced by Senator Cullom, 3 1 who
urged that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act
,vould be impossible in the absence of an effective immunity statute."" The bill, which became the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893,"" was drafted specifically
to meet the broad language in Counselman set forth
above."'' The new Act removed the privilege against
self-incrimination in hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission and provided that:
"no person shall be Pl})Secuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may
testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise .... " Act of Feb. 11 , 1893, 27 Stat. 444.
This transactional immunity statute became the basic
form for the numerous federal immunity statutes 35 until
1970. when, after re-examining applicable constitutional
principles and the adequacy of existing law, Congress
enacted the statute here under consideration. 36 The new
31

Counselman \Y3S decided J3n. 11, 1892. Senator Cullom introduced the new bill on J3n, 27, 1892. 23 Cong. Rec. 573 (1892).
32
23 Cong. Rec. 6333 ( 1892).
33
Art of February 11. 1893. 27 Sht. 443. repenled by the Organized
Crime Control Art of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452. § 245, 84 Stnt. 931.
31
See the remarks of Senator Cullom. 23 Cong. Rec . 573, 6333
(1892), and Congressman Wise. who introduced the bill in the Honse.
24 Cong. Rec. 503 (1893). See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1,
28-29 and 11. 36 (1948).
35
Ullmann'"· United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6 (1948). There was one minor except.ion. See Piccfrillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548, 571 and n. 11
(1971) (BRENNAN , J., dissenting): Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S.
71, 73 (1920).
36
The statute is a product of cnreful study and ronsiderntion
by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
as well as by Congress. The Commission recommended legislation
to reform the fedeml immunity laws. The recommendation served
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statute, which does not "afford [ the] absolute immunity
against future prosecution" referred to in Counselman,
was drafted to meet what Congress judged to be the conceptual basis of Counselman, as elaborated in subsequent
decisions of the Court, namely, that immunity from the
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive \vith the scope of the privilege. 37
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any
criminal case of "testimony or other information compelled under the order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)" is consonant with Fifth Amendment standards.
We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use
is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testias the model for this statute. In commenting on its proposal in a
special report to the President, the Commission said:
"We are satisfied that our substitution of immunity from use for
immunity from prosecution meets constitutional requir-ements for
overcoming the claim of privilege. Immunity from use is the only
consequence flowing from a violation of the individual's constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
his constitutional right to counsel, and his constitutional right not to
be coerced into confessing. The proposed immunity is thus of the
same scope as that frequently, even though unintentionally, conferred as the result of constitutional violations by law enforcement
officers." Second Interim Report of the National Commission onl
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, March 17, 1969, Working Papers
of the Commission, 1446 (1970).
The Commission's recommendation was based in large part on a
comprehensive study of immunity and the relevant decisions of this
Court prepared for the Commission by Prof. Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
of the George Washington University Law Center, and transmitted
to the President with the recommendations of the Commission.
See National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
Working Papers, 1405-1444 (1970).
37
See S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 51-56, 145 (1969);
H . R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 42 (1970).
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mony over a claim of the privilege. vVhile a grant of
immunity must afford protection commensurate with
that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader.
Transactional immunity, "vhich accords full immunity
from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled
testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broaderprotection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The privilege has never been construed to mean that
one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.
Its sole concern is to afford protection against being
"forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of
'penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.' " 38 Immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from
using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it
therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to theinfliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
Our holding is consistent with the conceptual basis
of Counselman. The Counselman statute, as construed
by the Court, was plainly deficient in its failure toprohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony. The Court
repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the·
statute:
"could not, and would not, prevent the use of his.
testimony to search out other testimony to be used
in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding .... " 142 U. S., at 564,
that it:
"could not prevent the obtaining and the use of
witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
38

Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438--439 (1956), quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886) . See Knapp v._
Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371, 380 (1958).
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directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when
otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could
not possibly have been convicted." 142 U. S., at
5'64,
and that it:
"affords no protection against that use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a
knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources
of information which may supply other means of
convicting the witness or party." 142 U. S., at 586.
The basis of the Court's decision was recognized in Ullmann Y. United States, 350 U. S. 422 0956), in which
the Court reiterated that the Counselman statute was
insufficient:
"because the immunity granted was incomplete, in
that it merely forbade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony."
350 U. S., at 437. (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 73 (1920).
The broad language in Counselnwn relied upon by petitioners was unnecessary to the Court's decision, and cannot be considered binding authority. 3 n
39 Cf. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term. i8 Han·. L. RcL 179, 230
(1964). Language similar to the Counselman dictum can be found in
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 594-595 (1896) , and Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906). Brown and Hale, however, inrn!Ycd statutes which were clearly sufficient to su pplant the privilege against
self-incrimination, as they provided full immunity from prosecution
"for and on account of any transaction, matter or thing, conccrning'r
which he may testify or produce evidence. . . . " 161 U.S., at 594;
201 U. S., at 66. The same is true of Smith v. United States, 337
U.S. 137, 141, 146 (1949) , and United States v. Mania, 317 U.S.
424, 425, 428 (1943). In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Con-

70-117-OPINION
KASTIGAR v. UNITED STATES

15

In Murphy Y. TVaterfront C01nm'n, 378 U . S. 52
(1964), the Court carefully considered immunity from
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom. The Murphy petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. After refusing to answer
certain questions on the ground that the answers might
tend to incriminate them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey
and Ke\\" York.•" They continued to refuse to testify,
however, on the ground that their answers might tend
to incriminate them under federal law, to which the
immunity did not purport to extend. They were adjudged in civil contempt, and that judgment was affirmed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 11
trol Board, 382 U. S. 70 (1965), some of the Counselman language
urged upon us by petitioners was again quoted. But Albertson,
like Counselman, im·olved an immunity statute which was held insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of e,·idence derived from
compelled admis~ions nnd the u~c of compelled ndmissions as nn
"investigntory lead." 382 U. S .. :-it 80.
In Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954) , nnd in Unitea
States v. Murdock. 284 U. S. 141. 149 (1931) , the Counselman
dictum was referred to as the principle of Counselman. The references were in the conte:--..i; of ancillary points not. essential to the
decisions of the Court. The Adams Court did note. however, that
the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibits the "uee" of compelled
self-incrimin:-itory testimon~-- 347 U. S., at 181. In any event, the
Court in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 , 436-437 (1956),
recognized that the rntionnle of Counselman wn s tlrnt the Counselman statute was insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of evidence
derived from compelled testimon?. Sec nlso Arndstein v. McCarthy,
254 U. S. 71, 73 (1920).
10
The Wnterfront Commi~sion of New York Harbor is a bistate
body established under an interstate compact npproved by Congress.
67 Stat. 541 (1953).
41
In re Application of Waterfront Comm'n of N. Y. Harbor,
39 N. J. 436, 189 A. 2d 36 (1963).
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The issue before the Court in Murphy was whether
New Jersey and New York could compel the witnesses,
whom these States had immunized from prosecution
under their laws, to give testimony which might then
be used to convict them of a federal crime. Since New
Jersey and New York had not purported to confer im-munity from federal prosecution, the Court was faced
with the question what limitations the Fifth Amendment privilege imposed on the prosecutorial powers of
the Federal Government. a nonimmunizing sovereign.
After undertaking an examination of the policies and
purposes of the privilege, the Court overturned the·
rule that one jurisdiction within our federal structure
may compel a ·witness to give testimony which could
be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction.12 The Court held that the privilege protects
state witnesses against incrimination under federal as
well as state law, and federal witnesses against incrimination under state as well as federal law. Applying
this principle to the state immunity legislation before
it, the Court held the constitutional rule to be that:
"a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot
be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement
this constitutional rule and accommodate the inter42
R econsideration of the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege
does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony which could be used to convict him in
another jurisdiction was made necessary by the decision in Ma11oy v.
Hogan, 378 U . S. 1 (1964), in which the Court held the Fifth
Amendment privilege applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 57
(1964).
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ests of the State and Federal Government in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use
of compelled testimony and its fruits." 43 378 U. S.,
at 79.
The Court emphasized that this rule left the state
witness and the Federal Government, against which
the witness had immunity only from the use of thecompelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom, "in
substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant
of immunity." 378 U. S., at 79.
It is true that in Murphy the Court was not presented
with the precise question presented by this case, whether·
a jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony may do so
by granting only use and derivative use immunity, for·
New Jersey and New York had granted petitioners transactional immunity. The Court heretofore has not
squarely confronted this question ,44 because post-Counselman immunity statutes reaching the Court either have·
followed the pattern of the 1893 Act in providing transactional immunity,4 5 or have been found deficient for·
43

At this point, the Court added the following note: "Once a
defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant
of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the
federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence
is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 378 U. S., at 79 n. 18.
If transactional immunity had been deemed to be the "constitutional
rule" there could be no federal prosecution.
44
See, e. g., California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 442 n. 3 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring), United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601, 606
n. 11 (1971); Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971); Stevens
v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 244---245 (1966).
45
E. g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964);
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956); Smith v. United ·
States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); United States v. Mania, 317 U.S. 424
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failure to prohibit the use of all evidence derived from
compelled testirnony.•G But both the reasoning of the
Court in Murphy and the result reached compel the
conclusion that use and derivative use immunity is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege. Since the privilege is fully applicable
and its scope is the same whether invoked in a state or
in a federal jurisdiction,4 1 the Murphy conclusion that a
prohibition on use and derivative use secures a witness'
Fifth Amendment privilege against infringement by the
Federal Government demonstrates that immunity from
use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of
the privilege. As the lvlurphy Court noted, immunity
from use and derivative use "leaves the witness and the
Federal Government in substantially the same position
as if the witness had claimed his privilege" 4 8 in the
absence of a grant of immunity. The ivlurphy Court
was concerned solely with the danger of incrimination
under federal law, and held that immunity from use and
derivative use was sufficient to displace the danger.
This protection coextensive with the privilege is the degree of protection which the Constitution requires, and
(1943); Hale v. H enkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); Jack v. Kansas, 199U.S. 372 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). See also•
n. 35, su.pra.
46 E. g., Albertson v. Subversive A ctivities Control Board, 38Z
U.S. 70, 80 (1965); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 , 73 (1920) .
17 In Ma1loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) , the Court held
that the same standards would determine the extent or scope of
t he privilege in state and in federal proceedings, because the same
substantive guarantee of the Bill of Rights is involved. The Murphy
Court emphasized t hat the scope of the privilege is the same in
state and in federal proceedings. Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n~
378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964) .
48
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964).
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is all that the Constitution requires even against jurisdiction compelling testimony by granting immunity. 4 9

IV
Although an analysis of prior decisions and the purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege indicate that
use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with
the priyilege, we must consider additional arguments advanced by petitioners against the sufficiency of such
immunity. We start from the premise, repeatedly affirmed by this Court, that an appropriately broad immunity grant is compatible with the Constitution.
Petitioners argue that use and derivative use immunity will not adequately protect a witness from various
possible incriminating uses of the compelled testimony:
for example, the prosecutor or other law enforcement officials may obtain leads, names of witnesses, or other information not otherwise available which might result in
a prosecution . It will be difficult and perhaps impossible,
the argument goes, to identify, by testimony or crossexamination, the subtle ways in which the compelled testimmi.y may disadvantage a witness, especially in the
jurisdiction granting the immunity.
This argument presupposes that the statute's prohibition will prove impossible to enforce. The statute
provides a sweeping proscription of any use, direct or
indirect. of the compelled testimony and any information derived therefrom:
"no testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly or
49
As the Court noted in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273,
276 (1968) , "[a]nswers may be compelled rega rdless of the privilege
if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled
testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution
against the person testifying."
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indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case . .. ." 18 U. S. C. § 6002.
This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive
safeguard, barring the use of compelled testimony as an
"investigatory lead," "0 and also barring the use of any
evidence obtained as a result of focusing investigation
on a witness as a result of compelled disclosures.
A person accorded this immunity under 18 U. S. C.
§ 6002, and subsequently prosecuted, is not dependent
for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and
good faith of the prosecuting authorities. As stated in
Murphy:
"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testi-fied, under a state grant of immunity, to matters
related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had
an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence." 378 U. S., at 79 n. 18.
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate,
is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes
on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.
This is very substantial protection,5 1 commensurate
with that resulting from invoking the privilege itself.
The privilege assures that a citizen is not compelled to
incriminate himself by his own testimony. It usually
operates to allow a citizen to remain silent when asked
5'D See, e. g., Albertson v. Subversiv e Activities Control Board, 382
U.S. 70, 80 (1965).
51
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 102-104
(1964) (WHITE, J., concurring).
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a question requiring an incriminatory ans,Yer. This statute, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, which operates after a witness
has given incriminatory testimony, affords the same
protection by assuring that the compelled testimony can
in no way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties.
The statute, like the Fifth Amendment, grants neither
pardon nor amnesty. Both the statute and the Fifth
Amendment allow the government to prosecute using·
evidence from legitimate independent sources.
The statutory proscription is analogous to the Fifth
Amendment requirement in cases of coerced confessions. 52
A coerced confession, as revealing of leads as testimony
given in exchange for immunity,53 is inadmissible in a
criminal trial, but it does not bar prosecution. 54 Moreover, a defendant against whom incriminating evidence
has been obtained through a grant of immunity may
be in a stronger position at trial than a defendant who
asserts a Fifth Amendment coerced confession claim.
One raising a claim under this statute need only show
that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to
shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that
all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from
legitimate independent sources. 55 On the other hand,.
a defendant raising a coerced confession claim under the
Fifth Amendment must first prevail in a voluntariness
52
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179, 181 (1954); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
53
As MR. JusTICE WHITE , concurring in Murphy, pointed out:
"A coerced confession is as revealing of leads as testimony given in
exchange for immunity and indeed is excluded in part because it is
compelled incrimination in violation of the privilege. Malloy v.
Hogan, [378 U. S. 1, 7-8]; Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315;
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532." 378 U. S., at 103.
54
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964).
55
See p. 20, supra; Brief for Respondent, at 37; Cf. Chapman
v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967) .
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hearing before his confession and evidence derived from
it become inadmissible.56
There can be no justification in reason or policy for
arguing that the Constitution requires an amnesty grant
where, acting pursuant to statute and accompanying safeguards, testimony is compelled in exchange for immunity
from use and derivative use when no such amnesty is
required where the government, acting without colorable
right, coerces a defendant into incriminating himself.
We conclude that the immunity provided by 18U. S. C. § 6002 leaves the witness and the prosecutorial
authorities in substantially the same position as if thewitness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilegeand suffices to supplant it. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accordingly is
Affirmed.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case ..

56

Jackson v. D enno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964).

'
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether the United
States Government may compel testimony from an unwilling witness, who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring
on the witness immunity from use of the compelled testi-mony in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the testimony.
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United
States grand jury in the Central District of California
on February 4, 1971. The Government believed that
petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment
privilege. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the Government applied to the District Court for an order di-recting petitioners to answer questions and produce
evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002-6003.
Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending primarily that the scope of the immunity provided by the
statute was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient
to supplant the privilege and compel their testimony.
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The District Court rejected this contention, and ordered
petitioners to appear before the grand jury and answer
its questions under the grant of immunity.
Petitioners appeared but refused to answer questions,
asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. They were brought before the District Court,
and each persisted in his refusal to answer the grand
jury's questions, notwithstanding the grant of immunity.
The court found both in contempt, and committed
them to the custody of the Attorney General until
either they answered the grand jury's questions or
the term of the grand jury expired. 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Stewart v.
United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA9 1971). This Court
granted certiorari to resolve the important question
whether testimony may be compelled by granting immunity from the use of the compelled testimony and
1
evidence derived therefrom ("use and derivative use'
immunity) , or whether it is necessary to grant immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testi~
mony relates ("transactional" immunity). 402 U. S.
971 (1971).

I
The power of government to compel persons to testify
in court or before grand juries and other governmental
agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence.2 The power with respect to courts was established by statute in England as early as 1562,3 and Lord
Bacon observed in 1612 that all subjects owed the King
The contempt order was issued pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1826.
For a concise history of testimonial compulsion prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, see 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2190
(McNaughton rev. 1961). See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 439 n. 15 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
3 Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz. I, c. 9, § 12 (1562).
1

2
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their "knowledge and discovery." 4 While it is not clear
when grand juries first resorted to compulsory process to
secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the
general common law principle that "the public has a
right to every man's evidence" was considered an "indubitable certainty" which "cannot be denied" by 1742.5
The power to compel testimony, and the corresponding
duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The first Congress recognized the testimonial duty in the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which provided for compulsory attendance
of witnesses in the federal courts. 6 MR . JusrrcE ·WHITE
noted the importance of this essential power of govern~
ment in his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Wat er front
Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 93-94 (1964):
"Among the necessary and most important of the
powers of the States as ,vell as the Federal Government to assure the effective functioning of govern-:
ment in an ordered society is the broad power to
compel residents to testify in court or before grand
juries or agencies. See Blair v. United States, 250
U. S. 273. Such testimony constitutes one of the
Government's primary sources of information."
Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials 769,
778 (1612).
5 See the parliamentary debate on the Bill to Indemnify Evidence, particularly the remarks of the Duke of Argyle and Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke, reported in 12 T. Hansard, Parliamentary
History of England 675, 693 (1812) . See also Piemonte v. United
States, 367 U. S. 556, 559 n. 2 (1961) ; Ullmann v. United States,
350 U. S. 422, 439 n. 15 (1956); Brown v. Walk er, 161 U. S. 591,
600 (1896) .
6 1 Stat. 73, 88-89 (1789).
4
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But the power to compel testimony is not absolute.
There are a number of exemptions from the testimonial
duty,7 the most important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental
values and aspirations,8 and marks an important advance in the development of our liberty. 9 It can be
asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; 10 and it
protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or
could lead to other evidence that might be so used.11
This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values
which underlie the privilege. 12
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep
in Anglo-American jurisprudence, 1 3 are not incompatible
7 See Blair v.
United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); 8
J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2192 , 2197 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
8 See Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
9 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426 (1956), E.
Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 7 (1955).
10 Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 94 (1964)
(WHITE, J., concurring); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34,
40 (1924); United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U. S. (1 Peters) 100
(1828); cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273 (1968).
11 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951); Blau v.
Unit ed States, 340 U. S. 159 (1950); Mason v. United States, 244
U.S. 362, 365 (1917).
12 See, e. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 443-444 (1966);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
1 3 Soon after the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
became firmly established in law, it was recognized that the privilege
did not apply when immunity, or "indemnity," in the English usage,
had been granted. See L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment
328, 495 (1968). Parliament enacted an immunity statute in 1710
directed against illegal gambling, 9 Anne, c. 14, §§ 3-4 (1710),
which became the model for an identical immunity statute enacted
in 1774 by the Colonial Legislature of New York. Law of March 9,
1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621,623 (1894). These
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with these values. Rather they seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and
the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens
statutes provided that the loser could sue the winner, who was
compelled to answer the loser's charges . After the winner responded and returned his ill-gotten gains, he was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and difcharged from any further or other
Punifhment, Forfeiture or Penalty, which he ... may have incurred
by the playing for, and winning fuch Money .... " 9 Anne, c. 14,
§ 4 (1710); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial La,rn of New
York 621, 623 (1894).
Another notable instance of the early use of immunity legislation
is the 1725 impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield. The
Lord Chancellor was accused by the House of Commons of the
sale of public offices and appointments. In order to compel the
testimony of Masters in Chancery who had allegedly purchased their
offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could incriminate themselves by so testifying, Parliament enacted a statute granting immunity to persons then holding office as Masters in Chancery. Lord
Chancellor Macclesfield's Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767, 1147
(1725). See 8 J. Wigmore, EYidence § 2281, at 492 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). See also Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 Howell's State
Trials 323, 604-605 (1723). The legislatures in colonial Pennsylvania
and New York enacted immunity legislation in the 18th century. See,
e. g., Resolution of January 6, 1758, in Votes and Proceedings of the
House of Representafo·es of the Province of Pennsylvania (16821776), 6 Pennsylvania Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban ed.
1935); Law of March 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of New
York 351, 353-354 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1651 , 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621, 623 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774,.
c. 1655, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 641-642 (1894). See
generally L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 359, 384-385,
389, 402-403 (1968). Federal immunity statutes have existed since
1857. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155. For a history of the
various federal immunity statutes, see Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J. 1568 (1963); Wendel, Compulsory
Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New
D evelopments and New Confusion, 10 St. Louis U. L. Rev. 327
(1966); and National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Working Papers, 1406-1411 (1970).
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to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the
importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses
are of such a character that the only persons capable of
giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.
Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, 14
and their primary use has been to investigate such offenses.15 Congress included immunity statutes in many
of the regulatory measures adopted in the first half of
this century.16 Indeed, prior to the enactment of the
14 See, e.g., Resolution of January 6, 1758, in Votes and Proceedings
of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania
(1682-1776), 6 Pennsylvania Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban
ed. 1935); Law of March 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of
New York 351, 354 (1894); Law of March 9, 1774, c. 1655,
5 Colonial Laws of New York 639, 642 (1894). Bishop Atterbury's
Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 323 (1723), for which the House of
Commons passed immunity legislation, was a prosecution for treasonable conspiracy. See 16 Howell's State Trials, at 604-605 (1723);
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 2281, at 492 n. 2 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Lard Chancellor M acclesfield's Trial, 16 Howell's State Trials 767
(1725), for which Parliament passed immunity legislation, was a
prosecution for political bribery involving the sale of public offices
and appointments. See 16 Howell's State Trials, at 1147 (1725).
The first federal immunity statute was enacted to facilitate an
investigation of charges of corruption and vote buying in the House
of Representatives. See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity
Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J. 1568, 1571 (1963).
15 See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 492 (McNaughton rev.
1961). MR. JUSTICE WHITE noted in his concurring opinion in
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 92 (1964) , that
immunity statutes "have for more than a century been resorted to
for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those whose proof and
punishment were otherwise impracticable, such as political bribery,
eid,ortion, gambling, consumer frauds, liquor violations, commercial
larceny, and various forms of racketeering." 378 U. S., at 94-95.
Seen. 14, supra.
16 See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory
and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J .
1568, 1576 (1963).
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statute under consideration in this case, there were in
force over 50 federal immunity statutes. 11 In addition 1
every State in the Union, as well as the District oi
Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one or more such stat.a
utes. 1 8 The commentators, 19 and this Court on several
occasions,20 have characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal
statutes. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, speaking
for the Court in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422
( 1956), such statutes have "become part of our constitutional fabric/' 21 350 U. S., at 438.

II
Petitioners contend first that the Fifth Amendmentfs
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which
is that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," deprives Congress
of power to enact laws which compel self-incrimination,
even if complete immunity from prosecution is granted
prior to the compulsion of the incriminatory testimony.
In other words, petitioners assert that no immunity statute, however drawn, can afford a lawful basis for com17

For a listing of these statutes, see National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers, 1444--1445
(1970).
18
For a listing of these statutes, see 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2281, at 495 n. 11 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
rn See, e. g., 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 501 (3d ed. 1940);
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2281, at 496 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
20
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 70 (1906); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
21
This statement was made with specific reference to the Compulsory T estimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, the model for almost all
federal immunity statutes prior to the enactment of the statute under
consideration in this case. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U. S. 52, 95 {1964) (WHITE, J., concurring).
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pelling incriminatory testimony. They ask us to re..:
consider and overrule Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591
(1896) , and Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422
( 1956), decisions which uphold the constitutionality of
immunity statutes. 22 We find no merit to this contention
and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullmann.

III
Petitioners' second contention is that the scope of immunity provided by the federal witness immunity statute, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, is not coextensive with the scope
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, and therefore is not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony over a claim of
the privilege. The statute provides that when a witness
is compelled by district court order to testify over a
claim of the privilege:
"the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order ( or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." 23 18 U. S. C. § 6002.
The constitutional inquiry, rooted in logic and history;
as well as in the decisions of this Court, is whether the
immunity granted under this statute is coextensive with
22
Accord, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 276 (1968);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924) (Brandeis, J.); H eike v. United
States, 227 U. S. 131, 142 (1913) (Holmes, J.).
23
For other provisions of the 1970 Act relative to immunity
of witnesses, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005.
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the scope of the privilege. 24 If so, petitioners 1 refusals
to answer based on the privilege were unjustified, and
the judgments of contempt were proper, for the grant of
immunity has removed the dangers against which the
privilege protects. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591
(1896). If, on the other hand, the immunity granted
is not as comprehensive as the protection afforded by
the privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing to
answer, and the judgments of contempt must be vacated.
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924).
Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes which
provide transactional immunity and those which provide,
as does the statute before us, immunity from use and derivative use. 2 5 They contend that a statute must at a
minimum grant full transactional immunity in order to
be coextensive with the scope of the privilege. In support of this contention, they rely on Counselman v,
Hit chcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), the first case in which
this Court considered a constitutional challenge to an
immunity statute. The statute, a re-enactment of the
Immunity Act of 1868,"r; provided that no "evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial
proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any
manner used against him ... in any court of the United
States. . . . " 21 Notwithstanding a grant of immunity
and order to testify under the revised 1868 Act, the
witness, asserting his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, refused to testify before a federal grand
jury. He was consequently adjudged in contempt of
28
On appeal, this Court construed the statute as
court.
24

See, e. g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 54, 78
(1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,585 (1892).
25
See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548 (1971).
26
15 Stat. 37 (1868).
27
See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 560 (1892).
28
In re Counselman, 44 Fed. 268 (CCND Ill. 1890).
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affording a witness protection only against the use of the
specific testimony compelled from him under the grant of
immunity. This construction meant that the statute
"could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him." 29 Since the revised 1868 Act, as construed by the Court, would permit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled
testimony, it did not protect the witness to the same
extent that a claim of the privilege would protect him.
Accordingly, under the principle that a grant of immunity cannot supplant the privilege, and is not sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege,
unless the scope of the grant of immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege,3° the witness''
refusal to testify was held proper. In the course of its
opinion, the Court made the following statement, on
which petitioners heavily rely:
"We are clearly of opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States.
[The immunity statute under consideration] does
not supply a complete protection from all the perils
against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that
prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision,
a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offence to which the question relates." 142 U. S.,
at 585-586.
Coumelman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 564 (1892).
Precisely, the Court held "that legislation cannot abridge a
constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replace or supply [sic]
one, at least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in
scope and effect." 142 U. S., at 585. See Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 54, 78 (1964).
29

30

70-117-OPINION
KASTIGAR v. UNITED STATES

11

Sixteen days after the Counselman decision, a new immunity bill was introduced by Senator Cullom, 31 who
urged that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act
would be impossible in the absence of an effective immunity statute. 32 The bill, which became the Compulsory T estimony Act of 1893, 33 was drafted specifically
to meet the broad language in Counselman set forth
above. 34 The new Act removed the privilege against
self-incrimination in hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission and provided that:
"no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may
testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise .... " Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 444.
This transactional immunity statute became the basic·
form for the numerous federal immunity statutes 35 until
1970, when, after re-examining applicable constitutional
principles and the adequacy of existing law, Congress
enacted the statute here under consideration. 36 The new
31 Counselman was decided J an. 11, 1892 . Senator Cullom introduced the new bill on Jan. 27, 1892. 23 Cong. R ec. 573 (1892).
32 23 Cong. Rec. 6333 (1892).
33 Act of February 11 , 1893, 27 Stat. 443, repealed by the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 245, 84 Stat. 931.
34 See the remarks of Senator Cullom, 23 Cong. R ec. 573, 6333
(1892) , and Congressman Wise, who introduced t he bill in t he House.
24 Cong. Rec. 503 (1893). See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1,
28-29 and n. 36 (1948).
35 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 438 (1956); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U. S. 1, 6 (1948). There was one minor exception. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548, 571 and n. 11
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Arndstein v. M cCarthy, 254 U.S.
71, 73 (1920).
36
The statute is a product of careful study and consideration
by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
as well as by Congress. The Commission recommended legislation
to reform the federal immunity laws. The recommendation served
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statute, which does not "afford [the] absolute immunityagainst future prosecution" referred to in Counselman;
was drafted to meet what Congress judged to be the conceptual basis of Counselman, as elaborated in subsequent
decisions of the Court, namely, that immunity from the
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived there37
from is coextensive with the scope of the privilege.
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any
criminal case of "testimony or other information compelled under the order ( or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)" is consonant with Fifth Amendment standards.
We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use
is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testias the model for this statute. In commenting on its proposal in a
special report to the Pre::;ident , the Commission said:
"We are satisfied that our substitution of immunity from use for
immunity from prosecution meets constitutional requir-ements for
overcoming the claim of privilege. Immunity from use is the only
consequence flowing from a violation of the individual's constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
his constitutional right to counsel, and his constitutional right not to
be coerced into confessing. The proposed immunity is thus of the
same scope as that frequently, even though unintentionally, conferred as the result of constitutional violations by law enforcement
officers." Second Interim Report of the National Commission on
Reform of F ederal Criminal Laws, March 17, 1969, Working Papers
of the Commission, 1446 (1970).
The Commission's recommendation was based in large part on a
comprehensive study of immunity and the relevant decisions of this
Court prepared for the Commission by Prof. Robert G. Dixon , Jr.,
of the George Washington University Law Center, and transmitted
to the President with the recommendations of the Commission.
See National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
Working Papers, 1405-1444 (1970).
37 See S. Rep. Ko. 91-617, 91st Cong .. 1st Sess., 51-56, 145 (1969);
H. R. R-ep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 42 (1970).
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mony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of
immunity must afford protection commensurate with
that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader.
Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity
from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled
testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader
protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The privilege has never been construed to mean that
one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.
Its sole concern is to afford protection against being
"forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of
'penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.' " 38 Immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from
using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it
therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
Our holding is consistent with the conceptual basis
of Counselman. The Counselman statute, as construed
by the Court, was plainly deficient in its failure to
prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony. The Court
repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the
statute:
"could not, and TI·ould not, prevent the use of his
testimony to search out other testimony to be used
in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding .... " 142 U. S., at 564,
that it:
"could not prevent the obtaining and the use of
witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
38

Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-439 (1956) , quoting
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886). See Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371, 380 ( 1958).
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directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when
otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could
not possibly have been convicted." 142 U. S., at
564,
and that it:
"affords no protection against that use of compelled
testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a.
knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources
of information which may supply other means of
convicting the witness or party." 142 U. S., at 586.
The basis of the Court's decision was recognized in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956), in which
the Court reiterated that the Counselman statute was
insufficient:
"because the immunity granted was incomplete, in
that it merely forbade the use of the testimony
given and failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony."
350 U. S., at 437. (Emphasis supplied.)

See also Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 73 (1920).
The broad language in Counselman relied upon by petitioners was unnecessary to the Court's decision, and cannot be considered binding authority. 39
39 Cf. The Supreme Court, 1963 T erm, 78 Harv. L. R ev. 179, 230
(1964). Language similar to the Counselman dictum can be found in
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 , 594-595 (1896), and Hale v. H enkel,
201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906). Brown and Hale, however, involved statutes which were clearly sufficient to supplant the privilege against
self-incrimination, as they provided full immunity from prosecution
"for and on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning,
which he may testify or produce evidence. . . . " 161 U. S., at 594;
201 U. S., at 66. The same is true of Smith v. United States, 337
U.S. 137, 141, 146 (1949), and United States v. Mania, 317 U.S.
424, 425, 428 (1943). In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Con-
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In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52'
( 1964), the Court carefully considered immunity from
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom. The Murphy petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. After refusing to answer
eertain questions on the ground that the answers might
tend to incriminate them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey
and New York. 40 They continued to refuse to testify,.
however, on the ground that their answers might tend
to incriminate them under federal law, to which the
immunity did not purport to extend. They were adjudged in civil contempt, and that judgment was affirmed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 41
trol Board, 382 U. S. 70 (1965), some of the Counselman language
urged upon us by petitioners was again quoted. But Albertson,
like Couns elman, involved an immunity statute which was held insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of evidence derived from
compelled admissions and the use of compelled admissions as an
"investigatory lead." 382 U. S., at 80.
In Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954), and in United
States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 149 (1931), the Counselman
dictum was referred to as the principle of Coun:,elman. The references were in the context of ancillary points not essential to the
decisions of the Court. The Adams Court did note, however, that
the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibits the "use" of compelled
self-incriminatory testimony. 347 U. S., at 181. In any event, the
Court in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 436-437 (1956),
recognized that the rationale of Counselman was that the Counselman statute was insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of evidence
derived from compelled testimony. See also Arndstein v. M cCarthy,
254 U. S. 71 , 73 (1920).
40 The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor is a bistate
body established under an interstate compact approved by Congress.
67 Stat. 541 ( 1953).
41 In re Application of Waterfront Comm'n of N. Y. Harbor,
39 N. J. 436, 189 A. 2d 36 (1963).
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The issue before the Court in Murphy was whether'
New Jersey and New York could compel the witnesses,
whom these States had immunized from prosecution
under their laws, to give testimony which might then
be used to convict them of a federal crime. Since New
Jersey and New York had not purported to confer immunity from federal prosecution, the Court was faced
with the question what limitations the Fifth Amendment privilege imposed on the prosecutorial powers of
the Federal Government, a nonimmunizing sovereign.
After undertaking an examination of the policies and
purposes of the privilege, the Court overturned the
rule that one jurisdiction within our federal structure
may compel a witness to give testimony which could
be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction.42 The Court held that the privilege protects
state witnesses against incrimination under federal as
well as state law, and federal witnesses against incrimination under state as well as federal law. Applying
this principle to the state immunity legislation before
it, the Court held the constitutional rule to be that :
"a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot
be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement
this constitutional rule and accommodate the inter42 Reconsideration of the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege
does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony which could be used to convict him in
another jurisdiction was made necessa ry by the decision in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), in which the Court held the Fifth
Amendment privilege applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 57
(1964).
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ests of the State and Federal Government in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Govern.,
ment must be prohibited from making any such use
of compelled testimony and its fruits." 43 378 U. S.,
at 79.
The Court emphasized that this rule left the state
witness and the Federal Government, against which
the witness had immunity only from the use of the
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom, "in
substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant
of immunity." 378 U. S., at 79.
It is true that in Murphy the Court was not presented
with the precise question presented by this case, whether
a jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony may do so
by granting only use and derivative use immunity, for
New Jersey and New York had granted petitioners transactional immunity. The Court heretofore has not
squarely confronted this question, 44 because post-Counselman immunity statutes reaching the Court either have
followed the pattern of the 1893 Act in providing transactional immunity,4" or have been found deficient for
43

At this point the Court added the following note: "Once a
defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant
of i=unity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the
federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence
is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 378 U. S., at 79 n. 18.
If transactional immunity had been deemed to be the "constitutional
rule" there could be no federal prosecution.
44
See, e. g., Cai,ifornia v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 442 n. 3 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) , United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601,. 606
n. 11 (1971); Piccirillo v. New York , 400 U.S. 548 (1971); Stevens
v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 244-245 (1966) .
45
E. g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964);
Ullmann v . United States, 350 U. S. 422 (1956); Smith v . United
States, 337 U. S. 137 (1949); United States v. Mania, 317 U.S. 424
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failure to prohibit the use of all evidence derived frorri
compelled testimony. 46 But both the reasoning of the
Court in Murphy and the result reached compel the
conclusion that use and derivative use immunity is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege. Since the privilege is fully applicable
and its scope is the same whether invoked in a state or
in a federal jurisdiction,4 1 the Murphy conclusion that a
prohibition on use and derivative use secures a witness'
Fifth Amendment privilege against infringement by the
Federal Government demonstrates that immunity from
use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of
the privilege. As the Murphy Court noted, immunity
from use and derivative use "leaves the witness and the
Federal Government in substantially the same position
as if the witness had claimed his privilege" 48 in the
absence of a grant of immunity. The Murphy Court
was concerned solely with the danger of incrimination
under federal law, and held that immunity from use and
derivative use was sufficient to displace the danger.
This protection coextensive with the privilege is the degree of protection which the Constitution requires, and
(1943); Hale v. H enkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); Jack v. Kansas, 199
U.S. 372 (1985); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S . 591 (1896). See also
n. 35, supra.
46 E. g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382
U. S. 70, 80 (1965); A rne/stein v. McCarthy, 254 U .S. 71 , 73 (1920).
47 In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964), the Court held
that the same standa rds would determine the extent or scope of
the privilege in state and in federal proceedings, because the same
substantive guarantee of the Bill of Right8 is involved. The Murphy
Court emphasized that the scope of the privilege is the same in
state and in federa l proceedings. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964).
48 Murphy v. Wat erfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 79 (1964).

70---117-0PINION

KASTIGAR v. UNITED STATES

19

is all that the Constitution requires even against the
19
jurisdiction compelling testimony by granting immunity.

IV
Although an analysis of prior decisions and the purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege indicates that
use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with
the privilege, we must consider additional arguments advanced by petitioners against the sufficiency of such
immunity. We start from the premise, repeatedly affirmed by this Court, that an appropriately broad immunity grant is compatible with the Constitution.
Petitioners argue that use and derivative use immunity will not adequately protect a witness from various
possible incriminating uses of the compelled testimony:
for example, the prosecutor or other law enforcement officials may obtain leads, names of witnesses, or other information not otherwise available ,vhich might result in
a prosecution. It will be difficult and perhaps impossible,
the argument goes, to identify, by testimony or crossexamination, the subtle ways in which the compelled testimony may disadvantage a witness, especially in the
jurisdiction granting the immunity.
This argument presupposes that the statute's prohibition will prove impossible to enforce. The statute
provides a sweeping proscription of any use, direct or
indirect, of the compelled testimony and any information derived therefrom:
"no testimony or other information compelled
under the order ( or any information directly or
49 As the Court noted in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273,
276 (1968) , "[a]nswers may be compelled regardless of the pri\·ilege
if there is immunity from federal nncl state use of the compelled
testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution
against the person testifying."

70-117-0PINION

20

KASTIGAR v. UNITED STATES

indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case .... " 18 U. S. C. § 6002.
This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive
safeguard, barring the use of compelled testimony as an
"investigatory lead," 00 and also barring the use of any
evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness
as a result of his compelled disclosures.
A person accorded this immunity under 18 U. S. C.
§ 6002, and subsequently prosecuted, is not dependent
for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and
good faith of the prosecuting authorities. As stated in
Murphy:
"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters
related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had
an independent, legitimate source for the disputed
evidence." 378 U . S., at 79 n. 18.
This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate,
is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes
on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.
This is very substantial protection, 51 commensurate
with that resulting from invoking the privilege itself.
The privilege assures that a citizen is not compelled to
incriminate himself by his own testimony. It usually
operates to allow a citizen to remain silent when asked
50

See, e. g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382
U.S. 70, 80 (1965) .
51
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm;n1 378 U. S. 52, 102-104
(1964) (WHITE, J., concurring).
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a question requiring an incriminatory answer. This statute, which operates after a witness has given incriminatory testimony, affords the same protection by assuring
that the compelled testimony can in no way lead to
the infliction of criminal penalties. The statute, like
the Fifth Amendment, grants neither pardon nor amnesty.
Both the statute and the Fifth Amendment allow the
government to prosecute using evidence from legitimate
independent sources.
The statutory proscription is analogous to the Fifth
Amendment requirement. in cases of coerced confessions. 52
A coerced confession, as revealing of leads as testimony
given in exchange for immunity, 53 is inadmissible in a
criminal trial, but it does not bar prosecution. 54 Moreover, a defendant against whom incriminating evidence
has been obtained through a grant of immunity may
be in a stronger position at trial than a defendant who
asserts a Fifth Amendment coerced confession claim.
One raising a claim under this statute need only show
that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to
shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that
all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from
legitimate independent sources. 55 On the other hand,
a defendant raising a coerced confession claim under the
Fifth Amendment must first prevail in a voluntariness
52

Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S . 532, 542 (1897) .
53
As MR. JusTrcE WHITE, concurring in Mu rphy, pointed out:
"A coerced confession is as revealing of leads as testimony given in
exchange for immunity and indeed is excluded in part because it is
compelled in crimination in violation of the priYilege. Malloy v.
Hogan, [378 U. S. 1, 7-8]; Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315;
Bram v. Unit ed States, 168 U. S. 532." 378 U. S., at 103.
54
J ackson v. D enno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964).
55
See p. 20, supra; Brief for Respondent, at 37; Cf. Chapman
v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967).
·
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hearing before his confession and evidence derived from-,
it become inadmissible. 56
There can be no justification in reason or policy for .
holding that the Constitution requires an amnesty grant
where, acting pursuant to statute and accompanying safeguards, testimony is compelled in exchange for immunity
from use and derivative use when no such amnesty is
required where the government, acting without colorable
right, coerces a defendant into incriminating himself.
·
· We conclude that the immunity provided by 18
U. S. C. § 6004. leaves the witness and the prosecutorial
authorities in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege
and suffices to supplant it. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accordingly is
Affirmed ..
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST
t,ook no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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Jackson v. D enno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964) .

